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Intellectuals today frequently incorporate biology into their analyses of human 
affairs. The fact that they do so is rarely acknowledged, much less questioned. However, 
when one learns the history of the relationship between biology and the social sciences, 
today‘s casual use of, and often dependence on, biological factors becomes a mystery. In 
the early 1900s thinkers of all stripes looked to biology—specifically the evolution of 
human beings—for guidance. Then, after the horrors of the holocaust became clear, 
Western society rejected the notion of innate biological differences between people and 
championed instead the paradigm of behaviorism, or the notion that all human beings are 
―blank slates‖ upon which culture scripts its values and ideas. How, then, did it come to 
pass that biological thinking returned to analyses of humans? In this paper I argue that 
two evolutionary biologists, William Hamilton and Robert Trivers, relied upon the 
insights of population genetics to demonstrate the evolutionary logic of cooperation and 
sacrifice, and that in doing so they gave the emotional and political ―green light‖ to 
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In February of 1978 a number of prominent scientists gathered in Washington, 
D.C for a two-day symposium organized by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS). Events like these are commonplace in academia and 
are typically collegial affairs characterized by mutual respect for the development of new 
ideas. But this time was different. This time a group of activists rushed toward E. O. 
Wilson, an elderly and mild-mannered myrmecologist (he studies ants), poured ice water 
over his head, and chanted ―Racist Wilson, you can‘t hide, we charge you with 
genocide!‖1 
How did this happen? How did an academic conference become the scene of such 
high drama? The answer lies in the subject of the conference: sociobiology. Building on 
recent insights in evolutionary biology, Wilson had introduced sociobiology in 1975 as a 
new discipline capable of interpreting the evolutionary utility of animal behavior. 
Initially, both the academic community and the general public welcomed the new 
approach, as Darwin himself had speculated on the evolution of behavior in The Origin of 
Species.
2
 A small group of scientists, however, unleashed a storm of protest. These 
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critics, many of whom were Marxists and feminists, believed that cultural factors made 
human behavior far too complex for biological analysis and they feared that sociobiology 
would reproduce the harmful narratives of biological determinism that had plagued the 
first half of the twentieth-century. Would their efforts be enough? As the water hung in 
the air at the AAAS conference no one knew whether the protest would come to be seen 
as a dramatic but necessary rejection of a crude, pseudo-scientific justification for 
inequality or as a politically motivated censorship of legitimate intellectual inquiry. The 
role of biology in analyses of human affairs depended on the answer to that question. 
Eventually, evolutionary thinking did in fact return to the social sciences and 
humanities—although how and why this occurred has yet to be explained. This project 
seeks to provide that explanation.  
 
Historical Context of the Debate Over Applied Darwinian Science 
In the late 1800s biologists began to accept the evolution of human beings as 
orthodox science. As a result, intellectuals of all stripes claimed Darwin as one of their 
own—radicals, racists, feminists, and conservatives all argued that evolution justified 
their own political or social agenda. A pivotal debate in the contest centered on whether 
inheritance was ―soft,‖ meaning parents passed on the physical and mental characteristics 
they acquired during their life, or whether it was ―hard,‖ meaning an organism‘s 
inheritance was fixed at birth.
3
 In other words, would a blacksmith‘s son be blessed with 




 The classic example in ―soft‖ inheritance arguments, made by French biologist 
  
3 
his father‘s strong arms? The Left favored soft inheritance because it seemed to support 
social and political mobility, but they were dealt a critical blow in 1891 when August 
Weisman demonstrated unequivocally that offspring do not inherit acquired 
characteristics. As a result, Social Darwinism, or the belief that individuals and races 
progressed through a ―survival of the fittest,‖ came to be seen as the logical expression of 
evolution in society. From this perspective, the poor were weak and welfare was 
detrimental to the long-term health of humanity. Narratives of white superiority and 
women‘s ―natural‖ domesticity proliferated, assuring proponents of the status quo that 
inequality was not oppression but the natural order. 
Fortunately, the triumph of Social Darwinism did not last long. Scientists‘ 
disagreements about important aspects of evolution, most notably the role of natural 
selection, caused an ―eclipse of Darwinism,‖ which in turn called into question the 
wisdom of basing public policy on the theory of evolution.
4
 At the same time, 
philosophers Henry Sidgwick and G. E. Moore pointed out that deriving social values 
from natural phenomena was a fallacy.
5
 Then anthropologists and sociologists (who had 
only recently established their academic disciplines) asserted their prerogative to analyze 
human affairs using methods and theories independent of the natural sciences. Finally, 
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and perhaps most significantly, the horrors of the Holocaust convinced the majority of the 
Western world that evolutionary ―fitness‖ had no place in discussions about men, women, 
and children. By 1950 it was taboo for academics to conduct biological analyses of 
human affairs. Post-WWII intellectuals did not see the taboo as censorship; rather, it was 
a defense of democratic values. With firm moral resolve, a generation still reeling from 
the specter of fascism established what they believed to be ground rules for the fair and 
open exchange of ideas. Yes, they insisted on strictly cultural analyses, but that was only 
because biological perspectives dictated whom society should value and they were 
committed to valuing everyone. Over the next twenty years, black Americans, women, 
and other marginalized people relied upon this premise of intrinsic equality to fight for 
social and political justice. The struggle was difficult and required tremendous sacrifice, 
but the country was making real democratic progress—and then sociobiology, in the eyes 
of its critics, threatened to reverse all that had been accomplished 
The critics were determined to prevent the return of biological perspectives on 
human beings because they believed social justice depended on the assumption that all 
people were fundamentally the same. They denounced sociobiology because they 
believed it to be a flawed, reductionist science and another iteration of the cruel 
biological determinism that led to the ghastly murder of millions of people. This is not 
hard to understand. At the AAAS conference, those with the signs and the bucket make 
sense: they were defending liberal values. But hapless Wilson, standing on stage and 
soaking wet, is harder to understand. Intellectuals throughout the United States and 
Europe had established that cultural analysis was the best way to interpret human 
behavior for both intellectual and political reasons, and by all accounts Wilson was a kind 
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and thoughtful man. He had no business arguing that ―most aspects of human social 
behavior and organization can only be understood in the light of their evolutionary 
history and evolutionary utility.‖6 Yet there he was.  
 
Hypothesis for the Return of Evolutionary Thinking in Human Affairs 
My goal in this project is to make sense of the rise of sociobiology both as a 
development in evolutionary theory and as a harbinger of biological thinking in the social 
sciences. My argument is that the ―modern synthesis,‖ which unified previously 
antagonistic geneticists, naturalists, and paleontologists under one banner, inspired 
British zoologist V. C. Wynne-Edwards to propose a new theory for altruism: group 
selection. Because altruism had been a critical obstacle to the full acceptance of natural 
selection from the beginning (Darwin himself called it a ―special difficulty‖), Wynne-
Edwards‘ work was of potentially great value. By analyzing bird clutch size through the 
lenses of population genetics and natural selection, which were two pillars of the 
synthesis, he was able to conclude that animals limited their reproduction to protect the 
species from overpopulation.  
Wynne-Edwards‘ argument earned him tremendous acclaim, but not everyone 
was convinced. Other scientists, also inspired by the modern synthesis, interpreted 
personal sacrifice differently. In particular, W. D. Hamilton, then only a graduate student, 
believed animals sacrificed themselves to benefit their kin and thus improve their own 
genetic reproduction. His paper, ―The Genetical Selection of Social Behaviour,‖ was 
incredibly technical, as it relied upon complex population genetics concepts such as 
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Sewall Wright‘s coefficient of relatedness, so initially it did not have much influence 
outside scientific circles.
7
 It did, however, influence the American evolutionary biologist 
Robert Trivers, who built on Hamilton‘s insights to provide an evolutionary explanation 
for cooperation among non-kin in a process he called ―reciprocal altruism.‖8 Within a few 
years, E. O. Wilson became convinced that Hamilton and Trivers had established the 
foundation for a biological understanding of human behavior, and he popularized their 
work in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.
9
  
The first social scientists to embrace sociobiology were young anthropologists 
whose careers did not rest on the discipline‘s prevailing theories and values. In their 
pioneering research, Napoleon Chagnon, Sarah Hrdy, and Martin Daly reintroduced 
evolutionary thinking to anthropology—and a close reading of their work reveals that  
Hamilton and Trivers had given them the tools to do so. In fact, these anthropologists, 
who are now in their late sixties and seventies, each describes the moment they realized 
the potential of analyzing human behavior through a sociobiological lens as an 
―epiphany.‖ Inspired by their colleagues in anthropology, other social scientists followed 
suit and became sociobiologists themselves. Pierre van den Berghe in sociology, David 
Barash in psychology, Robert Axelrod in political science, and Michael Ruse in 
philosophy all challenged the taboo against evolutionary thinking in their respective 
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disciplines. Personal correspondence with these authors reveals that they, too, relied 
heavily on Hamilton and Trivers. The rise of sociobiology had begun. 
Sociobiologists embraced the potential of kin selection and reciprocal altruism 
with nearly religious fervor. In their eyes, post-World War II intellectuals (who had been 
their mentors for the most part) willingly wore the blinders of cultural analysis for 
political rather than intellectual reasons; they had gotten swept up in the current of 
identity politics and allowed the values of the New Left to trump traditional liberalism 
and, more importantly, good science. From the sociobiologists‘ perspective, the Left was 
challenging the objectivity, and thus validity, of the entire scientific method by claiming 
that science was just another perspective of privilege shaped by race, class, and gender. 
This was too much for intellectuals who revered science as the closest thing we have to 
―truth‖ in the modern world.  
When reading the early sociobiological texts one feels the enthusiasm with which 
they grasped the opportunity to cast aside the darkness of ―politically correct‖ scientific 
censorship to let in the light of genuine intellectual exploration. They wanted to make a 
lasting intellectual contribution, to change the way people saw the world, and this gave 
them the courage to begin a discussion that others felt they weren‘t allowed to have. 
Unfortunately, if perhaps inevitably, these young, largely inexperienced academics 
reached too far in their work, claiming genetic explanations for specific behaviors that 
could not withstand scientific scrutiny. Their critics, who abhorred both the science and 
politics of sociobiology, rightly pointed out that the sociobiological narratives, while 
plausible, were not proven in any real scientific sense, and they derided them as ―just-so 
stories‖ similar to children‘s tales about how leopards got their spots.  
  
8 
At this point sociobiology teetered on the precipice of failure. Despite Wilson‘s 
ambitious call to ―biologize‖ the social sciences, it was clear the new discipline could not 
account for the immense complexity of human behavior. Even with the insights of kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism, sociobiology suffered from the same biological 
determinism, ad hoc fallacies, and unfalsifiability that had plagued past evolutionary 
analyses of human affairs. Yet there was something different, if not about sociobiology 
itself, then about the circumstances surrounding it. When Wilson published Sociobiology 
a small number of the world‘s leading scientists, many of whom came of age during the 
social activism of the 1960s, felt compelled to critically engage the new discipline 
because they feared its narratives would convince the general public and their political 
representatives that social inequality was ―natural.‖ Ironically, it was their criticism of 
sociobiology that made all the difference. 
The critics of sociobiology, many of whom were leaders in their respective fields, 
supported the taboo mid-century intellectuals established because they believed it was the 
last line of the defense for progressive values. Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, and 
Jon Beckwith served as the vanguard of a committed cadre of academics and other 
professionals who took time away from their primary responsibilities to combat the threat 
of sociobiology because they were convinced that racial and gender equality were at 
stake. They formed the Sociobiology Study Group to learn as much as they could about 
the opposition. They published widely, at first in a jointly written article to the New York 
Times titled plainly ―Against Sociobiology,‖ and later in a radical magazine, Science for 
the People, that kept readers informed on the current status of the fight. Eventually, a 
number of them wrote books entirely devoted to discrediting sociobiology. The net effect 
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of this Herculean effort, however, was not to repudiate biological analyses of human 
affairs. By going through the sociobiological tracts so closely with their red pens, the 
critics in effect provided the feedback necessary for sociobiologists to improve their 
arguments. In a near textbook case of the Hegelian dialectic, these men and women 
supplied the antithesis to sociobiology‘s thesis of genetically programmed behavior, 
which resulted in a remarkably productive research program centered on discerning the 
implications of evolved psychological predispositions. Thus the critics became the 
unwitting allies to the return of biological thinking in the social sciences, albeit in a more 
circumscribed and nuanced manner than the early sociobiologists originally claimed.   
 
Existing Historical Literature and the Need for a New Explanation 
The return of evolutionary thinking to American intellectual discourse is a largely 
unexplored historical phenomenon, which is both a challenge and an incredible 
opportunity. As of this writing only two histories explicitly cover the subject—and both 
of them have significant shortcomings. Hamilton Cravens, a historian of science at Iowa 
State University, wrote The Triumph of Evolution in 1978 during the heart of the 
sociobiology debate.
10
 Cravens argued that the professionalization of anthropology and 
sociology in the early twentieth-century resulted in the fall of applied evolutionary 
thinking for both political and professional reasons. According to Cravens, the founders 
of these disciplines, Franz Boaz and Lester Ward, opposed Social Darwinism‘s 
justification of laissez–faire government so they discredited evolutionary perspectives on 
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human beings. Their disciples, the newly minted anthropologists and sociologists, 
supported cultural analysis, in Craven‘s view, out of shared political values and 
professional insecurity. (For the two fledgling disciplines to gain credibility it was 
necessary to assert their prerogative over human affairs without deference to biology.) 
Cravens further argued that the stark dichotomy between biology and culture, commonly 
referred to as ―nature‖ and ―nurture,‖ ended amicably in the 1940s, with both sides 
reconciling their differences and agreeing to view the two factors as inextricably linked.  
 The Triumph of Evolution is clearly well researched, yet two critical weaknesses 
undermine his argument. For one, while Cravens convincingly demonstrates the role 
academic rivalry played in the downfall of evolutionary explanations of human behavior, 
he ignores several other important factors. Philosophical challenges to evolutionary 
ethics, scientific alternatives to natural selection, and the Holocaust all played major roles 
in this process yet receive no mention. Also, his conclusion that former adversaries in the 
nature versus nurture debate found a happy marriage in the 1940s does not correspond 
with the fact that social scientists overwhelmingly rejected biological analysis throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, it was this strict adherence to cultural factors that acted as 
the tinder in the sociobiology firestorm. How, from Cravens‘ perspective, does one 
explain the extreme opposition to the publication of Wilson‘s Sociobiology in 1975? 
 Carl Degler‘s In Search of Human Nature also analyzes the return of evolutionary 
thinking in the social sciences.
11
 A Pulitzer-Prize winner and past president of both the 
Organization of American Historians (OHA) and the American Historical Association 
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(AHA), Degler brought impeccable credentials to the subject. His encyclopedic 
knowledge about the various professors involved in the bitter debate over evolution‘s role 
in human affairs makes In Search of Human Nature incredibly informative reading. His 
grasp of scientific concepts, especially ethology, allows him to articulate complex 
biological issues in ways most historians could not. Degler was also the first person to 
depict the rise of sociobiology as a return of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences, 
and in that regard I am indebted to his work. 
 In Search of Human Nature is invaluable as a groundbreaking effort to bring to 
light a major development in American intellectual history, yet much work remains to be 
done. While Degler does an admirable job explaining what happened (evolutionary 
thinking returned to the academic community at-large after a period of disfavor), he is 
remarkably deficient at explaining why this happened. For example, his argument that 
cultural analysis became dominant in the 1930s and 1940s due to antiracism is 
inconsistent with the extreme racial inequality that still ravaged the nation at this time. 
Further, by failing to provide supporting evidence for his vague yet fundamentally correct 
claim that ―new developments in biology‖ in the 1960s caused a ―revival of interest in 




 There are other weaknesses as well. Although Degler demonstrates familiarity 
with Konrad and Tinenberg‘s research in ethology, he does not refer to the scientific 
advancement directly responsible for the rise of evolutionary thinking in the social 
sciences: the substitution of the individual for the gene as the unit of competition in 
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natural selection. It is only through an understanding of the implications of gene-based 
evolution that we arrive at the possibility for altruism, which is what convinced some 
intrepid intellectuals that they finally had the theoretical tools for a biological 
understanding of social behavior. Lastly, In Search of Human Nature does not adequately 
address recent events. Like Cravens before him, Degler focuses primarily on the early 
twentieth-century, and while he does extend the narrative somewhat, there remain almost 
thirty years of the story to be told.  
Histories of sociobiology by laymen provide another helpful lens into the general 
effort to revive evolutionary thinking in the American intellectual discourse. The most 
important of these works is Ullica Segerstrale‘s The Defenders of The Truth, which 
stands as the definitive treatment of the subject.
13
 Segerstrale, a sociologist with a 
background in chemistry, captures the controversy in intimate detail, thanks to her 
personal involvement and her insightful interviews with leading scientists. The 
Sociobiology Debate, edited by Arthur Caplan, provides an informative and well-
balanced introduction by abridging several of the participants‘ arguments into an easily 
accessible format.
14
 John Alcock‘s The Triumph of Sociobiology is more biased, as it is 
written from the perspective of a sociobiology advocate, but it effectively outlines the 
scientific developments that inspired Wilson and his supporters.
15
 If the return of 
evolutionary thinking were simply a matter of sociobiology‘s emergence within the 
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scientific discourse, there would not be much to add. However, from the perspective of 
intellectual history, sociobiology is best understood as the catalyst for a wider adoption of 
evolutionary thinking in the social sciences and humanities, and thus these works are not 
sufficient due to their lack of historical context. For example, there is no mention of the 
debates on evolution‘s social implications during the early twentieth century, nor of the 
intellectual trajectories that many disciplines have taken since the sociobiology debate. 
Thus, a new history of the return of evolutionary thinking outside the natural sciences 
remains necessary.  
 
Methodology 
I do not adhere to a particular methodology. In my opinion, attempts to perform 
―Marxist‖ or ―Poststructural‖ analyses, for example, curtail a historian‘s creative 
potential by imposing previously determined perspectives on a subject rather than 
allowing the past to speak for itself. That said, I think it is appropriate to view this project 
as an intellectual history, influenced by the Annales School‘s concept of ―mentalities‖ 
and relying on oral history.  
Intellectual history has come a long way from its origins in the ―history of ideas,‖ 
which Arthur Lovejoy popularized in the 1950s but has since fallen into disrepute. Unlike 
its predecessor, intellectual history does not study ideas as metaphysical concepts, 
divorced from a gritty reality.
16
 To the contrary, intellectual history‘s central premise, as 
popularly understood, is ―that ideas do not develop in isolation from the people who 
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create and use them, and that one must study ideas not as abstract propositions but in 
terms of the culture, lives, and historical contexts that produced them.‖17 Most historians 
who study changes in thought have come to prefer the label ―intellectual and cultural 
history‖ because it better captures the discipline‘s emphasis on the intimate connections 
between ideas and their political, social, and economic environments. The current project 
embraces the new interdisciplinary model, as the central hypothesis—that changes in 
scientific developments allowed progressive intellectuals to feel comfortable 
incorporating evolution into their disciplines—hinges on the premise that intellectual 
endeavors are guided by political and social values.  
The Annales School, specifically the third generation of Annales historians led by 
Emanuel LeRoy Ladurie and Roger Chartier, viewed history as a complex, non-
teleological process marked by different stages of widely shared world views.
18
 These 
―mentalities‖ were not abstract concepts enforced as orthodoxy by authority; they were 
by-products of particular cultural contexts, and often believed without critical self-
awareness. The rise of evolutionary thinking outside of the natural sciences in the late 
twentieth century marks the emergence of a new ―mentality,‖ one with important social 
and academic implications. The Annales School informs the current project in another 
fundamental way as well: the emphasis on the long durée. Fernand Braudel introduced 
the long durée in 1958, precipitating an era of historical scholarship focused on long-
term, structural changes in society that cannot be witnessed over the course of a few years 
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 A result of this approach is a decreased dependency on archives, 
which tend to capture moments in time rather than general trends.
20
 Similarly, this project 
views the return of evolutionary thinking as part of a long trajectory that began with 
Darwin‘s publication of Origin of Species and will last as long as man continues to 
contemplate the ultimate implications of our evolutionary heritage.  
 Published texts from a range of disciplines serve as the predominant, if somewhat 
unorthodox, set of primary sources for the current project, yet analysis of published texts 
alone will not complete all of the project‘s goals. One of the most conspicuous gaps in 
what little historical scholarship exists on the subject is a sufficient explanation for why 
intellectuals have changed their perspective on evolutionary thinking in their disciplines. 
Oral history methods provide the key to answering this fundamental question, as it is 
through personal correspondence and interviews that this project ascertains the authors‘ 
values and beliefs.
21
 Personal convictions play a large role in a scholar‘s academic 
interest, yet these beliefs are often only implicit in their published work. Through 
extensive correspondence I have gained valuable new insight into the authors‘ thoughts 
and feelings on evolution in light of the scientific developments of the 1960s.  
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Concluding Remarks  
The antagonistic yet ultimately constructive conflict between sociobiologists and 
their critics changed the intellectual landscape in the West. Biological factors, while not 
accepted by everyone, have once again become intellectually respectable. Today, 
classrooms across the United States discuss without controversy how human beings‘ 
biological predispositions affect society. Popular newspapers and magazines publish 
articles on the genetic basis of almost every conceivable personal characteristic. There 
are books describing the current political divide in this country as a by-product of 
evolutionary psychology and others that claim one must understand human evolution to 
be an effective negotiator.
22
 Evolution, it seems, is everywhere. As a historian, my 
concern is not whether the science behind these publications is valid (professional 
scientists are more qualified to make that judgment). My intent is to explain how 
biological explanations of human affairs became so prevalent, especially when previous 
intellectuals had effectively prohibited such thinking after World War II. 
 My research shows that developments in evolutionary biology inspired 
sociobiologists to challenge a powerful taboo against biology in the social sciences. Then 
a small group of politically ―radical‖ academics critiqued who feared a return of harmful 
biological determinism compelled the sociobiologists to improve their earlier, flawed 
work until it became a productive research program that focused on the evolution of 
psychological predispositions rather than specific behaviors. This argument makes an 
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important contribution to intellectual history because, until now, no historian has 
proposed an adequate explanation for the return of evolutionary thinking in the social 
sciences.
23
 To some degree the silence is understandable, as sociobiology was a relatively 
recent phenomenon and it takes time to fall under the purview of historical analysis. 
Further, the almost universal academic acceptance of human evolution along with the 
ubiquity of biological narratives in American intellectual discourse has had the effect of 
naturalizing the incorporation of evolution into the social sciences, of making it seem 
inevitable and therefore unremarkable. For most of us biological narratives have become 
so commonplace that we take them for granted. Familiarity, however, should not be 
mistaken for understanding. The return of evolutionary thinking to the social sciences 
was an important and controversial development in intellectual history and it is time to 
thoughtfully discuss it. 
Despite the project‘s somewhat narrow focus, historians who do not specialize in 
American intellectual history benefit from this research as well. For reasons that remain 
unexplored at the present time, history as a discipline remained aloof from the zeitgeist of 
evolutionary thinking that swept the social sciences in response to sociobiology. As a 
result, almost all historians continue to view the past from a strictly cultural lens, while 
many modern economists, philosophers, anthropologists, and psychologists embrace 
biological factors in their work. Daniel Kahnemaan, for example, has earned popular and 
academic acclaim for his research in behavioral economics, and it appears that the 
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discipline will no longer rely strictly on the ―rational actor‖ as the model participant in 
the market but rather a human being motivated by a number of irrational desires and 
emotions that stem from the particular biological architecture of the brain.
24
 A historical 
account of the return of biological thinking in other disciplines raises the important 
question, ―Are we historians limiting ourselves by neglecting an important lens of 
inquiry?‖ 
 Perhaps most importantly, the general public has a vested interest in the subject. 
The introduction of evolutionary thinking to human affairs in the early twentieth-century 
led to the forced sterilization of over twenty thousand people and the murder of millions 
more. People should know why influential intellectuals are again viewing problems 
through an evolutionary lens. If they do not find the logic convincing, they may wish to 
critically engage in the ongoing debate over biology‘s role in the social sciences in an 
effort to swing the pendulum back toward cultural analyses. Regardless of the reader‘s 
particular interest in the research, I hope she finds the narrative ahead interesting and 
informative.
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In 1859 Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species, forever changing the 
way human beings viewed themselves and their place in the world. Europeans, the 
natural audience for the Englishman Darwin, were the first to feel the impact of his work. 
Overwhelmingly Christian at this time, Europeans believed the biblical narrative that God 
had created the different species and arranged them in a perfect, hierarchical relationship 
culminating with human beings in a place of privilege. Then, in roughly five hundred 
pages, Darwin decisively undermined their notion of a divine plan on earth with his thesis 
of evolution through natural selection. There was no plan, no purpose, no role to play. 
Each species, it turned out, was the end result of a random, meaningless process. And, 
while Darwin did not directly address human beings in On the Origin of Species, the 
implications for God‘s ―children‖ were clear.25  
The deceptive simplicity of evolution leads one to imagine a single ―eureka!‖ 
moment much like the apocryphal falling apple that inspired Isaac Newton at 
Woolsthorpe Hall the previous century; however, the real process of discovery was more 
complex.
26
  In fact, Darwin did not ―discover‖ evolution at all, as popularly imagined. 
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Others had proposed evolution numerous time before. Darwin‘s contribution was to 
elucidate the mechanism that made evolution function: natural selection. The ―father‖ of 
evolutionary thinking was in fact eighteenth-century French Naturalist Georges-Louis 
Leclerc, known as the Comte du Buffon. Buffon theorized a nonbiblical explanation of 
earth‘s history (he believed that a comet struck the sun, causing the release of debris that 
formed into the solar system‘s planets), and the transformation of species in response to 
climate change as the earth cooled over time. Buffon, however, did not provide evidence 
for his theory or explain how, exactly, a species changed over time, so evolution 
remained outside respectable science. 
Despite its lack of credibility, iconoclastic thinkers continued to dream about 
evolution. One of these men was none other than Charles Darwin‘s grandfather, Erasmus 
Darwin. The elder Darwin enjoyed a successful career as a doctor (King George III asked 
him to be his personal physician), yet he found his greatest joy inventing and writing 
poems. In his most influential work, Zoonomia, which is a fascinating blend of science 
and poetry, he speculated about the evolution of all the earth‘s species from a single 
organism: 
Would it be too bold to imagine, that in the great length of time, since the 
earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of 





Like Buffon before him, however, the elder Darwin failed to explain how evolution 
occurred, relegating his theories to the realm of faith rather than science. It would be Jean 
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Baptiste Lamarck, the French naturalist and soldier (a combination you don‘t see much 
these days) who provided the first explanation.  
Lamarck claimed that animals evolved by inheriting the characteristics their 
parents developed in their lives. A favorite example of his was a giraffe‘s long neck.  
According to Lamarck, this trait is the result of generations of giraffes stretching to reach 
the leaves on tall branches. Essentially, he viewed changes in phenotype as the by-
product of effort. Unfortunately for Lamarck, his theory came just as Napoleon 
established his dictatorship and the espousal of change as a means towards positive 
growth was dangerously close to a justification for revolution. Much better, from the 
perspective of an establishment determined to uphold the status quo, was Georges 
Cuvier‘s argument that ―any basic changes in an animal would wreck internal 
organization and upset the delicate balance established by the Creator between an animal 
and its milieu.‖28 Cuvier, who was Europe‘s preeminent scientist by this time and firmly 
ensconced within the corridors of power, held great contempt for the theory of evolution 
and he used his authority to discredit Lamarck.
29
  
Despite these repeated failures to establish a secure foothold in scientific 
respectability, evolutionary ideas were clearly ―in the air‖ by the time young Darwin set 
foot on the Beagle. What had been missing from previous theories of evolution was a 
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sound explanation for how it occurred. It was one thing to claim that a species changed 
over time—Buffon had said as much in the mid-eighteenth century—but it was another to 
articulate the mechanism that actually drove the change. Lamarck had tried, but he met 
tremendous political opposition. Further, his reliance on an indiscernible ―inner drive‖ to 
evolve simply did not meet the acceptable criteria of nineteenth-century European 
science. As inheritors of a Newtonian worldview, Darwin‘s contemporaries required 
scientific theories to be based upon simple, uniform laws.
30
 So, how did Darwin provide 
clarity to the existing morass? How did he discover a scientific explanation for the 
phenomena his grandfather could only hint at? For this critical insight, he was inspired 
not by other biologists, but by geologists, economists, and even the animal breeders from 
his hometown.  
 Nineteenth-century geology was divided into two starkly opposed camps: 
catastrophism and uniformitarianism. Catastrophists believed that the earth had 
experienced abrupt, episodic catastrophes (hence the name) throughout its history. From 
this point of view, mountains burst suddenly from the plains and massive earthquakes 
transformed the land and sea. The leading catastrophist, Georges Cuvier, developed the 
argument as an explanation for the mass extinctions he and others were beginning to 
discover in the fossil record. Intellectuals who wanted to affirm God‘s presence in the 
natural world were drawn to naturalism because violent, powerful transformations 
seemed to imply a higher power. In England, geologists William Buckland and Robert 
Jameson argued that catastrophism provided scientific support for the veracity of Noah‘s 
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 Uniformitarians interpreted the geologic record quite differently. Led by Charles 
Lyell, a Scottish lawyer-turned-geologist, the uniformitarians emphasized natural law and 
gradual processes that took place over a long time. According to Lyell, the forces acting 
upon the earth today, such as wind erosion and sedimentation, were the same forces that 
acted upon the earth in the past. He arrived at uniformitarianism after studying under the 
catastrophist William Buckland at Oxford and becoming disenchanted with his mentor‘s 
supernaturalism. Determined to practice respectable, Newtonian science, the young 
scholar turned to the work of James Hutton, a Scottish famer who had proposed a 
perpetually changing and ancient earth almost fifty years earlier. Hutton gave Lyell the 
theoretical tools to examine the European landscape in a new way, and he eventually 
discovered evidence that mountain valleys were carved by nothing more than the constant 
force of wind and water. 
 As a student at Cambridge, Darwin was steeped in catastrophist ideology due to 
the conservative nature of the institution, but it was Lyell who influenced him more due 
to the great geologist‘s emphasis on natural laws rather than divine intervention. In fact, 
when Darwin set off on his voyage to the Galapagos aboard the Beagle, he spent many of 
his long hours at sea soaking up the uniformitarian perspective in Lyell‘s ―Principles of 
Geology.‖ An early example of Lyell‘s role in Darwin‘s intellectual development can be 
seen in Darwin‘s 1842 theory of the formation of coral reefs. Previously, naturalists 
explained the beauty and apparent design of coral reefs as the work of a divine creator. 
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Darwin recognized that if one assumed that the land near water‘s edge was slowly 
subsiding, it was possible to predict quite unusual coral patterns, such as atolls, that 
formed rings around now submerged islands. Eventually, Darwin would discern 
uniformitarian changes occurring in animals as well: ―As natural selection acts solely by 
accumulating slight successive favorable variations, it can produce no great or sudden 
modifications; it can act only by very short and slow steps.‖32   
 After returning from his voyage aboard the Beagle, Darwin spent long hours 
studying the literature of animal breeding and talking with experts about the subject. It 
was this exposure to the willful manipulation of domestic animals‘ traits that caused him 
to recognize the central importance of selection in speciation, and to seek its mechanism 
in nature. He explained the connection in his autobiography, ―by conversation with 
skillful breeders and gardeners, and by extensive reading… I soon perceived that 
selection was the keystone of man‘s success in making useful races of animals and plants. 
But how selection could be applied to organisms living in a state of nature remained for 
some time a mystery to me.‖33 Some scholars have minimized the importance of animal 
breeding on Darwin‘s thinking because he does not mention it in his notebooks, and also, 
perhaps, because animal breeding is too ―dirty‖ to include in the rarified air of intellectual 
discovery. However, it is reasonable to assume that the artificial breeding of animals 
sincerely influenced Darwin, as many of his friends bred dogs and horses and he would 
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have been exposed to their thoughts on the matter throughout his life. Further, if we take 
Darwin‘s word on the subject, and there is no reason not to, he explicitly acknowledges 
his intellectual debt: ―I came to the conclusion that selection was the principle of change 
from the study of domestic productions.‖34 
Economic theory was the final, critical influence on Darwin. As an educated 
Englishman with an ecumenical mind, he was well read in disciplines outside his primary 
field, and in the course of these investigations he came across the work of the pessimistic 
cleric and economist, Thomas Malthus. By the turn of the nineteenth century, some of the 
optimism surrounding Adam Smith‘s concept of the free market had started to wane, as 
the realities of mass poverty and the abuses of industrial labor became hard to reconcile 
with the maxim that self-interest benefited everybody. In An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, Malthus depicted the harsh reality of unfettered competition. He argued that, 
while the food supply could only grow geometrically, the population would grow 
exponentially due to the ―passion between the sexes,‖ and thus famine was an inevitable 
aspect of society.
35
 In other words, poverty was natural, which made social reforms a 
waste of time and resources. When, in 1838, Darwin read Malthus, the elder economist‘s 
ideas shook him to the core: 
Fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to 
read for amusement Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to 
appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on, form 
long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at 
once struck me that under these circumstances favorable variations 
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would tend to be preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The 
result of this would be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had 




The theory he alludes to is none other than the theory of natural selection. Finally Darwin 
had found an explanation for evolution. He was ready to send shockwaves through a 
scientific establishment still largely committed to viewing life on earth as part of a divine 
plan—if that is indeed what he wanted.  
 Having found his ―theory by which to work,‖ Darwin did not publish On the 
Origin of Species until 1859. The untimely delay begs the question ―Why?‖ Scientists 
fiercely compete for original ideas and Darwin was clearly doing groundbreaking work. 
The answer, it appears, was Darwin‘s personality. A shy, mild-mannered country 
gentleman, he was reluctant to publish a controversial work that would undoubtedly bring 
tremendous strife into his and his devout wife‘s lives.37 Newton and his predecessors, the 
―giants‖ whose shoulders he stood upon to peer into the laws of gravity and movement, 
had effectively removed the immediate influence of God from the universe. The heavens 
were no longer a place of mystery and divine intervention once it became known that 
planets and stars obeyed the same universal laws that operated on earth. If God did exist 
in the night sky, it was only as a ―watchmaker,‖ one who set things into motion and 
remained distant. For Darwin‘s peers, the vast majority of whom were deeply religious, 
the relegation of God to the sidelines in astronomical matters was as secular as they were 
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willing to go; it was simply imperative that God remained an active, involved presence in 
life on earth. 
So, what caused Darwin to finally put pen to paper and face the inevitable 
scrutiny? It was a letter from a young, relatively unknown naturalist named Alfred 
Wallace who had contacted Darwin seeking feedback on a manuscript he had written. 
Like Darwin before him, Wallace was conducting research on exotic islands (Darwin in 
the now famous Galapagos off the coast of Ecuador and Wallace in the Maluku Islands, 
an archipelago in what was then the Dutch East Indies). Wallace had also read and been 
strongly influenced by the works of both Thomas Malthus and Charles Lyell. Further, 
much as Darwin had been exposed to early evolutionary theories by his grandfather and 
Lamarck before setting sail on the Beagle, Wallace began his research with a pre-existing 
belief in evolution due to his favorable reading of Robert Chambers‘ largely discredited 
exposition on evolution, the Vestiges of Natural Creation: 
I have a rather favourable opinion of the Vestiges ... I do not consider it a 
hasty generalization, but rather as an ingenious hypothesis strongly 
supported by some striking facts and analogies, but which remains to be 
proven by more facts and the additional light which more research may 




Much to Darwin‘s surprise, Wallace‘s letter revealed that his faith in evolution 
and his reading of Malthus and Lyell had conditioned him to induce the same 
remarkable insight as Darwin: the theory of natural selection.
39
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 Thankfully, Wallace described the historic moment when he theorized natural 
selection, ―At the time in question I was suffering from a sharp attack of intermittent 
fever, and every day during the cold and succeeding hot fits had to lie down for several 
  
28 
Wallace‘s ―On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the 
Original Type.‖ expressed views so similar to Darwin‘s that the elder biologist 
wrote in despair, ―I never saw more striking coincidence; if Wallace had my M.S 
sketch written out in 1842, he could not have made a better short abstract!‖40 
Aghast at the similarity and obvious ethical dilemma, Darwin did not know how 
to respond. He wanted to do what was right and credit the young scholar‘s 
discovery, but he also felt the pang of possibly having his life‘s work credited to 
someone else. He lamented, ―There is nothing in Wallace‘s sketch which is not 
written out much fuller in my sketch copied in 1844,  & read by Hooker some 
dozen years ago…but as I had not intended to publish any sketch, can I do so 
honourably because Wallace has sent me an outline of his doctrine? —I would far 
rather burn my whole book, than that he or any other man should think that I had 
                                                     
 
hours, during which time I had nothing to do but to think over any subjects then 
particularly interesting me. One day something brought out my recollection Malthus‘s 
―Principles of Population,‖ which I had read about twelve years before. I thought of his 
clear exposition of ―the positive checks to increase‖-disease, accidents, war, and famine-
which keep down the population of savage races to so much lower an average than that of 
more civilized peoples. It then occurred to me that these causes or their equivalents are 
continually acting in the case of animals also…it suddenly flashed upon me that this self-
acting process would necessarily improve the race, because in every generation the 
inferior would inevitably be killed off and the superior would remain—that is, the fittest 
would survive.‖  Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life: A Record of Events and Opinions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 360-361. 
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behaved in such a paltry spirit.‖41  
In the end, his friends Charles Lyell, the geologist, and Joseph Hooker, a 
famous botanist, arranged to have Wallace‘s paper and Darwin‘s early sketches 
on evolution read together at a meeting of Linnaean Society on July 1
st
, 1858. 
Wallace was on the other side of the world at the time and could not be contacted 
before the meeting, but he never expressed any bitterness toward the arrangement. 
A poorer man, and of considerably less standing in the scientific community, 
perhaps he felt grateful to simply have his work discussed alongside Darwin‘s. I 
feel it is important, however, to credit the man himself and not solely his 
circumstances for the humble relinquishment of his claim to the discovery of 
natural selection. Wallace deserves recognition as a genuinely kind man 
motivated by a selfless love of learning and the desire to help others. Whatever 
the reason, he assuaged Darwin‘s lingering guilt in their personal correspondence, 
―As to the theory of Natural Selection itself, I shall always maintain it to be 
actually yours and yours only. You had worked it out in details I had never 
thought of, years before I had a ray of light on the subject, and my paper would 
never have convinced anybody or been noticed as more than an ingenious 
speculation, whereas your book has revolutionized the study of Natural History, 
and carried away the best men of the present age.‖42   
When Darwin did publish On the Origin of Species in 1859 it was not only 
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biologists and other natural scientists that took notice; an extraordinary range of 
intellectuals wrestled with the implications of evolution for Darwin had truly changed the 
intellectual landscape of the world and many previously accepted views were now subject 
to scrutiny. Was morality dead? Living one‘s life according to religious scripture seemed 
strangely out of place after being removed from the seat of honor in God‘s divine plan 
and unceremoniously dumped alongside the rest of earth‘s living creatures. And how 
should we govern ourselves? The debate surrounding the political implications of 
Darwinism divided roughly between those who believed inequality and hierarchy to be 
good, or at least inevitable, and those who desired a society of equals.
43
 What wasn‘t up 
for debate, however, was whether or not evolution held profound implications for society, 
for, unlike the sociobiology debates of the 1970s, which pitted advocates of an 
evolutionary perspective against those who insisted on strictly cultural analyses, the 
thinkers of this time agreed that evolution should inform their arguments. Indeed, to be an 
intellectual during the Gilded Age meant addressing the work of Charles Darwin.  
 The most eloquent defender of a ―natural‖ hierarchy among people was Herbert 
Spencer. One of the last polymath geniuses, Spencer became an expert in every subject 
he touched: anthropology, literature, biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, and political 
science. It was his contributions to philosophy, however, which earned him his 
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tremendous fame across the English-speaking world. In System of Synthetic Philosophy 
he argued that natural laws governed every aspect of the universe and thus all existing 
academic disciplines could be unified (this is what made his philosophy ―synthetic‖).  
Further, he claimed that the progressive character of these laws meant that human society 
was inexorably evolving toward perfection. Progress in Spencer‘s schema, unfortunately, 
came with a price, as the pitiless ―survival of the fittest‖ would ―cull the herd‖ of less 
capable members of society, leaving behind only the best and brightest people.
44
 Those in 
power, who tended to be white men, eagerly adopted Spencer‘s views on the evolution of 
society as scientific justification for the economic inequality and racism of the times.  
Cynically, it could be said that the elite lauded Spencer because he echoed their 
beliefs back to them in a gratuitous display of self-congratulation. In other words, he 
became their champion by telling them what they wanted to hear. The historian Perry 
Miller argued as much: ―undoubtedly the main reason for the appeal of Spencer to so 
many Americans‖ was his injunction that ―competitive America of 1870s should continue 
to be just what it was, and nobody should complain.‖45
 
From this point of view Spencer 
can be seen as the mouthpiece for conservative politics and a defender of the status quo. 
A more balanced view, however, recognizes that Spencer‘s popularity transcended 
politics, that he became ―America‘s philosopher‖ because he legitimized the Victorian 
faith in progress, accountability, and a comprehensible universe operating by natural 
laws. As immigration, racial strife, and a growing, tumultuous corporate economy made 
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the world increasingly unrecognizable, Spencer reassured people that the country was not 
falling apart, as many feared, but simply experiencing growing pains towards a better 
future. There was no need to panic, for America was evolving, and ―evolution can end 
only in the establishment of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness.‖46  
Spencer had a tremendous influence on America‘s ―most vigorous and influential 
social Darwinist,‖ William Graham Sumner, who became convinced that the foundation 
of human society was the man-land ratio.
47  
Sumner argued that competition among 
people was inevitable considering that population increases faster than available 
resources. And if that were so, what should be done? Unflinching from the cold, hard 
reality before him, Sumner championed minimal government as the right response. He 
believed government intervention in public affairs would disrupt fair competition and 
unduly hinder the ―fittest‖ members of society. Yes, the poor and the weak would suffer, 
but artificial attempts to circumvent nature‘s cruelty would hinder man‘s evolution and 
progress. Ultimately, according to Sumner, man‘s activities were governed by the same 
natural laws as evolutionary biology and it would be foolish to legislate counter to this 
reality.  
Sumner argued that selfish interests motivated people and that competition led to 
progress. An active government which interfered ―with natural laws could only lead to 
disastrous consequences; perhaps it would even push the hands of the clock of progress 
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Sumner articulated his theory of minimal government most clearly in the 
essay ―The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over.‖ His basic premise was that the 
government had to choose between liberty and progress at the price of inequality, or 
authoritarianism and decline for the benefit of equality. For Sumner, the choice was clear: 
inequality must not stand in the way of progress, for ―human progress is at bottom moral 
progress.‖49 By allowing hard-working Protestants to succeed without the interference of 
a meddling government, the United States could evolve into a utopia of morality and 
efficiency.  
 Conservative thinkers had convincingly argued that that economic inequality 
corresponded with eternal natural laws. Instead of being seen as part of a political agenda, 
a small government indifferent to the needs of its poorest citizens was viewed as an 
unbiased means for facilitating progress through competition. American philosopher John 
Fiske, for example, ―tied the system to God‘s cosmic destiny.‖50 By the turn of the 
century, a large number of Americans ―believed in the widest possible extension of the 
principle of private property, and the narrowest possible restriction of state interference, 
except to aid private property to increase its gains.‖51 Spencer and his disciples eventually 
convinced so many people that laissez faire economics began to be written into the 
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Constitution (In Lochner v. New York the Supreme Court ruled against a law in New 
York limiting the number of hours a baker could legally be required to work. The 
justices‘ logic: freedom of contract trumped considerations of fairness.52).53  
 For contemporary readers who have not explored the intellectual history of 
evolution, the impact of Darwin on social theorists can be summed up in two words, 
―Social Darwinism,‖ yet the Left was an equal contestant in the claim for Darwinian 
sanction at the turn of the century.
54
 An early, powerful voice for leftist evolutionary 
thinking was Peter Kropotkin, a Russian anarchist whose heroic exploits and sincere 
commitment to the betterment of the world caused the sardonic wit of the times, Oscar 
Wilde, to sincerely pen that Kropotkin was a ―beautiful white Christ‖ and ―one of the 
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 There are two primary reasons for this simplified view. The first is the 
disproportionate influence Social Darwinism had on public policy in the early twentieth-
century—a subject we will address in depth later in the chapter. The other reason is the 
remarkable Richard Hofstadter, a professor of history at Columbia University whose 
Social Darwinism in American Thought stands alongside his other great works as 
testaments to his ability to craft lasting narratives of American history. Hofstadter wrote 
captivating books that analyzed intellectual issues of an epic scale, yet the grand scale of 
his analyses meant that many of the details were inevitably left out. In the case of 
evolutionary thinking at the turn of the twentieth-century, one of the more interesting, 
and important, details the eminent professor left out was the vocal appropriation of 




most perfect lives I have come across in my own experience.‖55 The son of nobility, his 
mother the daughter of a prominent general and his father a prince, as a youth Kropotkin 
worked as a page for Czar Alexander II, whom he witnessed liberate the serfs in 1861. 
Before long he was promoted from page to a position in the army, and he took this 
opportunity to join two sweeping geographical survey expeditions that explored North 
Manchuria. It was a massive undertaking, spanning over fifty thousand miles of 
extremely challenging environments, but Kropotkin was not daunted. In fact, he could 
barely conceal his excitement to be following in the footsteps of his hero, Alexander von 
Humboldt, who had explored the South American wilderness years before and stood as 
the embodiment of the humane, Western intellect.  
Kropotkin had already read On the Origin of Species before he set out on his 
journeys and he looked forward to studying natural selection in the Russian wilderness, 
where he fully expected to witness brutal competition among members of the same 
species. Nature ―red in tooth in claw‖ was the seemingly necessary condition in which 
natural selection could take place; however, what he saw was quite different. After years 
of carefully observing migrating birds, mammals, fish, and insects, Kropotkin became 
convinced that cooperation, not competition, was the defining characteristic of life in the 
wild. True there was a struggle for survival, but this struggle pit groups of animals 
against a hostile environment, not members of the same species against themselves. In 
the unforgiving Russian tundra, Kropotkin ―saw mutual aid and mutual support carried 
on to an extent which made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for 
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maintenance of life, the preservation of each species and its further evolution.‖56 And the 
cooperation he witnessed was not confined to wild animals; the peasants in the small 
Siberian villages enjoyed a strong sense of community and thoughtlessly lent assistance 
to their neighbors.  
After his experience in the Russian wilderness, Kropotkin, a Russian nobleman 
whose heart and mind still soared with the radical republicanism of the day, began to 
suspect that British thinkers had a skewed view of evolution due to the industrialization 
of their nation. The cutthroat competition Malthus believed to be inevitable was actually 
an anomaly produced by the centralization of power in the hands of factory owners. Real 
life, the kind found in the vast expanses of nature and in human communities unsullied by 
powerful governments and militaries, favored those who practiced mutual aid. 
Radicalized by these insights, Kropotkin resigned from the army and committed himself 
to science and political activism, a decision that cast him from the inner circle of Russian 
privilege and landed him in multiple prisons. Despite the hardships, he maintained the 




Kropotkin returned to Russia following the February Revolution in 1917, greeted 
by tens of thousands of people. Within a few months, however, the Bolsheviks seized 
power in the October Revolution, disillusioning the now elderly man who despised the 
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communists‘ authoritarian methods.58 Yet evolutionary thinking and communism were 
not necessarily oil and water. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels both read On the Origin of 
Species and held the work in high regard. In fact, Marx wrote to Engels that evolution 
―contains the basis in natural history of our view.‖59 At this time most biologists 
considered themselves ―natural theologians,‖ and they studied nature in veneration of 
God‘s works. Natural theologians, who had held sway over Western minds for centuries, 
believed in a timeless, divine plan for nature, which gave implicit support for the idea 
that change would cause great havoc. In Darwin, the communists recognized an ally in 
the fight against the essentialist worldview, as natural selection demonstrated that change, 
and progress, can occur without divine intervention. For Marx and Engels, reality was not 
one of platonic ideals, but of development through a Hegelian dialectic that took place in 
concrete historical contexts. Just as there is no ―evolution‖ outside of an environment, 
there is no progress outside of existing political and economic institutions. Therefore, in 
Marx and Engels‘ eyes, Darwin‘s scientific insights supported their claims that capitalism 
developed from the conditions of feudalism and that communism would emerge from the 
capitalism once an empowered proletariat took control of the means of production. 
Engels was the more scientifically inclined of the two, although both men 
engaged in wide-ranging intellectual inquiry in a way that is hard to imagine today‘s age 
of academic specialization. They assiduously kept up to date with the leading scientific 
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developments out of intellectual curiosity and, more importantly, because they believed 
there to be only one true science, which meant that for communism to be legitimate it had 
to be scientifically sound. From their perspective, distinct categories such as 
―philosophy‖ and ―science‖ were arbitrary and ultimately false. In 1844, Marx wrote in 
his notebook, ―Natural science will, in time, incorporate into itself the science of man, 
just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will 
be one science.‖60 The next year, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels similarly 
remarked, ―We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history 
from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two 
sides are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are 
dependent on each other so long as men exist.‖61 It was this faith in the consilience of 
knowledge that led them to receive Darwin‘s work so warmly. They finally had the 
scientific backing for their political project they had been looking for. 
Still, the marriage between communism and evolution was not free of 
disagreement. In particular, Marx distrusted the implications of a universal human nature, 
which seemed a logical corollary to evolution. Marx certainly recognized that humans 
were animals that had evolved over time, and that speciation through evolution had led to 
a ―human nature‖ that could be considered universal. (In fact, one productive way of 
viewing Kapital is as a critique of man‘s estrangement from his essential nature through 
the alienation from his labor.) But he also believed that man ―acts upon nature and 
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changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.‖62 In essence, 
human beings had become so powerful as to transcend their animal heritage. The world 
in which humans lived was a human, not a ―natural‖ world. To understand the human 
condition, therefore, one has to study history, not biology. Human beings‘ dramatic 
departure from the animal world meant that evolution, while still correct and important, is 
best seen as metaphysical support for a dynamic, revolutionary world and not as a source 
of knowledge for human affairs.  
In some ways socialism was a better fit for Darwinism. As previously mentioned, 
communists appreciated Darwin‘s contribution to the attack on essentialism, which had 
long been held as the logic of God‘s plan and the argument against change in nature or 
politics; however, communist ideology also required a dramatic and purposeful shift, a 
revolution, from the normal course of affairs in order to become fully realized. In this 
way communism was better suited, ironically enough, to the catastrophist thinking of the 
staunch conservative Cuvier and his disciples. Socialism, on the other hand, required no 
such deviation from normal processes. Like evolution, it is predicated on the assumption 
that change itself is reality. As Heraclitus said, ―you can not step twice into the same 
river.‖63 The logical affinity between socialism and evolution makes it unsurprising that 
one of the founders of natural selection, Alfred Wallace, declared himself a socialist in 
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1889 after reading Edward Bellamy‘s Looking Backward.64 
Those skeptical of a purported link between socialism and evolutionary theory 
can point to Darwin‘s statement in 1877 that ―(a) foolish idea seems to prevail in 
Germany on the connection between Socialism and Evolution through Natural Selection‖ 
as evidence for their perspective. 
65
 And, while argument from authority is a well-known 
logical fallacy, it is hard at first glance to maintain that there exists a connection between 
Darwinism and Socialism if Charles Darwin himself is saying there is none. Digging a bit 
deeper, however, reveals a remarkable paradox: from a modern perspective Alfred 
Wallace was more ―Darwinian‖ than Darwin. (By that I mean Wallace was the true early 
champion of Darwin‘s greatest insight, natural selection, as the sole mechanism for 
evolution.) Darwin himself believed, as did Herbert Spencer and many other prominent 
evolutionary thinkers at the time, that inherited characteristics, or ―Lamarckism,‖ also 
played a key role in evolution. In fact, challenges to Darwinism such as the blending of 
heritability caused almost all scientists by the 1880s to accept evolution but to deny 
natural selection.  
Not Wallace. In 1889 the humble co-discover of natural selection wrote a book 
titled Darwinism in which he defended the tenets of natural selection as the driving force 
of evolution. Wallace was also the first to person to apply evolutionary thinking to the 
study of humans, arguing against racial inequality in ―The Origin of Human Races and 
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the Antiquity of Man Deduced from the Theory of ‗Natural Selection.‖66 As Wallace 
explored the implications of evolution for man he became convinced that humans had 
entered a new chapter of development, that we had reached a point of intellectual 
development where we responded to the environment through our minds, not our bodies. 
When faced with harsh winters or fierce animals humans don‘t get fatter or stronger; they 
make fires, stitch coats, and use weapons. Wallace concluded that human beings had 
entered a new chapter in their evolution and now thrived in direct accordance with their 
levels of intelligence and cooperation. Those were the characteristics being selected for in 
the new human environments and Socialism embodied them both.  
Wallace believed that evolution and socialism were passive articulations of 
reality, not a call to action. For this reason, socialists constantly disappointed their 
political cousins, the communists, who believed that historical developments had evolved 
to create the conditions for revolution, but who also felt it was necessary to fight to 
achieve their political ends. Socialists held many of the same critiques of capitalism as 
the communists—it‘s just that they did not see the point in fighting to achieve what was 
inevitable anyway. The work of Laurence Gronlund, a Danish-born lawyer who tirelessly 
championed socialism in the United States, illuminated socialism‘s distinct political 
strategy. He writes, ―As collectivists, we do not approve of the violent methods of the 
(communists). We want the gradual absorption of all capital by the government in a 
peaceable manner.‖67 And, making the connection between Darwinism and his politics, 
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―this movement is evolutionary, not revolutionary.‖68   
Socialists‘ optimism for the future rested in large part on their understanding of 
evolution, which was Lamarckian. This was a good fit for socialists because it was the 
prevailing model for ―soft inheritance,‖ a term coined by the evolutionary biologist Ernst 
Mayr. Soft inheritance means that organisms pass on characteristics acquired during a 
lifetime to their progeny, and the implications of this theory support liberal public policy. 
Imagine, for example, if your children were born smarter as a result of the books you 
read. You would actually read all those books collecting dust on the bookshelf! Taking a 
broader view, Lamarckism creates an ethical imperative to provide an environment 
conducive to personal growth for all citizens. By doing so, it would be possible to create 
a healthy, enlightened populace, and to eliminate a lot of the social ills. This sounds like 
progress, an undeniable good, but, remember, Spencer and his disciples had their own 
arguments for progress 
 As diverse thinkers attempted to use evolutionary theory to support their vision 
for progress, it was perhaps inevitable that they would find themselves adopting scientific 
positions that aligned with their personal values and beliefs. Politically liberal people, for 
example, favored soft inheritance because of its implications for the betterment of 
society. Conversely, those who favored centralized power and a hierarchical social 
organization favored ―hard inheritance,‖ another term Ernst Mayr coined, which is 
defined as the antonym of soft inheritance. (In other words, offspring are not born with 
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their parents‘ acquired characteristics.) Conservatives believed in hard inheritance 
because it supported their notion that life was a competition between dissimilar people, 
and that there were those naturally fit for positions of power.
69
 True, many of these men 
and women were proud supporters of the American republic who disdained the 
monarchy, but this was primarily because in their minds a royal hierarchy was artificial. 
To find out who was truly superior it was necessary for people to compete freely, without 
governmental interference. The result, they believed, would be a meritocracy of the kind 
the Founding Fathers of the country envisioned.  
 From one angle it appears that the intellectuals of the late nineteenth century were 
destined to participate in an endless, Sisyphusian tug-of-war. Equality or hierarchy? Big 
or small government? Since the Enlightenment, intellectuals had fought over these 
questions in various forms and to this day one can find reasonable company in either 
camp. What differentiated the early debates on evolution and public policy, however, was 
their intimate connection to science. Because the mechanism of evolution was uncertain, 
social theorists were able to choose the particular theory of evolution that best suited their 
arguments. And, while this freedom of choice gave them more custom-fit scientific 
backing for their views, it also tied their hands in a way quite dissimilar to typical 
arguments in the social sciences and humanities—which often end in an unsatisfying 
agreement to disagree due to the inherent subjectivity of the subject matter. By tying their 
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social theories to scientific ones, the liberals and conservatives of the time had essentially 
forfeited their prerogative to accept their disagreement as simply a difference of opinion. 
In their circumstance, if biologists proved that one of the evolutionary theories was 
incorrect, the social theories derived from that perspective would lose credibility as well. 
And that is exactly what happened.  
 August Weismann was born in Frankfurt, Germany in 1834, the middle class son 
of a teacher. His boyhood curiosity led him to study music, painting, and, his favorite 
subject of all, butterflies. For financial reasons he chose to be a doctor rather than a 
scientist, but after achieving success as the Chief Medic during the Second Italian War of 
Independence and working as the personal physician to Archduke Stephen of Austria, he 
followed his childhood calling and became a professor of biology at the age of twenty-
nine. Initially, Weismann, like Darwin and many other prominent scientists of the time, 
believed Lamarckism played an important role in evolution, but his German colleagues 
had begun to make groundbreaking discoveries about the structure and function of cells 
and these developments caused him to reconsider.
70
  
 The key insight for Weismann‘s contribution to evolutionary biology was the 
recognition of the distinction between gametes (sex cells like sperm or eggs) and somatic 
cells, which comprise all the remaining cells of the body. Weismann called gametes 
―germ‖ cells, and he postulated that they alone were responsible for inheritance. There 
was, in effect, a ―Weismann barrier‖ that precluded the somatic cells from having any 
influence over the gametes, which eliminated the possibility that changes in one‘s brain 
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cells or muscle cells, for example, could be inherited. In 1893, Weismann first published 
these views, labeling them his ―germ plasm‖ theory.71  
Skeptics railed against Weismann‘s theory, claiming that without the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics there simply wasn‘t enough differentiation among individuals 
to allow natural selection to function. To these arguments, Weismann responded that 
sexual selection provided the necessary individual distinctions, which, in turn, set off 
another round of denunciations, as most biologists of the time, working before the 
rediscovery of Gregor Mendel‘s work on genes, believed that sexual procreation blended 
parent phenotypes and thus prevented, not facilitated, individual differentiation. 
Weismann, however, privy to the latest research on gametes being done by his German 
colleagues, knew that maternal and paternal chromosomes do not fuse during 
fertilization, but instead establish a new, unique diploid zygote. Back and forth the 
competing factions went until, in 1893, Weismann conducted a decisive experiment that 
would set the record straight. 
 To prove once and for all that acquired characteristics were not inherited, August 
Weismann concocted an ingenious, if somewhat macabre, experiment: cutting off 
hundreds of mice tails. How could that possibly solve the problem? Well, by 
systematically cutting of the tails of nine hundred and one mice over the span of several 
generations, Weismann was able to show that none of the progeny were born with short 
tails. If Lamarckism were right the removal of the mice tails should have influenced the 
offspring‘s phenotypes, but….nothing. For advocates of laissez faire governance, 
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Weismann‘s findings proved that unfettered competition was healthy for society, as it 
allowed naturally ―superior‖ citizens to rise to the top and did not waste resources 
coddling the ―inferior‖ citizens incapable of meaningful change.72  
For the progressives who supported collective bargaining, racial equality, and a 
robust welfare state, the writing on the wall was clear, and it was not pretty. ―If 
Weismann…. (is) right,‖ remarked Berkeley biologist Joseph LeConte in 1891, ―if 
natural selection be indeed the only factor used by nature in organic evolution and 
therefore available for use by Reason in human evolution, then, alas, for all our hopes of 
race improvement, whether physical, mental, or moral!‖73 Dismayed, LeConte and other 
social reformers found themselves pushed in a new direction following the discovery that 
soft inheritance was a lie. Once committed to a program of improvement for an entire 
nation of people, they grudgingly accepted the fact that Weismann‘s findings required a 
new course of action. Social worker Amos Warner explained, ―if acquired characteristics 
be inherited, then we have a chance to permanently improve the race…by seeing to it that 
individuals acquire characteristics that is (sic) desirable for them to transmit,‖ but in light 
of hard inheritance‘s victory, reformers must now look to ―exercising an influence upon 
the selective process.‖74 Here again is LeConte, arriving at the awful, yet logical 
implications of soft inheritance‘s demise: ―if we are to have race improvement at all, the 
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dreadful law of destruction of the weak and helpless must with Spartan firmness be 
carried out voluntarily and deliberately. Against such a course all that is best in us 
revolts.‖75 
Eugenics, or the attempt to ―improve‖ a population through controlled 
reproduction, became a popular cause for diverse thinkers at this time.
76
 African-
American professor W.E.B. DuBois, birth control advocate Margaret Sanger, and radical 
anarchist Emma Goldman, for example, all wove eugenics into their platforms. George 
Bernard Shaw, a socialist playwright, liked to poke fun at the trendy new way of thinking 
by reminding others that he, and possibly they, would have certainly been chosen ―unfit‖; 
however, he, too, saw tremendous potential in eugenics and incorporated it quite clearly 
into his play Man and Superman. The idea was not new. Francis Galton, Darwin‘s half-
cousin coined the term in 1883, yet Weismann‘s denunciation of soft inheritance gave 
fuel to the smoldering concept, resulting in a conflagration of eugenic thought that spread 
across the Atlantic.
77
 Before long there was a Eugenics Education Society in England and 
an American Eugenics Society as well as the International Federation of Eugenics 
Organization. Influenced by the growing intellectual support for state managed evolution 
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 Turn of the century bipartisan acceptance of eugenics puzzles modern readers 
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of a population, numerous governments began to implement eugenic policies—the first 
being Indiana state‘s 1907 law providing for the involuntary sterilization of ―confirmed 
criminals, idiots, imbeciles and rapists.‖78  
Although some prominent eugenicists favored ―positive‖ eugenics, meaning the 
facilitation of procreation by exemplary individuals, the restriction of reproduction by 
supposedly lesser members of society, or ―negative‖ eugenics, emerged as an 
immediately popular agenda among social reformers. Sociologist Richard Dugdale‘s 
study of the ―Jukes‖ family (a pseudonym for a combination of four actual families) 
traced dozens of criminals and prostitutes to a single Dutch settler, showing the 
alarmingly deleterious effects of uncontrolled reproduction among the unfit. Clearly, 
Dugdale argued, it was imperative to prevent similar cases; however, to pursue the task 
effectively it was first necessary to identify who, in fact, were society‘s irredeemable 
degenerates. Not coincidentally, intelligence testing emerged as a fledgling practice 
concurrently with society‘s newly perceived need to cull its weaker members.   
Harvard psychology professor Richard Yerkes‘s IQ tests filled this need. Now, 
scientists claimed, they could objectively analyze one‘s intelligence, making possible the 
identification and subsequent elimination of the unfit. The influential psychologist Henry 
Goddard tirelessly campaigned to apply the new technology of intelligence testing to 
government policy. One of his primary accomplishments to this end was the division of 
the intelligence spectrum into identifiable categories (From Goddard we have the term 
―moron,‖ which is used loosely today as an insult, but originally referred to a specific 
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range of intelligence scores.).
79
 In The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of 
Feeble-Mindedness, he argued for widespread testing and the placing of the feeble-
minded in institutions where they would be trained to perform menial labor.
80
 Eventually 
Goddard put his theory into practice as Director of Research at the Vineland Training 
School for Feeble-Minded Girls, and he was far from alone in his efforts. By 1920, 
agencies of various sorts had forcibly sterilized over 65,000 women, the majority of 
whom were either Native American or African American.  
Fundamental to the conscious marginalization of ―inferior‖ citizens was the 
perception that pre-existing racism and gender discrimination had been given scientific 
sanction. To understand the facility in which ―superior‖ was conflated with ―white man‖ 
it is necessary to recognize that at the turn of the twentieth century almost all of the 
powerful people in the United States were white men. These men had crafted narratives 
to justify their privilege before the triumph of hard inheritance, but now an aura of 
objectivity gilded their claims of superiority. This was the beginning of the age of 
―scientific racism,‖ an ignominious chapter in the history of applied science—and a 
prominent reason the radicals fought so hard against sociobiology.  
A quick tour of the 1893 Chicago World‘s Fair provides a fascinating glimpse of 
scientific racists‘ ―mental map.‖ Visitors to the grounds would immediately have noticed 
that the fair was divided into two distinct grounds: the White City representing white 
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men‘s accomplishments and the circus-like exhibit featuring the ―savage‖ dark races. 
Inside the White City itself, which was designed by Daniel Burnham and Frederick Law 
Olmsted, were fourteen neo-classical plaster buildings featuring modern marvels such as 
Nikola Tesla‘s alternating current electricity, the original Ferris Wheel, and the first 
commercial movie theater. White women‘s achievements, while still a part of the White 
City, were all housed in a single small building on the periphery instead of being featured 
alongside their white male counterparts. This compartmentalization signified women‘s 
idealized domestic relegation in society. Outside the White City, and thus outside 
respectability, were numerous ―native‖ villages.81 These villages represented various 
―savage‖ peoples around the world, and their arrangement essentially ranked them along 
a spectrum of development, with the tribes of Africa occupying the lowest rung of 
respectability. 
What strikes the modern American most about the White City‘s organization is 
not the existence of racism, but its official sanction. Most thoughtful people recognize 
that racism is alive and well today. To find explicit claims of white superiority, you must 
look to the margins, where disreputable ideas lurk in the shadows. In stark contrast, at the 
turn of the century, white superiority was orthodox thinking. For example, the wildly 
popular president Theodore Roosevelt tirelessly campaigned against ―race suicide,‖ his 
term for the eventual decline of the allegedly superior white race due to their low 
birthrate relative to immigrants and minorities. According to Roosevelt, who was an 
accomplished amateur historian, the great empires of the past had succumbed not to 
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military defeat but to the ―watering down‖ of their bloodline. He argued that Rome fell 
because of ―a change in the population…caused by the immense importation of slaves, 
usually of inferior races.‖82 Madison Grant, the best-selling author of The Passing of the 
Great Race, explicitly drew from eugenics and Darwinism to claim that ―Nordics‖ were 
the highest racial stock and that the immigration of ―lesser‖ peoples coupled the 
expansion of the Black population into the urban North was undermining America‘s 
greatness.
83
 According to Grant, Nordics could be identified by their ―wavy brown or 
blonde hair and blue, gray or light brown eyes, fair skin, high, narrow and straight nose,‖ 
and were destined to be ―all over the world, a race of soldiers, sailors, adventurers, and 
explorers, but above all, of rulers, organizers, and aristocrats.‖84 The orthodoxy of 
scientific racism, which had been made possible by the successful association of 
conservative politics with the theory of evolution, provided the intellectual legitimacy for 
discriminatory policies such as the National Origins Act of 1924 that attempted to 
maintain the ―racial character‖ of the United States by forcing immigration numbers to 
correspond to the nation‘s 1890 demographics. 
It is clear that, after a long struggle to determine the political implications of 
evolution, the triumph of hard inheritance had facilitated the dramatic rise of policies that 
favored a racial and gender hierarchy. To be respected as a serious intellectual meant 
making arguments that corresponded with Darwinism, and early twentieth-century 
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scholars agreed that Darwinism implied a competition among unequal individuals that 
―naturally‘ resulted in white men‘s political and economic dominance. Yet this 
perspective is not the reality that scholars faced in the 1960s. In fact, it was almost the 
complete opposite. Sociobiologists and other intellectuals who attempted to analyze 
human behavior through an evolutionary lens faced almost universal contempt. What had 
happened? Well, reality abhors simplicity like nature does a vacuum, so there is no one 
factor to point to, but it is fair to point to four developments that caused scholars to 
repudiate evolutionary thinking in the social sciences: philosophical challenges, 
professional competition with the new branches of sociology and anthropology, rising 
uncertainty in the scientific community about natural selection in light of genetics, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the terrible legacy of Nazi Germany‘s race extermination 












Historians have known for quite some time that Social Darwinism eventually fell 
from favor. Incredibly, however, there are few explanations why. The seeming 
inevitability of its fall may have played a part in the silence: Social Darwinism was 
clearly influenced by the era‘s prevailing racism, and I imagine that people assume it was 
discredited along with the concept of superior races during the long march toward racial 
equality that took place throughout the twentieth-century. From that perspective, past 
scientists quickly came to see that Social Darwinism was wrong and discarded it in the 
trash bin of intellectual history without further ado. Social Darwinism was ―bad science,‖ 
an aberration, and like phrenology before it, there was no need to explain why it was no 
longer held in high esteem because its absurdity was manifestly obvious. I believe, 
however, that the true story of Social Darwinism‘s demise is more complex.  
While it may feel good to view the fall of Social Darwinism as the triumph of 
good over evil, racism was alive and well long after intellectuals discredited the view of 
society as an organism that needed intense evolutionary competition between its 
members to thrive. The truth is that there were a number of factors that played a part in 
the demise of Social Darwinism, and morality played only a supporting role. Despite the 
popularity and influence of Social Darwinism, eugenics, and scientific racism, there were 
cracks in the ideological foundation of applied evolutionary thinking that allowed seeds 
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of opposition to take root. In time, Social Darwinism and the other forms of biological 
determinism crumbled under the attacks, leaving a new paradigm of strictly cultural 
analysis in its place.  
The earliest challenge to biological analyses of human affairs was philosophical. 
In 1907, Cambridge professor Henry Sidgwick declared that attempts to prescribe human 
behavior from the principles of evolution committed the logical fallacy of deriving an 
―ought‖ from what ―is.‖ Yes, he argued, it is true that humans evolved and that evolution 
entails ruthless competition, but that does not mean people should abandon their moral 
commitment to others. That‘s like saying because warfare exists it must be good. No. 
Voltaire surely would have laughed at such Panglossianism; however, it was his 
contemporary, the great David Hume, who first identified the fallacy (which is why it is 
known today as Hume‘s Law) in his A Treatise on Human Nature:  
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark‘d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz‘d to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with 
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as 
this ought, or ought not, express some new relation or affirmation, ‗tis 
necessary that it should be observ‘d and explain‘d.85 
 
Of course, Hume himself was not addressing the application of evolutionary science to 
human affairs, as he died almost a hundred years before Darwin published On the Origin 
of Species. Yet the argument remains the same, and Sidgwick believed the ―gap,‖ as he 
called it, between what is and what ought to be was clearly present in the flawed logic of 
evolutionary ethics.  
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  Sidgwick‘s student at Cambridge, G.E Moore, continued his mentor‘s assault on 
evolutionary ethics in the Principia Ethica, which would come to stand as one of the 
most influential tracts in twentieth-century philosophy.
86
 In addition to violating Hume‘s 
Law, Moore claimed, any attempt to derive values from evolutionary biology committed 
the ―naturalistic fallacy.‖87 Naturalistic fallacies mistakenly attempt to deconstruct an 
irreducible concept such as ―good‖ into constituent parts—parts that don‘t exist because 
the original concept cannot be further divided. For example, while it is possible to 
describe a car, which is a complex concept, as an assemblage of tires, doors, and engine, 
and so on, it is impossible to describe the color blue in a similar manner. The color blue is 
simply the color blue. And those who would try to express ―blue‖ to a blind person would 
inevitably find themselves at a loss of words. Moore believed that those who claimed 
laissez faire governance and white supremacy were good because they were expressions 
of the ―survival of the fittest‖ failed to recognize that they were ―identifying the simple 
notion which we mean by ‗good‘ with some other notion,‖ in this case the characteristics 
of evolution.
88
 Like the color blue, Moore argued, what is good is simply good; it has no 
defining characteristics.
89
 For many members of the members of the philosophical 
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89Here you can see Moore‘s tremendous influence on continental philosophy, as 
he transforms classical philosophical questions into semantic problems. Wittgenstein, 
who recognized Moore as a tremendous thinker, would later champion this course of 
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community, the cogency of Sidgwick and Moore‘s arguments effectively closed the door 
on efforts to justify public policies based on concordance with evolution.  
 Philosophers weren‘t the only intellectuals to chip away at the credibility of 
applied evolutionary thinking. Motivated by a complex blend of sincere progressive 
values and a selfish desire to carve out a niche of professional authority, members of the 
fledgling social sciences also began to assert that biological realities had no direct bearing 
on societal matters. Prior to this time, most anthropologists were wealthy amateurs whose 
work was meant for public consumption. The new generation, intent on becoming a 
respected academic discipline, had higher intellectual ambitions. Sociologists suffered 
from similar professional insecurity. Their discipline‘s founder, Auguste Comte, had 
posited the interdependence of all knowledge, but authority in academia was becoming 
increasingly tied to specialization, so they desperately needed to carve out an identity for 
themselves independent from the other, more established sciences. Fighting for their 
professional lives, the anthropologists and sociologists attacked the concept of 
biologically informed social sciences. 
 The central figure in this story was a young immigrant from Germany named 
Franz Boas. Born in 1858 to parents who despised the backwardness and authoritarianism 
of Prussia, Boas was raised to value the core principles of the Revolution of 1848: 
democracy, liberalism, and modernity. Initially, Boas was a physicist, but after earning 
his doctorate he participated in an expedition to Baffin Island in northern Canada, where 






he worked intimately with the Inuit people, and he decided to study indigenous people 
instead of abstract forces. Even at this early stage in his career, the young Boas expressed 
the combination of intelligence and kindness that would define his legacy. After 
analyzing the less materially developed Inuit, he concluded, ―I often ask myself what 
advantages our 'good society' possesses over that of the 'savages' and find, the more I see 
of their customs, that we have no right to look down upon them.‖90 Determined to pursue 
his work with indigenous cultures, and finding that his job opportunities in Germany 
were dwindling due to the rise of anti-Semitism, he moved to the United States and 
joined the Smithsonian Museum. Within a few years he joined the faculty at Columbia 
University and set his sights on the dominant intellectual trends of eugenics and scientific 
racism.  
Boas‘ first salvo was The Mind of Primitive Man, where he established his 
enduring thesis, namely, that there is no single spectrum of development along which 
human beings ascended. Previous anthropologists had assumed that this was the case and 
subsequently concerned themselves primarily with explaining why certain peoples were 
more or less advanced than others. As seen in the exhibit of ―savages‖ at the White City, 
post-Darwin anthropologists tended to explain these differences by referring to less 
technologically developed people as less evolved. Boas would have none of it. His 
experiences with the Inuit had proved to him that they were not lesser people in any way. 
That, in fact, they were incredibly well adapted to their particular environment and that 
the self-declared ―advanced‖ people would quickly find themselves in dire straights were 
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they to find themselves in a similarly frozen and formidable environment. To argue his 
position, Boas reintroduced a discredited interpretation of Darwinism that had originally 
been proposed by natural selection‘s neglected second founder, Alfred Wallace.  
Like Boas, Wallace had spent significant amounts of time with indigenous people 
and, like Boas, he had left these experiences with a deep conviction in the universal 
potential of human beings rather than a renewed sense of white superiority. Both men 
emphasized the nonteleological nature of evolution, claiming that there was no pre-
determined end in the process, but instead a constant process of adaptation to particular 
environments. This meant that a human was not ―more evolved‖ than a monkey; it had 
just evolved under different pressures.
91
 From their perspective, distinctions between 
groups of humans could be explained the same way. The contexts in which the Inuit and 
other indigenous peoples found themselves caused them to take distinct, yet parallel and 
equal, paths of development. For the anthropologist Boas, this meant that biological 
interpretations of people were unhelpful. Yes, of course, humans evolved, but they had 
evolved to have the intelligence to manipulate their environments. This meant that what 
truly differentiated people was not biology, which was universal, but culture.  
The next year (he was a prolific writer), Boas furthered his argument for cultural 
relativity in the American Anthropologist article ―Changes in the Bodily Form of 
Immigrants.‖ ―Changes‖ was a case study of the cephalic index, which is a particular 
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ratio of a head‘s length to width. As odd as that sounds, prominent intellectuals of the 
time used the index to classify humans into categories of ascending order. Nordic heads, 
for example, are on average a 75 on the cephalic index, and this particular head shape 
was associated with the supposedly superior physical and intellectual traits of those 
people. Interestingly, Boas chose not to argue that head size was irrelevant, but that head 
sizes changed due to their environment. To prove this, he analyzed the cephalic indices of 
second-generation immigrants, concluding that their heads had dramatically ―improved‖ 
relative to their foreign born parents. Thus, it was a person‘s environmental influences 
that mattered most, not a genetic blueprint.  
For Boas, the greatness of ancient Chinese and Egyptian civilizations provided yet 
more proof of the importance of historical, geographical, and cultural context when 
studying humans. If white people were objectively superior, how does one explain the 
fact that Asians and Africans had previously been the most powerful and sophisticated 
civilizations in the world? This line of argument brought Boas into collaboration with the 
African-American intellectual W.E.B Dubois, who invited him to give the 
commencement address at Atlanta University in 1905. For Boas, who inherited a 
monogenesis perspective from his mentor, Theodor Waitz, all human beings were 
brothers and sisters sharing the same original common stock, and their perceived 
irreconcilable differences were simply adaptations to their particular environments.
92
 To 
those committed to the view that indigenous peoples were somehow beneath or less 
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human than whites, he replied, ―the mind of the native enjoys as well the beauties of 
nature as we do; he expresses his grief in mournful songs, and appreciates humorous 
conceptions… it is only the superficial observer to whom he appears stupid and 
unfeeling.‖93   
By 1917, Boas had transformed his discipline, causing Robert Lowie, a curator at 
the American Museum of Natural History, to declare a new age of anthropology, one 
based on the dictum ―Omnis cultura ex cultura.‖94 Sociology was next.  Inspired by 
Comte‘s concept of unified knowledge, the first prominent American sociologist, Lester 
Ward, accepted the premise that evolutionary theory played a key role in the analysis of 
society. His influence convinced the first generation of sociologists in the United States 
to make similar assumptions, as seen in G. Archibald Reid‘s 1906 article, ―The 
Biological Foundations of Sociology,‖ which he wrote for the discipline‘s first scholarly 
journal, the American Journal of Sociology.
95
 The interdisciplinary trend continued for 
the fledgling discipline (only the University of Chicago and Columbia offered graduate 
degrees in the subject as late as 1920) throughout its early years, as it embraced the 
theories and methodologies of psychology, which at the time was dominated by William 
James and G. Stanley Hall. The incorporation of James‘ and Hall‘s theories on instinct 
and recapitulation, respectively, which were quite influential at the time, gave sociology a 
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 Basically, ―all culture comes from culture.‖ Lowie intended this to be a maxim 
for anthropological methods: ―This means that (an anthropologist) will account for a 
given cultural fact by demonstrating some other cultural fact.‖  
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surge in popularity—but left the discipline without an independent identity and even 
further associated with the ugliness of scientific racism due to Hall‘s conspicuous role in 
the construction of race hierarchies.
96
 Increasingly, the leaders of the field began to 
recognize the need to eliminate outside influences. 
Boas‘ attacks on biological determinism in human affairs found fertile ground in 
the hearts and minds of the sociologists. Many of these men were liberal thinkers who 
saw sociology as both an academic discipline and a tool for facilitating democratic ideals, 
and they welcomed the opportunity to marry their professional and political values. The 
future president of the American Sociological Society, Ellsworth Faris, for example, 
celebrated that Boas had discredited the false, invidious ―distinctions between the 
civilized and the savage mind.‖97 By the 1920s, sociologists had turned the corner and 
begun the hard work of laying a new foundation for the discipline, one based on the 
premise that culture, not biology, was the place to look for insights into human behavior: 
―Sociology is at last shaking itself free from biological dominance and is developing an 
objective and a method of its own. Thus it promises to be a science, not merely a poorly 
organized and presumptuous branch of biology, as some biologists formerly seemed to 
regard it.‖98 
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Even those who continued to believe that biology could inform the social sciences 
found themselves standing on increasingly tenuous ground, as physical scientists in 
different fields began to doubt natural selection was the mechanism driving evolution. 
This posed a serious problem for advocates of biologically informed policies such as 
eugenics because the attempt to manage the evolution of society by selecting who should 
and should not have children would be completely misguided, not to mention cruel, if 
evolution did not take place through selection in nature. The mounting skepticism 
stemmed from the inability of the theory of natural selection to adequately solve several 
nagging problems. For example, the gradual, cumulative nature of the process did not 
seem capable of causing radical change. Perhaps selection could account for a species 
getting incrementally better, say taller or faster, but how could it be responsible for the 
development of wings or eyes? Another problem involved time, or, more specifically, the 
lack of it. The prevailing estimate of the earth‘s age was between ten and a hundred 
million years old (which is around four billion years off current predictions), and a 
process as slow as natural selection could not possibly have generated the vast variety of 
life on earth in that time period. It simply took too much time.  
There was also the question of ―blending,‖ the common-sense criticism that 
natural selection of favorable abnormal traits would not modify a species because 
reproduction inexorably returns outliers to the mean. Take an abnormally tall person as 
an example. One could imagine relative height to be advantageous in certain 
                                                     
 




environments and reasonably speculate that this individual would have more children due 
to her comparative advantage. But what about the mate? The mate would almost certainly 
be shorter if in fact great heights were abnormal, and thus the children would most likely 
be only slightly taller than their peers. When these slightly taller children matured and 
reproduced with average partners of their own, their grandparent‘s initial advantage 
would be even further diminished, and so on through the generations.  
The lack of answers to problems such as these resulted in the rise of new 
explanations for evolution. Some of these explanations clung too tightly to outdated 
ideology and would fade from relevance. Others would inform scientific inquiry well into 
the twentieth-century. But they all undermined the credibility of natural selection. By 
1907, the reputation of Darwin‘s central insight had fallen far enough for the biologist 
Vernon Kellogg to argue, "(T)he fair truth is that the Darwinian selection theory, 
considered with regard to its claimed capacity to be an independently sufficient 
mechanical explanation of descent, stands today seriously discredited in the biological 
world."
99
 Kellogg‘s despairing words (he was a proponent of natural selection) might 
have been hyperbolic, but it does reflect the troubled history of one of today‘s most 
respected and widely accepted theories. As late as 1940, Julian Huxley, a British 
scientist, could reasonably label the collective efforts of natural selection‘s detractors as 
the ―eclipse of Darwinism.‖100  
One of the most serious challengers to natural selection was Lamarckism, which 
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had been labeled ―Neo-Lamarckism‖ to make it more palatable than the earlier, 
discredited theory, but with only minor modifications to the basic premise. Although 
August Weismann‘s experiments on rats‘ tails had repudiated the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics for the majority of scientists, the Neo-Lamarckians held on to the promise 
of perfectibility through evolution. Ernst Haeckel, a leader of this perspective, claimed 
that offspring only inherited characteristics that were willfully cultivated, like strength or 
intelligence, not arbitrary body modifications such as chopped off tails or foreskins. 
Primarily field naturalists and paleontologists, the Neo-Lamarckians contended that their 
work in the field revealed progressive phenotypic development among animals, not 
random change. Over time, bears had gotten stronger, fish had gotten faster; evolution 
seemed to correspond with the use of characteristics beneficial to each particular species. 
The Neo-Lamarckians believed Weismann‘s flawed experiment had caused the scientific 
community to prematurely accept natural selection, which had significant theoretical 
limitations.
101
 To prove their point, they began to conduct experiments of their own.  
Paul Kammerer, an Austrian biologist, conducted the most prominent of these 
experiments. He claimed that midwife toads could willfully adapt to changing 
environments. To demonstrate this fact, Kammerer increased the temperature in the 
toads‘ cages, forcing them to spend their time in the cool water rather than land, which is 
where they typically reside. In response, ―the males, probably on account of the difficulty 
of clasping the female in the water, have developed as an adaptation coarse swellings on 
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their thumbs.‖102 According to Kammerer, the midwife toad experiments proved 
Lamarckism, and, in turn, provided human beings with scientifically based optimism for 
the future: 
This wonderful new result, together will all those previously attained, 
opens an entirely new path for the improvement of our race, the purifying 
and strengthening of all humanity…If acquired characters, impressions of 
the individual life, can, as a general thing, be inherited, the works and 
words of men undoubtedly belong to them. Thus viewed, each act, even 
each word, has an evolutionary bearing…The active striving for definite, 
favorable, new qualities will in a like manner yield the power to transmit 
the capabilities which we have acquired, the activities which we have 
busily practiced, the overcoming of trials and illness—will leave 




Unfortunately for Kammerer and those who associated social progress with Lamarckism, 
his experiment soon fell under intense scrutiny and charges of fraud. In 1926, G.K. Noble 
of the American Museum of Natural History used microscopic analysis to prove that the 
―coarse swellings‖ on Kammerer‘s midwife toads were due to injections of India ink, not 
a natural biological development. Despite Kammerer‘s protestations of innocence (he 
claimed an assistant must have injected the frogs without his knowledge), the scientific 
community largely took him to be a fraud and he took his own life on September 23, 
1926, just a few weeks after the allegations surfaced.  
Around the same time, John William Heslop-Harrison claimed his experiments on 
peppered moths proved that they could change their coloration when exposed to 
pollution. However, his findings also fell under disrepute when other scientists were 
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unable to replicate the same result. How do we explain these desperate, scandalous 
efforts to advocate the inheritance of acquired characteristics? Of course, crass desire for 
individual recognition could have played a significant role. Less cynically, perhaps these 
men felt that Neo-Lamarckism was the only hope for a progressive future. Kammerer 
clearly believed his experiments on toads had direct implications for human beings and 
modern society. And there were certainly people outside scientific circles who felt that 
way. At the height of Kammerer‘s popularity, newspapers across the country joyfully 
speculated on the potential to create ―supermen‖ through willful evolution.104 In the 
preface to Back to Methuselah, George Bernard Shaw passionately declared, ―if one 
could not disprove selection, one must still, from the depths of one‘s conviction, tell its 
supporters that they are fools and liars.‖105 Apparently, the need for evolution to support 
the prospect of human perfectibility trumped any commitment to scientific integrity for 
Neo-Lamarckians, which meant this theory would remain influential, even if shrouded in 
scandal, until it could be definitively rebuked.   
Ideological concerns guided another one of natural selection‘s major competitors, 
orthogenesis, which is the theory that evolution intrinsically develops in a linear 
fashion.
106
 Orthogeneticists, however, were committed to scientific rather than social 
values. These men did not necessarily believe evolution validated social progress, like the 
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neo-Lamarckians did, nor did they believe that it led to some ―higher‖ or ―better‖ result, 
as that would be too teleological to be compatible with contemporary scientific views.
107
 
Instead, they remained committed to the notion that nature obeyed fixed, universal laws. 
An evolutionary theory firmly rooted in the scientific tradition established after the 
Scientific Revolution—and before the Second Scientific Revolution that revealed the 
extent to which chance and unpredictability govern reality—orthogenesis appealed to 
those who found solace in an understandable world, one where, as Einstein once said, 
―God doesn‘t play dice.‖108     
From the orthogenicists‘ point of view, natural selection was not simply a flawed 
scientific theory, it was not even qualified to be considered science. Science, when 
properly done, revealed universal laws, made accurate predictions, and could be proven 
wrong in experiments.
109
 Natural selection failed to meet all of these criteria because it 
depicted evolution as essentially random (Darwin himself faced similar criticism from the 
influential philosopher of science Sir John Herschel who contemptuously labeled 
Darwin‘s theory the ―law of higgledy-piggedly‖ for relying on chance and thus being 
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 Further, the orthogeneticists bemoaned Darwin‘s reliance on 
adaptation—a phenomenon for which there can be no incontrovertible evidence. They 
believed it was too easy to claim the adaptivity of a particular phenotypic characteristic 
and too hard to disprove. How, for example, does one show that the hair on human legs is 
not an adaptation to keep us warm? It sounds plausible, but plausibility cannot stand as 
the bedrock of science. Clever scientists could come up with adaptationist explanations 
for just about every trait, which would bring us no closer to the truth.  
To make their case, orthogeneticists sought examples of orderly, nonadaptive 
evolution.
111
 Horses featured prominently in these early efforts because their fossil record 
showed what appeared to be regular and goal-oriented evolution.
112
 In the eyes of 
orthogeneticists, the horses‘ phylogenetic tree was not random and branching, which is 
how most observers would see it today, but a clear progression toward the prototypical 
horse of today.
113
 It is as if the orthogeneticists believed there was a Platonic ideal for 
each species and that evolution was an effort to realize that ideal. The apparent evolution 
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―toward‖ the modern horse, therefore, supported the orthogenetic view that ―In all cases 
the individual and its series must change by growth along certain lines of 
modification.‖114 From the orthogenetic perspective, the ―growth‖ of a species, its 
evolution, was not a random process driven by natural selection but an orderly march 
toward a predetermined goal. Further, evolution was not necessarily adaptive, as natural 
selection claimed, but could lead a species to decline or even extinction. 
Orthogeneticists argued that the extinction of a species conclusively discredited 
Darwinian natural selection and adaptation. As paleontologists, they largely relied on the 
fossil record as evidence for their claims, and the fossil record showed that a number of 
species did not adapt to their environment over time. They went extinct. The Irish elk, for 
example, appeared to develop along a species-specific path that brought about a period of 
fecundity followed by a period of reduced fitness. At first, orthogeneticists speculated, 
the Irish elk‘s increasing antler size must have brought considerable advantages, but over 
countless generations the antlers continued to grow until they eventually became such a 
burden that the species could no longer successfully compete with its rival ungulates.
115
 
Russian biologist and staunch Darwin critic Lev S. Berg explained the orthogenetic  
implications of these findings: ―The fact that not infrequently evolution proceeds, as it 
were, in face of the environment, in a direction leading the organism to destruction‖ 
implies that ―there are intrinsic and constitutional agencies laid down in the chemical 
structure of the protoplasm, which compelled the organism to vary in a determined 
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direction.‖116 In other words, evolution was orderly, and it was nonadaptive.  
Orthogeneticists‘ commitment to ―determined‖ evolution did have one alarming 
drawback. If correct, the theory doomed the human race to an inevitable, catastrophic 
end, for, just as the Saber tooth tiger, Irish elk, and countless other that have become 
extinct before us, human evolution will eventually become maladaptive and lead to our 
demise. In a literal sense, the orthogeneticists believed, the lifespan of a species was 
analogous to that of an individual organism and the end is inevitably death. Alpheus 
Hyatt articulated upon the lifespan metaphor in On the Parallelism between the Different 
Stages of Life: ―The proportions between the different periods of life of any one 
individual may be compared with accuracy to the life of the group to which it belongs; in 
youth to what it is in the beginning, in the adult to what it is now, and in old age to what 
it is to be in the future.‖117 Another concerned thinker, British paleontologist F.A. Bather, 
also bemoaned the sad realization that ―decadent races, whether ostriches or human 
beings…await alike the inevitable hour.‖ Clearly, those who wanted science to align with 
social values, like the neo-Lamarckians, would be aghast at orthogenesis, for ―it follows 
(from orthogenesis) that the idea of human progress as a biological law ceases to be 
tenable.‖118 Yet, for the orthogeneticists, a more important battle had been won. They had 
grounded their evolutionary theory in observable evidence (the fossil record) and they 
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had demonstrated that biology behaved rationally, like physics, and indeed that each 
species rose and fell as predictably as an object in orbit.  
The naturalists and the paleontologists weren‘t the only ones with an alternative 
theory of evolution. Influenced by their working environment, geneticists proposed the 
theory of mutation, or ―saltationism,‖ as a replacement for natural selection. The 
geneticists eschewed the anecdotalism of fieldwork, preferring instead to conduct their 
work in a laboratory. There, they believed, they were able to conduct more ―professional‖ 
science. Not surprisingly, the sterile, artificial confines of the lab led them to de-
emphasize the importance of the natural environment, which played no role in their 
reach, and to focus instead on the factors existent in their experiments. What they found 
in their test tubes and under their microscopes was the radical transformation of a species, 
and even the creation of new ones, resulting from genetic mutations. 
The founder of Mutation Theory was the Dutch botanist Hugo DeVries. Working 
without any knowledge of Gregor Mendel, DeVries postulated that individual 
characteristics were heritable after conducting a number of experiments on the common 
evening primrose, ―Oenothera lamarckiana.‖119 In these experiments he discerned the 
existence of dominant and recessive traits, and how they interacted to produce variety 
through generations.
120
 The wild, dramatic changes the primrose made in the course of a 
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single reproduction caused DeVries to claim that mutations played a significant role in 
natural selection.
121
 According to DeVries, evolution did not take place gradually, it burst 
forth in rapid episodes of dramatic change. Dwarfs, giants, and albinos seemingly proved 




A major advantage to mutation theory was that it solved two of the major 
weaknesses of natural selection. If evolution took place rapidly, as it did according to 
DeVries, there was no longer any incompatibility between evolution and the relatively 
young earth (Remember, scientists at this time had miscalculated the age of the earth by 
billions of years). Also, the ―incomplete‖ fossil record was now complete. There weren‘t 
―gaps‖ in the record; evolution proceeded in fits and starts, which is exactly what the 
paleontologists were seeing. Convinced of his theory‘s superiority, DeVries lectured 
widely on its advantages, eventually compiling his arguments in a provocatively titled 
treatise, Species and Varieties: Their Origin by Mutation.
123
 
All of these competing theories of evolution eroded confidence in Darwinian 
natural selection, which brought into question the application of ―survival of the fittest‖ 
logic in public policy. Advocates of a laissez faire government that accepted social 
inequality as natural were worried, and rightly so. If, for example, the Neo-Lamarckians 
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were right, and an individual could pass along her acquired traits, would it not make more 
sense for the government to provide education and healthcare for everyone? Certainly 
that was better than letting people languish in poverty who had the potential for positive 
growth. Or, what if the mutationists were right and evolution actually took place in 
radical spurts? Did this not justify revolution as a means to progress? Perhaps the 
communist agitators in the street were right and the people should revolt for a better life.  
Clearly, the uncertainty about how evolution actually took place raised troubling political 
questions.  
At the time no theory of evolution was able to definitively establish its 
superiority, so these questions remained unanswered; however, scientific support for 
Social Darwinism and eugenics, both of which relied upon natural selection, almost 
disappeared amidst the confusion. The genetic research led by Devries and his 
successors, in particular, had a devastating effect on the prevailing acceptance of these 
views, for the more scientists looked into the inner-workings of genes, the more they 
realized that physical characteristics were vastly more complex than an expression of a 
single gene. Humbled, geneticists had come to realize that they barely understood how 
genes even functioned, which rendered absurd the idea that they could offer reasonable 
suggestions for how to manage the genetic stock of a diverse human population.  
The prime protagonist in this next generation of genetics research was Thomas 
Hunt Morgan. Having grown up in the American south, Morgan took up science as an 
adult to combat the religious beliefs that had suffocated him in his youth. Initially, he 
favored a blend of orthogenesis and mutation theory as the most plausible explanations 
for evolution, as natural selection smacked of religious mysticism to the young Morgan 
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because it explained too much, too simply, and seemed to engender the kind of blind faith 
among its adherents that he deplored.
124
 After establishing his famous ―fly rooms‖ at 
Columbia University in 1910, however, Morgan changed his views.
125
 Working with the 
fruit fly ―Drosophila,‖ he learned that mutations occurred in single genes and produced 
minor changes to the species and that the changes were random, not the by-product of an 
inner-directed course of evolution.
126
 These insights convinced him to disregard 
orthogenesis. He had found that the relationship between genes and phenotypes was the 
critical factor in evolution—and far more complex than previously understood. 
In 1916, Morgan‘s laboratory discovered that at least seven different factors 
determined a drosophila‘s eye color, effectively ending earlier hopes that phenotypic 
characteristics correlated to a single gene.
127
 In addition, genes appeared to be linked at 
times and interdependent at others. And in many cases there would be a ―crossing over‖ 
of genes from one chromosome to the other. As if that was not enough, Morgan and his 
researchers began to look at the affect of environment on trait development and 
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 Morgan‘s fly room was a radical scientific laboratory for its time. Unlike most 
labs, which featured a lead scientist and subordinates, Morgan‘s fly room embraced 
democratic scientific inquiry where everybody worked together as partners. This unique 
environment proved to be extremely successful, as five of Morgan‘s students went on to 
win the Nobel Prize.  
126
 He chose this species because it was inexpensive to culture in laboratory 
conditions, it had a short life cycle, it produced large numbers of externally laid embryos, 
and they could be genetically modified in numerous ways. 
127
 Calvin B. Bridges, ―Non-Disjunction as Proof of the Chromosome Theory of 




determined that the expression of a gene was intimately tied to its surroundings. Truly, 
genetics had undergone a significant transformation, as Morgan‘s genes opened up a 
world of questions that Mendel‘s genetics had not even thought to ask. Morgan‘s 
textbook The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity showed a new generation of geneticists 
the future of the field: exploring the incredible complexity of genes, not a naïve attempt 
to discover and manage the genes responsible for traits.
128
   
The professionalization of genetics had created an insurmountable gap between 
leading genetic theory and eugenics. If the eyes of flies were complex, human behavior 
was practically unfathomable. Subsequently, professional geneticists of the time went out 
of their way to counter the growing tide of eugenic policies. In his chapter on human 
genetics in Evolution and Genetics, Morgan reminded the reader, ―we (should not) feel 
any assurance in deciding genetic superiority or inferiority as applied to whole races.‖129 
In another early exhortation of the interdependence of nature and nature, Johns Hopkins 
geneticist Herbert Spencer Jennings wrote, ―Neither the material constitution alone, nor 
the conditions alone, will account for any event whatever, for it is always the 
combination that has to be considered.‖130 Eugenics was simply an impossible task 
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considering the newfound complexity of genes combined with cultural factors.  
The implausibility of eugenics, however, did not mean it could safely be ignored. 
The rise of the Nazi party to power in Germany made that clear. The specter of Nazism 
across the English Channel compelled the prominent British eugenicist, Julian Huxley, to 
begin arguing that ―race‖ was a social and not biological concept.131 There were no 
distinct races of ―Teutonic‖ people or Jews, he argued, so the Nazi narrative was 
fundamentally flawed. To prove his point, Huxley ironically queried, ―how close a 
composite of the black-haired Hitler, the broad-faced Rosenberg, the slight Goebbels, and 
the rotund Goering would come to the Teutonic ideal?‖132 In fact, scientific analysis of 
their characteristics revealed that Jews and Gentiles shared every trait imaginable, and 
there was no scientific way to discern who was who based solely on an analysis of 
phenotype. Subsequently, when speculating on how to improve society, ―a little goodwill 
might seem more fitting in treating those complicated questions than the attitude adopted 
by some of the modern race-propagandists.‖133 
In many ways, the rise of the Nazi party and their horrific effort to eliminate Jews 
and other ―undesirables‖ from their country would prove to be the proverbial ―final nail‖ 
in eugenics‘ coffin. Philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and scientists had 
effectively discredited the application of biology to human affairs among intellectuals, 
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but there is a big world outside the ivory tower and it was clear there would need to be a 
political repudiation as well to end eugenics once and for all. American resistance to Nazi 
eugenics, however, was not immediately forthcoming because the two countries 
embraced many of the same core values and prominent thinkers on both sides of the 
Atlantic shared the conviction that they were on the front lines in a pitched battle against 
―inferior‖ citizens‘ deleterious effects on their nations. Leon White, for example, who 
served as the secretary for the American Eugenics Society, lauded Nazi eugenic policies: 
―(we) have long been working earnestly toward something very like what Hitler has now 
made compulsory.‖134 Similarly, in the Journal of Heredity, an influential eugenics 
journal in the United States, Paul Popenoe admired Hitler‘s willingness to place ―his 
hopes of biological regeneration solidly on the application of biological principles of 
human society.‖135  
American eugenicists admired Nazi Germany‘s ability to quickly enact policies 
without the burden of democratic resistance or the appeal to constitutional rights. In the 
United States, eugenicists had only been able to sterilize relatively small numbers of 
people, primarily the incarcerated. Nazi Germany, on the other hand, passed the Eugenic 
Sterilization Law in 1933, and this gave the state the power to sterilize anyone disabled in 
some manner, despite their legal standing or protests to the contrary. Within three short 
years almost two-hundred and twenty-five thousand men and women had been sterilized, 
many of whom suffered from nonheritable diseases like blindness, physical deformity, 
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epilepsy, and alcoholism. To carry out this plan, the government required all doctors to 
report ―unfit‖ people to the newly formed Heredity Health Courts, and issued stiff 
penalties for those who did not comply. Besides efficiency, American eugenicists 
applauded Nazi Germany‘s early emphasis on ―positive‖ eugenics, which meant that they 
facilitated breeding among the ―biologically sound.‖ Lebensborn, translated literally as 
the ―fount of life,‖ was one prominent example of Nazism‘s positive eugenics. These 
were spa-like homes where S.S. mothers went to receive the best health care. Because 
these women did not need to be married to be admitted, many powerful Nazi leaders sent 
their mistresses there. For the ―desirable‖ women who were married, the government 
offered loans that would be forgiven upon the birth of a baby.   
The Nazis also found much to like across the ocean. German leadership, including 
Adolf Hitler himself, looked to the United States for historical guidance in how to solve 
the ―race problem.‖136 As terrible as it sounds, the United States government-sanctioned 
genocide of Native Americans actually inspired him because it effectively opened the 
country for white settlement in much they same way Hitler hoped to open an Aryan 
homeland, or Lebensraum, in Europe. Further, America‘s racist subordination of black 
people from slavery through Jim Crow modeled how a society founded on the principle 
of white supremacy could marginalize designated groups of others. In fact, Hitler 
considered Madison Grant‘s Passing of the Great Race to be his ―bible,‖ and wrote the 
author a flattering letter from prison. Here is Hitler explicitly praising American efforts to 
manage its national stock, ―There is today one state in which at least weak beginnings 
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toward a better conception are noticeable. Of course, it is not our model German 
Republic, but the American Union, in which an effort is made to consult reason at least 
partially. By refusing immigration on principle to elements in poor health, but simply 
excluding certain races from naturalization, it professes in slow beginnings a view which 
is peculiar to the folkish state concept.‖137  
The mutual respect among German and American eugenicists began to fracture, 
however, as Hitler continued to annex territory through military force. Americans 
increasingly viewed Germany less as a kindred progressive nation and more as a threat to 
Western values. To their horror, American eugenicists, who prided themselves on their 
commitment to objective science, witnessed Germany‘s management of their nation‘s 
genetic stock degrade into an ugly tool of political oppression. German intellectuals, 
some of the brightest men and women in the world, fled in droves, fearing that they, too, 
would be persecuted under the Nazi regime. Clearly, something had gone wrong, and it 
became incumbent to re-evaluate the relationship with Germany and the central tenets of 
eugenics.  
In 1933, Robert M. Hutchins at the University of Chicago formed the Emergency 
Committee in Aid of German Displaced Scholars. Within the year, multiple other 
universities followed suit. The rejection of Nazi terror cast eugenics in a new pejorative 
light. Herman J. Muller, an American geneticist and future Nobel laureate, wrote that 
eugenics had become ―hopelessly perverted‖ into a scientific justification for ―advocates 
of race and class prejudice, defenders of vested interests of church and state, Fascists, 
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Hitlerites, and reactionaries generally.‖138 When the Third International Congress of 
Eugenics was held in New York City, only a few hundred people attended.
139
 
Despite the changing tide of public opinion, the remaining advocates of eugenics 
were not simply quacks and racists. Many of them were eminent scholars. As such, they 
recognized that eugenics as previously conceived was over, but they held hope for new, 
more sophisticated efforts. Luminaries such as R.A Fisher, Karl Pearson, George Bernard 
Shaw, Julian Huxley, and Havelock Ellis led the new effort of ―reform eugenics,‖ which 
distinguished itself from earlier iterations by avoiding grand claims about the superiority 
of a certain race or class to instead focus on individuals. Presumably, this would be more 
democratic and less amenable to tyrannical government applications. Further, they 
operated within the new, Morganian paradigm of genetics that emphasized the role of 
environment in phenotype expression, leading them to support social welfare and other 
efforts to facilitate the positive expression of one‘s potential. Like their predecessors, 
these men believed it was possible to discern superior and inferior human beings; 
however, they believed that in order to do so it was necessary to first create a level 
playing field. In a 1936 lecture to the British Eugenics Society, Huxley succinctly 
articulated the reformist credo: ―We can‘t do much practical eugenics until we have more 
or less equalized the environmental opportunities of all class and types—and this must be 
by leveling up.‖140  
Soon, however, even the reformist eugenicists found themselves on tenuous 
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ground. After Hitler declared war on the United States in 1941, dialogue in the United 
States bifurcated into the simple binary of ―us‖ and ―them,‖ and it was no longer 
politically expedient to support policies that could be construed as Nazism. Further, 
eugenics, which had started as a seemingly practical attempt to scientifically manage 
society, had transformed into an effort to construct a ―master race.‖ This revolting cause, 
marred by increasing reports of mass murder, led people to view eugenics as simply 
scientific justification for committing atrocities to gain political ends. Former Auschwitz 
inmate Marie Claude Valliant-Couturier revealed the ugly truth behind the scientific 
facade: ―The Germans said they were looking for the best method of sterilization so they 
could repopulate all western European countries with Germans within one generation 
after the war.‖141  
Hitler‘s suicide on April twentieth, 1945 signified more than the military defeat of 
the Axis Powers. Major cultural changes followed as well. Germany abandoned its 
ambitions for imperial glory to become one of the more peaceful and progressive nations 
among its European peers. Japan, stripped of its military power, would reinvent its 
aggressive identity to embrace cartoons and entertainment.
142
 And throughout the 
industrialized world, nurture triumphed over nature as the lens through which to analyze 
human beings. Within two years after the fall of Nazi Germany, a leading scientist, 
geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky, and anthropologist, M.F Ashley-Montagu, declared a 
new consensus on the subject. ―Instead of having his responses genetically fixed as in 
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other animal species, man is a species that invents its own responses, and it is out of this 
unique ability to invent…his responses that cultures are born.‖143 No longer did one need 
to understand genes and genomes to be able to understand human beings. Yes, humans 
had evolved, but the salient aspect of our evolution was our flexibility. In the same 
article, Dobzhansky and Ashley-Montague explain, ―The effect of natural selection in 
man has probably been to render genotypic differences in personality traits, as between 
individuals and particularly as between races, relatively unimportant compared to their 
phenotype plasticity.‖144 
By the early 1950s, evolutionary analysis had no place in the social sciences, as 
academics across the disciplines collectively rejected notions of biological influence in 
human affairs and embraced cultural analysis as the future of intellectual inquiry. From a 
modern perspective, the repudiation of biological thinking might seem an unnecessary 
limitation, but for those personally involved in the endeavor (all of whom vividly 
remembered the atrocities committed by Nazis in the name of evolutionary progress), the 
decision was necessary. Further, the emphasis on culture was not solely a limitation; it 
was as much about exploring new ideas as it was about shutting the door on the racist, 
sexist perspectives of the past.  
After decades of academic wrangling, cultural analyses had firmly replaced 
biological interpretations among intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic and, in the 
process, a new vision of liberalism emerged. At the turn of the century liberals had 
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despaired when Weismann‘s experiments demonstrated that acquired characteristics 
could not be inherited because they had assumed that human beings‘ intrinsic worth was 
found in one‘s genes. If the genetic stock could not be ―improved‖ through education, it 
seemed like eugenics was the only viable path forward to progress. Now, due to a 
combination of philosophical dissent, academic rivalry, developments in genetics, and the 
horrors of Nazi Germany, the correlation between a person‘s worth and her genome had 
lost credibility. It was no longer necessary to improve one‘s genes to improve the 
individual; everyone is equally capable of development and it is the environment rather 
than aptitude that explains differences in ability. The new liberal consensus that emerged 
after World War II is akin to John Locke‘s ―blank slate‖ in that all human beings are born 
on equal footing, which places the responsibility on society to create positive 
environments conducive to growth.  
 Powerful governmental organizations promptly established the new liberal 
orthodoxy in the wake of biological determinism‘s fall from grace. Reflecting the 
political undertones that surrounded the shift in scientific opinion, the constitution of the 
recently formed United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) stated, "The great and terrible war that has now ended was a war made 
possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual 
respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, 
of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races."
145
 The assumption that men varied in 
ability had been with Western thinkers for centuries, but World War II placed that 
assumption on its head. Democratic values now reigned, so equality was assumed and it 
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was inequality that had to be explained. UNESCO‘s statement on ―The Race Question‖ 
on July eighteenth, 1950 captured the new ethos, declaring to the world that ―The law 
sees in each person only a human being who has the right to the same consideration and 
to equal respect. The conscience of all mankind demands that this be true for all the 
peoples of the earth.‖146 
 The liberal platform endorsed by governmental organizations deeply influenced 
academia, as universities depend on public funding and logically strive to demonstrate 
shared values, yet the relationship went both ways. To remain at the forefront of 
innovation and expertise, governments turn to academic advisors, and in this instance 
these two pillars of society mutually reinforced each other‘s liberal transformation—with 
results that outran the original intent. Beyond simply challenging biological determinism, 
prominent governmental and academic organizations increasingly denied any effect of 
biology on human behavior whatsoever. The third iteration of UNESCO‘s statement on 
race stated as fact a radically egalitarian perspective that seemingly claims biological 
distinctions don‘t even exist: ―All peoples of the world possess equal faculties for 
attaining the highest level in intellectual, technical, social, economic, cultural, and 
political development.‖147 Further, ―the differences between the achievements of the 
different peoples are entirely attributable to geographical, historical, political, economic, 
social, and cultural factors.‖148 In other words, every human being is exactly the same. 
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The shift in focus from biology to culture in the postwar era can be seen in 
academic journals. For generations, psychologists had been attempting to discern which 
physical distinctions explained the intellectual and emotional differences between people. 
These efforts had led otherwise reasonable men and women to prod one another‘s heads 
during phrenological exams.
149
 After that was discredited, the ―father‖ of American 
psychology, William James, continued to turn to nature to explain the mind. He 
speculated that biological instincts were at the core of one‘s thoughts and behaviors. 
James‘s successor, G. Stanley Hall, the first president of the American Psychological 
Association, argued that children were immature because they were literally evolving 
through the phases of human development. According to this theory, Caucasian children 
could develop past this stage, but people of color could not, which is what explained their 
purportedly perpetual childishness. Between 1935 and 1940, however, the Journal of 
Applied Psychology published no articles on race, gender, or heredity.
150
 The American 
Sociological Review was also silent on these subjects, which is striking because they had 
been a mainstay of biological sociology prior. Committing to the new, prevailing views, 
the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences baldly stated that there is ―no conclusive 
evidence of genetic differences between races.‖151  
 Ahead of the curve in the appreciation of diversity thanks to Franz Boas‘ lasting 
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legacy, the American Anthropological Association had previously denounced biological 
determinism at a 1938 conference, yet other social sciences followed suit during the 
liberal consensus after the war. In 1961, the American Sociological Society officially 
declared the discipline‘s alignment with cultural analyses. Its president, Robert Faris, 
explained, ―(In the past) ability was generally held to be fixed in a biological inheritance 
and improvable, if at all, only by a glacially slow and impractical eugenics program. We 
no longer heed the doctrinaire testers who pronounce specific individuals limits for 
potentialities in mechanical ability, language ability, artistic ability, and mathematical 
ability.‖152 Basking in the victory over fascist ideals, academics embraced the liberal 
consensus that had formed. ―Barriers in many fields of knowledge are falling before the 
new optimism which that anybody can learn anything,‖ Faris exulted.153  
Leading intellectuals across the social sciences and humanities left biological 
reasoning behind to explore the effects of culture, establishing a cross-discipline liberal 
consensus in post-World War II academia. Ruth Benedict led the way in anthropology. 
Born in New York City in 1887, Benedict lost her father at a young age. This early 
experience with death left a lasting impression on her, which can be seen in the somewhat 
macabre fascination with mortality throughout her studies. Perhaps this contemplation of 
death, the great universal among mankind, conditioned her to accept arguments for 
human beings‘ equal potential. Or perhaps it was the charisma of her thoughtful, 
compassionate professor, Franz Boas, that brought her to dispel notions of an intrinsic 
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biological hierarchy among human beings. In any case, Benedict, who as president of the 
American Anthropological Association earned the distinction of becoming the first 
woman to serve as president of a major American academic organization, fearlessly 
attacked any vestiges of biological thinking that remained in her discipline. According to 
Benedict, the modern world brought together previously unfamiliar peoples, and it was 
imperative to move past the ―nationalism and racial snobbery‖ that had characterized the 
early encounters.
154
 Anthropologists under her considerable influence accepted as fact 
that, when studying a person from another culture, ―not one item of his tribal social 
organization, of his language, of his local religion, is carried in his germ cell.‖155  
 For anthropologists, culture was not an expression of a people‘s inherent 
characteristics but rather as a way of life that developed in response to unique 
environmental conditions. ―Most people are shaped to the form of their culture because of 
the malleability of their original endowment,‖ declared Benedict in her defining work, 
Patterns of Culture.
156
 This reversal of primacy between nature and nurture, this firm 
declaration that indeed the cultural ―egg‖ comes before the natural ―chicken,‖ had 
profound implications for the perception of individual beings. According to Benedict and 
others at this time, Babies are not born with any essential, intrinsic characteristics. They 
are blank slates, and in the new political and cultural climate any discussion about human 
nature was decried as biological determinism, and the first step on the slippery slope to 
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racism, sexism, and xenophobia. Leslie White, who would later become the president of 
the American Anthropological Association, reflected the discipline‘s views on cultural 
primacy:  
 The fallacy of illusion here is, of course, that what one takes for ―human 
nature‖ is not natural at all but cultural. The tendencies, emphases, and 
content that one sees in the overt behavior of human beings are often not 
due to innate biological determination…but to the stimulation of external 
cultural elements. Much of what is commonly called ―human nature‖ is 





The repudiation of biology had transformed how intellectuals perceived human beings. 
Instead of seeking to understand why human beings were so fundamentally different, 
social scientists sought to understand how culture created differences among 
fundamentally equal humans. And the new assumption at the heart of this intellectual 
endeavor was that an individual ―has no instincts, because everything he is and has 
become he has learned, acquired, from his culture, from the man-made part of the 
environment, from other human beings.‖158   
 Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal joined Benedict in the postwar advocacy of nurture 
over nature and ―blank-slate‖ human nature, writing several influential books on the 
matter, most notably his classic denunciation of racism in America, An American 
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. Born in Sweden in 1898, Myrdal 
experienced the terror of an expanding fascist Germany and became virulently opposed to 
arguments for biological inferiority, believing them to be ignorant justification for violent 
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repression. In 1938 the Carnegie Foundation funded Myrdal to study race relations in 
America, and he concluded, along with co-authors R.M.E Sterner and Arnold Rose, that 
black Americans‘ relatively poor economic and social standing resulted from systemic 
discrimination.
159
 There was no hint of a racial hierarchy in the book, which upended 
white America‘s self-flattering narrative of themselves as the nation‘s rightful leader. The 
change in perspective had tremendous political implications. If black Americans were 
equally capable yet remained marginalized, white Americans could no longer portray 
themselves as benevolent paternalists; they were tyrants who repressed others for their 
own advantage. According to Myrdal, "(w)hite prejudice and discrimination keep the 
Negro low in standards of living, health, education, manners and morals. This, in its turn, 
gives support to white prejudice. White prejudice and Negro standards thus mutually 
‗cause‘ each other."160  
 Myrdal‘s solution to the ―negro problem‖ in America would certainly not be 
eugenics, as there was nothing ―wrong‖ with black people.161 Instead, Myrdal advocated 
public education—the logical conclusion derived from the premise of universal human 
nature. In American Dilemma, he explains, ―(t)he trend toward a rising educational level 
of the Negro population is of tremendous importance for the power relations discussed in 
this part of our inquiry. Education means an assimilation of White American Culture. It 
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decreases the dissimilarity of the Negroes from other Americans.‖162 Those last lines 
might surprise you. But, remember, many post-World War II liberals did not value 
diversity per se. This was the old, not the ―new‖ left. They still accepted, whether 
consciously or subconsciously, the notion that their way of thinking, that their way of 
living, was objectively superior. The primary distinction from their predecessors was the 
fact that they believed nonwhite people were capable of thinking and behaving the same 
way whereas their predecessors believed nonwhites to be physiologically incapable of 
making the necessary ―improvement.‖ Subsequently, instead of arguing for postmodern 
education, Myrdal argued that black Americans ―acquire the traits held in esteem by the 
dominant white Americans.‖163 
 Public education quickly became a central pillar in the post-World War II liberal 
platform. Of course, it was imperative that this education was free and of equal quality, as 
early inequalities in educational experience would only exacerbate existing patterns of 
socioeconomic privilege. In practical terms, this meant that black children required 
access to the same schools as white children, and this is indeed what happened, albeit 
slowly and not without tremendous struggle. In Brown v. Board, the landmark Supreme 
Court case that integrated public schools, Chief Justice Warren and the other justices 
unanimously rejected Plessy v. Ferguson‗s racist precedent and accepted contemporary 
social scientists‘ optimistic arguments for equal potential among all people regardless of 
race or ethnicity. The critical question of exactly how to educate the nation‘s children 
immediately engaged some of America‘s brightest thinkers, as the ―blank slate‖ model of 
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the mind upset earlier Progressive pedagogy that focused on training individuals to 
perform roles they were ―naturally‖ predisposed to play in society.164  
 Harvard psychologist Burrhus Frederick ―B.F.‖ Skinner dominated post-World 
War II pedagogy in the United States. Born in a small town in Pennsylvania, Skinner 
originally wanted to be a writer. In college he became friends with Robert Frost and 
wrote short stories. His efforts, however, failed and the sensitive young man went 
through what he called his ―dark years.‖ It was at this time he became familiar with the 
work of John B. Watson, an early twentieth-century psychologist who pioneered 
―behaviorism,‖ which is the belief that one‘s behavior is the result of conditioning rather 
than an expression of one‘s personality (Indeed, from the perspective of behaviorism, 
there is no such thing a person‘s intrinsic personality). Like his contemporaries, Watson 
was interested in professionalizing his discipline, making it a ―real‖ science. In genetics, 
Thomas Morgan had led his colleagues away from field study and into the sterile, 
predictable confines of the laboratory. Likewise, Watson focused on what could be 
measured, behavior, and not what must remain speculative, the inner world of 
somebody‘s consciousness. For Watson, psychology should be ―a purely objective 
experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of 
behavior.‖ To that end, he experimented on monkeys for years, testing his ability to 
predict their response to a given set of circumstances, before eventually focusing on 
infants in the late 1920s.  
As a pre-World War II intellectual, Watson was not party to the absolute rejection 
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of biological influence on humans. In fact, like many of his peers, he assumed evolution 
played a large role in our individual lives and, by extension, to society as a whole. ―The 
behaviorist…recognizes no dividing line between man and brute,‖ he exclaimed in 
―Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.‖165 So, how could a Watson, a man entirely at 
home in the intellectual world of his evolutionary-minded peers, inspire Skinner to 
establish a liberal pedagogy founded on the assumption of man‘s distinction from the 
animal kingdom? Well, by refusing to investigate consciousness and focusing instead on 
behavior, he essentially created the chasm between biology and culture that post-World 
War II academics sought. For them, there was no intrinsic human, and, for Watson, 
human nature existed but was too complex to be studied scientifically. Theoretically, 
therefore, a significant divide existed between the two camps, but, practically speaking, 
Watson‘s work was the perfect precursor. A letter he wrote to his close friend Robert 
Yerkes, who was largely responsible for the rise of intelligence testing in the United 
States, makes the intellectual precedent clear, ―To my mind, it is not up to the behavior 
man to say anything about consciousness.‖166 
After reading Watson‘s work during his ―dark years,‖ Skinner became invigorated 
by behaviorism‘s potential applications to education. After earning a doctorate in 
psychology at Harvard, he would write prolifically on the subject for the next sixty years, 
publishing twenty-one books and one hundred and eighty articles. In addition, he used the 
mechanical aptitude he had developed on his childhood farm to build inventions based on 
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his pedagogical principles. These included an air crib, a teaching machine, and, my 
personal favorite, a pigeon-guided missile, which placed pigeons in the missile‘s 
transparent cone and trained them to steer the missile by pecking where they saw the 
intended target. Unfortunately for Skinner and those with a fondness for the absurd, the 
military decided to pass on this particular suggestion because, Skinner lamented, ―no one 
would take us seriously.‖167 He called his perspective ―radical behaviorism‖ and he 
believed it represented a radical departure from existing pedagogy: ―For twenty five 
hundred years people have been preoccupied with feelings and mental life, but only 
recently has any interest been shown in a more precise analysis of the role of the 
environment. Ignorance of that role led in the first place to mental fictions.‖168  
The primary influence Skinner had on education was to create the belief that 
students needed to engage in behavior in order to learn rather then passively receive 
information. Only by engaging in learning tasks could students receive the feedback they 
needed to make better decisions in the future. He based this model of education on his 
―principle of reinforcement,‖ which postulated that free will as commonly understood did 
not exist, and that all human actions are conditioned by the consequences of previous 
actions. To induce desirable behavior, both negative and positive feedback were 
effective, yet he preferred positive consequences when dealing with children, as 
punishment was prone to lead to other, unwanted consequences. The culmination of his 
academic work was Verbal Behavior, which tied together behaviorism with linguistics, 
yet he is probably best remembered for Walden Two, a utopian novel that demonstrates 
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the benefits of a society guided by behavior management.
169
  
 The psychologist Skinner had joined his colleagues in sociology and anthropology 
to establish a post-World War II liberal orthodoxy that fiercely resisted any mention of 
biology when discussing human beings. Cultural analysis had become the only acceptable 
form of analysis for a generation of scholars. These men and women did not establish an 
academic orthodoxy out of thin air, however. Biological considerations had been under 
scrutiny for quite some time before then. Philosophers, hearkening back to the great 
David Hume, challenged the notion that one could logically infer anything about humans 
by looking to nature. Led by Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore, they argued that 
evolutionary-derived theories suffered from the ―ought/is‖ the ―naturalistic‖ fallacy. The 
rise of the social sciences as independent disciplines also fractured the foundation of 
biological thinking. As fledgling disciplines, they strove to assert their autonomy from 
the natural sciences by demarcating clear boundaries between cultural and biological 
academic issues. (It is for this reason the father of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim, 
put forth his dictum that social facts must be explained by social theories.) 
Developments in genetics had likewise undermined facile applications of biology 
to humans such as eugenics or ―scientific‖ racism. Thomas Hunt‘s experiments in the ―fly 
room‖ had shown the tremendous complexity of genetic inheritance and its intimate 
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relationship with the environment. From that point forward, few professional geneticists 
believed it was possible to responsibly manage evolution. Finally, the horror of the 
holocaust, which put on graphic display the potential for terrible violence once people are 
categorized as ―naturally‖ inferior or superior, provided moral justification for the liberal 
victors of the war to declare an end to speculation on the relationship between biology 
and human behavior. Cultural analysis had political and academic backing at the highest 
levels, and it had the moral high ground. Anyone who violated the taboo and attempted to 
discern biology‘s influence on people would face significant consequences, both 







THE MODERN SYNTHESIS  
 
 
By the 1950s social scientists had completely abandoned biology as a tool for 
their research. Unlike their turn-of-the-century predecessors, almost all of whom wrestled 
with the implications of evolution for human beings, postwar intellectuals focused 
entirely on culture as the key to unlocking the mysteries of human behavior. This is not to 
say that universities retreated into a ―dark ages‖ of evolutionary denial. In fact, there was 
near consensus among all educated people that human beings evolved. However, the 
methodology of analyzing human affairs through an evolutionary lens had been 
discredited, seemingly for good.  
From the new cultural perspective equality was assumed and inequality required 
an explanation. Thus, one of the great projects of the postwar social sciences was 
determining the cultural factors that had led to a nation‘s relative standing. In the context 
of military victory and newfound status as a global superpower, postwar American 
scholars initially succumbed to self-flattery and investigated what cultural factors had 
made the United States so great. During this era of ―liberal consensus‖ intellectuals 
celebrated democracy and capitalism as the twin pillars of successful society. In time, 
however, the civil rights movement compelled a new generation of thinkers to examine 
the unfulfilled promise of democracy and capitalism for those removed from power, 
primarily Americans of color and women, who in fact comprised the majority of the 
population. Liberalism had evolved, pardon the pun, to embrace diversity and post-
  
97 
modern perspectives, yet the rejection of evolutionary thinking remained constant 
because the new generation of scholars was unapologetically political and any 
perspective that could be used to justify inequality in their minds was anathema to their 
progressive agenda. The new liberals, who came to be known as the ―New Left,‖ had 
seen enough of supposedly natural discrimination.
170
  
 In academia, disagreement alone should not be enough to remove an idea from 
circulation. Heavily influenced by Hegel‘s dialectic concept, Western universities, in 
theory at least, embrace the chance to develop collective understanding through the 
creative tension of synthesis and antithesis. From this perspective, evolutionary thinking 
could have played an important role even for those who disagreed with its fundamental 
tenets. Simple disagreement alone did not cause Progressives in the 1960s to continue the 
liberal disavowal of evolutionary thinking. It was also the fact that the application of 
evolutionary thinking to human affairs lacked credibility. As discussed previously, a 
number of factors had caused intellectuals to reject the evolutionary perspective as a 
legitimate lens for inquiry. Philosophically, politically, scientifically, and ethically it was 
bankrupt, and thus academia could, with good conscience, search for answers in other 
directions.  
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 Of course, there were outliers from the consensus, iconoclasts who insisted that 
the discovery of evolution had irrevocably transformed the intellectual landscape. These 
stubborn souls believed there was no intrinsic relationship between evolution and 
authoritarian politics. They saw the exclusive focus on culture as an intellectual retreat 
from the search for truth, one made in the context of extreme political pressures that 
could be reversed through dialogue. For the most part these were natural scientists, so 
they were protected them from the strongest winds of intellectual censorship. Also, 
whether deserved or not, the natural sciences benefited from a reputation of objectivity, 
making the authors less susceptible to personal attacks.  
The evolutionary biologists Julian Huxley, Ernst Mayr, and Theodosius Dobzhansky 
all wrote popular works demonstrating the compatibility of anthropology with 
evolutionary theory. Luminaries in their respective fields, these men commanded respect 
from their peers but their contemporaries in the social sciences and humanities largely 
ignored them. The taboo was simply too strong. In 1946, when the new International 
Society for the Study of Evolution (SSE) began, not a single anthropologist attended.
171
 
Mayr actively sought anthropologists who would be willing to submit papers to the 
journal Evolution, but these otherwise publication-hungry academics declined the offer 
en masse. Amazingly, the journal‘s opening decade, which began in 1946, only received 
three submissions from anthropologists, much to the chagrin of its publishers. They 
believed social scientists were remaining willfully ignorant of the latest developments in 
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evolution, developments that revealed the inherently contingent nature of biology, 
making it irreducible to inviolable laws like physics and thus unsuitable for speculations 
about human beings‘ supposedly innate characteristics.  
Dobzhansky‘s work on the origin of species, for example, had shown that a species 
was in fact a diverse population whose commonality ended with the ability to reproduce 
together. According to him, a species was not, as had been previously assumed, a discrete 
and intrinsically similar entity. Diversity, not homogeneity, was the reality, meaning that 
categories such as race were simply ―a tool for description‖ and not an actual biological 
entity.
172
 The more this generation of scientists explored evolution the stronger their 
conviction that it was not the reductionist or determinist dogma the social scientists 
feared it to be. Further, they directly addressed the philosophical concerns raised by 
Sidgwick and Moore earlier in the century, namely that any application of evolutionary 
thinking to human affairs was a violation of the is/ought and naturalistic fallacies. How 
they did so was quite surprising: they completely agreed. ―Of course,‖ they said, you 
should not attempt to derive human values from observations of nature. But this does not 
mean you should ignore evolution, essentially sticking your head in the sand and hoping 
for the best. Genuine intellectuals explore truth wherever it may lead, and if there are 
unsavory aspects of evolution, we should aim to transcend them. Dobzhansky and 
Huxley, for example, believed humans were indeed inclined to act selfishly due to 
selection pressures, but they also believed ―man could escape its own brute nature 
through use of mind.‖173 
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 So, how does one explain the paradox of natural scientists clamoring for social 
scientists to accept evolution while social scientists reject evolutionary thinking because 
it is scientifically discredited? The answer, in part, is the inevitable ―lag‖ between 
scientific thought and the dissemination of that knowledge to laymen. Post-World War II 
social scientists were absolutely correct that geneticists and evolutionary biologists had 
discredited evolutionary thinking in the early twentieth-century. At the time, natural 
selection seemed incapable of answering several important questions, which had led to 
competing theories for the mechanisms of variation and inheritance. The only 
fundamental agreement among turn-of-the-century scientists regarding evolution was that 
there were far too many uncertainties to enable a responsible application of evolutionary 
theories to human affairs. Scientific inquiry, however, did not stop there. While social 
scientists eagerly explored cultural theories for human behavior, the natural scientists 
continued to search for the true mechanism behind evolution, eventually resolving the 
competing theories into a single, coherent framework known as the ―modern 
synthesis.‖174 Without much fanfare, scientists had overcome one of the primary 
obstacles to the biologically informed social science: the absence of a scientific 
consensus. Although intellectuals throughout the social sciences and humanities 
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continued to reject the application of biology to their disciplines, a new foundation had 
been established upon which it was possible to reintroduce evolutionary thinking to 
human affairs. To understand how the synthesis came to be, and to understand how the 
synthesis would eventually serve as the catalyst for the return of evolutionary thinking in 
the social sciences, requires a brief look at developments in evolutionary biology during 
the first half of the twentieth-century.  
 Remember, there were three primary alternatives to natural selection that divided 
the scientific community at the turn of the century: Neo-Lamarckism, orthogenesis, and 
mutation theory. Of these three, only mutation theory had the potential for lasting 
relevance, as orthogenesis and Neo-Lamarckism both suffered from attachments to 
outdated ideals that kept them firmly rooted in the past and unable to carry the torch of 
evolutionary thinking in the modern world. It is not surprising, then, that the most 
influential theories of evolution time embraced probability, technology, and the 
professionalization of intellectual inquiry. Biometrics, founded by Charles Darwin‘s 
cousin, Francis Galton, sought to modernize evolutionary biology by incorporating 
sophisticated mathematics and statistical methods. Raphael Weldon, a leading 
biometrician, declared, ―The questions raised by the Darwinian hypothesis are purely 
statistical, and the statistical method is the only one at present obvious by which that 
hypothesis can be experimentally checked.‖175 Galton also inspired the other leading 
theory of evolution in the early twentieth-century, Mendelian genetics, by theorizing that 
especially evolution could not occur as the result of continuous variation due to the 
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blending of inheritance and thus must occur during episodic ―bursts.‖  
Biometrics and Mendelian genetics were not fundamentally incompatible.  For 
one, the leaders of both fields started out as friends. William Bateson, who would become 
the world‘s foremost expert in Mendelian genetics, and Raphael Weldon, the preeminent 
biometrician, went to school together in the late 1800s. And while not all schoolmates 
necessarily enjoy each other‘s company, Mrs. Bateson described Weldon as her 
husband‘s ―most intimate friend‖ during his college years.176 Further, both sides 
considered the same figure, Francis Galton, to be their mentor. Bateson freely expressed 
his admiration, ―The novelty of (Galton‘s) thoughts and the freshness of his outlook on 
nature are not to be found in any other living writer, so far as I know. I often remember 
the thrill of pleasure with which I first read Heredity Genius and the earlier chapters of 
Natural Inheritance.‖177 Likewise, the biometricians saw themselves as Galton‘s 
intellectual descendants. Karl Pearson, a prominent biometrician and the most 
mathematically gifted of the group, spent countless hours discussing evolution with 
Galton, considering himself the elder‘s protégé. Their relationship was close enough that 
upon Galton‘s death Pearson took it upon himself to write a heartfelt biography ―without 
regard for traditional standards, to the needs of publishers or to the tastes of the reading 
public.‖178  Despite their shared collegiate experience and mutual respect for Galton, 
however, the two sides bifurcated into opposing camps rather than work together to solve 
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the problems plaguing evolutionary theory.  
Biometrics emerged as a discipline to serve a specific function, ―measuring the 
degree of correlation between the variation of different characters,‖ which is a 
surprisingly narrow raison d’etre for an entire discipline that can only be understood by 
looking closely at the writings of its founder.
179
 Galton ―had long been interested in the 
properties of the normal distribution and how it could be applied to what we now 
recognize as continuously varying traits such as stature.‖180 Normal, Gaussian 
distributions, he thought, supported the notion that evolution occurred gradually through 
the relative success of segments of the population, while wild, random distributions 
supported saltationism, or evolution through sporadic ―jumps.‖ Accepting the task of 
empirical discovery, the biometricians quickly set out to measure the natural world, and 
their early efforts revealed that each species‘ characteristics indeed varied along the 
Gaussian bell-curve, confirming Darwin‘s original conclusions. As more and more data 
came in, the biometricians realized that ―statistical regularities, based on ever more fine-
grained analysis of correlated phenomena, could generate predictions and even guide 
interventions,‖ which led them to believe that they were on the right track toward 
reestablishing evolution on solid scientific ground.
181
  
The Mendelians were not interested in Galton‘s call to mathematical arms in the 
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natural sciences, preferring to investigate his theory that evolution occurred in 
discontinuous ―sports.‖ Galton had personally concluded that evolution could not occur 
in small, incremental steps in 1884, when he realized that his ―ancestral law of heredity,‖ 
which claimed that all of one‘s ancestors contributed proportionally to heredity, would 
inevitably lead phenotype variations back to the mean over time.
182
 There simply had to 
be large leaps of change that established entirely new phenotypes. The question was how 
do those leaps occur? William Bateson, who would become the leading Mendelian, had 
struggled with this problem for years. As a graduate student, he had been an orthodox 
Darwinian thinker but his studies of marine habitats in isolated Russian lakes revealed no 
adaptation despite the presence of distinct and isolated environments. He then focused on 
one of the central transformations in evolutionary history, the genesis of vertebrates in an 
entirely invertebrate world, and became convinced that evolution was indeed episodic 
rather than smooth. In 1894 he wrote Materials for the Study of Variation, whose subtitle, 
Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species firmly established 
him as a disciple of Galton.
183
 With the zeal of a convert, Bateson toured England 
lecturing on saltationism, during which time he came across Mendel‘s genetics, a theory 
he was ―primed‖ to recognize as the answer to evolution‘s central problems due to its 
emphasis on discrete, mutational variations.  
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In hindsight, we know that Mendelism and Darwin are not mutually exclusive, 
that they are in fact mutually supportive; however, in the early twentieth-century these 
two schools of thought saw each other as antagonists. Perhaps this was inevitable. Gregor 
Mendel, the Austrian monk Mendelism is named after, certainly opposed Darwinism, as 
the theory of natural selection was directly associated with atheism in German-speaking 
countries in his lifetime.
184
 In addition, there were several personal and professional 
differences between the leading biometricians and Mendelians that made cooperation 
difficult. For one, the biometricians were academic insiders, holding prestigious posts at 
Cambridge and London University, and thus held a personal stake in academic 
orthodoxy, while Bateson frequently roamed the world, teaching and researching in the 
United States, Russia, and even Egypt. It makes sense that he would be less attached to 
the status quo. Also, the biometricians prided themselves on their mathematical acumen, 
and Bateson, who had always struggled with math, simply could not comprehend much 
of their work. ―Pearson‘s treatment is an algebraic of form and beyond me,‖ he 
admitted.
185
 Nonetheless, the supremely confident Bateson refused to believe calculation 
superseded theory in the search for knowledge: ―We have been told of late, more than 
once, that Biology must become an exact science. The same is my own fervent hope. But 
exactness is not always attainable by numerical precision: there have been students of 
Nature, untrained in statistical nicety, whose instinct for truth yet saved them from 
perverse inference, from slovenly argument, and from misuse of authorities, reiterated 
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Politics also played a critical factor in the intractable debate. Biometrics, with its 
commitment to growth through gradual adaptation, appealed to conservatives who 
preferred small-scale reforms to the radical revolutionary proselytizing of socialists and 
anarchists heard throughout the crowded streets of every major Western city. Karl 
Pearson clearly saw the connection: ―No great change ever occurs with a leap; no great 
social reconstruction, which will permanently benefit any class of the community, is ever 
brought about by a revolution. It is the result of a gradual growth, a progressive change, 
what we term an evolution. This is as much a law of history as of nature.‖187 Further, the 
methodology of biometrics, with its focus on measurement and predictable variation, 
supported governmental efforts to manage their populations‘ genetic stock through 
eugenics—a policy supported explicitly by Pearson, who believed that August 
Weismann‘s experiments with rats had effectively put an end to notions of human 
improvement. Bateson, who strongly opposed the science of biometrics, found even less 
appeal in its social implications. He believed progress came through in bursts of genius, 
not plodding reform. ―It is upon mutational novelties, definite favourable variations, that 
all progress in civilization … must depend,‖ he claimed, convinced of a deeper truth that 
transcended science and society.
188
 To his horror, the biometricians, whom he saw as 
unimaginative men kept busy in a fool‘s errand of measurement, wanted to cull the 
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exceptional outliers from the world in an attempt to create a dystopian world of 
bureaucrats.  
Clearly, the conflict between the biometricians and Mendelians was complex and 
involved myriad personal and professional factors. Over time, different authors have 
interpreted the tension in numerous ways, each bringing to light important details and 
providing helpful insights.
189
 The most useful way to understand the conflict, however, is 
to view the participants as intellectual pioneers who had moved past the teleology of 
progress in the natural world but had yet to feel totally at home with probability rather 
than certainty as the ultimate scientific reality. That is to say, they remained committed to 
the notion that there was a single explanation rather than multiple valid views. Neither 
the biometricians nor the Mendelians could accept the logic of another paradigm, for to 
do so was to jettison all that was right with their own work (although recent 
developments in physics, most notably the double slit experiment on light, had 
shockingly demonstrated that reality was in fact both conditional and uncertain). Pearson 
captured the distance between the two camps quite well, exclaiming, ―Mr. Bateson and I 
do not use the same language.‖190 And indeed he did not, at least initially. In order to 
articulate Mendelian genetics, Bateson and his colleague Wilhelm Johanssen had to 
invent new words such as ―gene,‖ ―genotype,‖ and ―phenotype.‖ Only then did people 
outside the discipline have the tools to comprehend the world of heritability hidden 
behind physical appearances. It would take a new generation of thinkers, men entirely at 
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ease with uncertainty to build a solid foundation for evolutionary biology.  
The first men to lay the bricks of that foundation were an eclectic cast of 
characters with larger-than-life reputations. Ronald Fisher, a British statistician and 
biologist, demonstrated an otherworldly aptitude for mathematics at an early age. Due to 
his poor vision he learned to solve complex equations in his head—an ability that both 
frustrated and awed others who bemoaned his tendency to forego written proofs. 
According to evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, Fisher was ―the greatest biologist 
since Darwin.‖191 J.B.S Haldane, a British-Indian aristocrat, fought with the infantry in 
World War I and wrote Marxist articles for the Daily Worker. He is best known today for 
his pithy comments on life. For example, when asked his opinion on God he responded, 
―If he exists, he must have an inordinate fondness for beetles.‖192 And, when 
contemplating the cosmos, he wrote, ―My own suspicion is that the universe is not only 
queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.‖193 The final member of this 
group, the American Sewall Wright, was less obviously idiosyncratic—although he was 
the son of two first cousins and he wrote extensively on the effects of inbreeding. 
Together, these luminaries, along with others who followed their lead, developed what 
came to be known as the ―modern synthesis,‖ which is a nebulous term but one that 
contemporaries saw as the merging of antagonistic fields. Julian Huxley, who coined the 
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term, explained, ―Biology in the last twenty years, after a period in which new disciplines 
were taken up in turn and worked out in comparative isolation, has become a more 
unified science. It has embarked upon a period of synthesis, until today it…is coming to 
rival the unity of older sciences like physics.‖194  
These men faced many of the same obstacles establishing a consensus that the 
previous generation of biometricians and Mendelians did, so their success cannot be 
ascribed to a simple change of circumstances. In many ways, Haldane and Fisher, due to 
their commitment to quantitative analysis, were the natural inheritors of biometry. In ―A 
Mathematical Theory of Natural Selection‖ Haldane makes this connection explicit: ―A 
satisfactory theory of natural selection must be quantitative (for) in order to establish the 
view that natural selection is capable of accounting for the known facts of evolution we 
must show not only that it can cause a species to change, but that it can cause it to change 
at a rate which will account for present and past transmutations.‖195 Fisher seemed to 
have even deeper ties to biometry. Like Pearson before him, he was primarily a 
statistician and became involved in evolutionary theory indirectly, in his case after 
reading the classic biometric paper, ―Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of 
Evolution.‖196 Over the years he developed a friendship with the aging Pearson, and 
would often submit his papers to the elderly biometrician for feedback and praise.  It 
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would have been all too easy for Fisher to follow in Pearson‘s footsteps and to continue 
denying Mendelism had any legitimacy. Likewise, Sewall Wright seemed perfectly 
poised to carry the mantle of Mendelism, for he was also a geneticist whose ―home-
made‖ knowledge of mathematics hindered his ability to meaningfully critique the 
quantitative methods being championed as the future of the discipline.
197
  
What differentiated these scholars from their predecessors was not the benefit of 
more amenable personalities nor a reduction in academic politics, but a shared 
recognition that ―at rock bottom the world is governed in significant measure by laws of 
chance.‖198 How to explain such a drastic change of perspective? The historians of the 
philosophy of science, David Depew and Bruce H. Weber, explain: ―By the end of the 
nineteenth-century, Newton‘s luminous explanation of the system of the world had been 
honorifically retired as an exemplar of great physics. Two new, but closely related, 
paradigm cases had taken its place: Maxwell‘s reduction of the phenomenological gas 
laws, relating temperature, pressure, and volume to statistically calculable collisions 
between millions of molecules, and hard on its heels, Boltzmann‘s reduction of 
thermodynamics to more or less probably arrays of molecular motion.‖199 As a result, the 
new generation of thinkers (which included Fisher, Haldane, and Wright in the biological 
sciences as well as the founders of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr, Max Planck, Albert 
Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Erwin Schrodinger in physics) assumed 
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unpredictability and irreversibility in the world around them.  
The intellectual debt to the Second Scientific Revolution owed by the founders of 
the modern evolutionary synthesis is apparent with a close reading of their work. Fisher, 
for example, wrote that ―It is often convenient to consider a natural population not so 
much as an aggregate of living individuals but as an aggregate of gene ratios‖; further, he 
treated those gene ratios in the same manner Maxwell and Boltzmann treated arrays of 
gas molecules.
200
 He explained his novel approach to evolutionary theory in a lecture to 
the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1922: ―the investigation of natural selection may be 
compared to the analytic treatment of the Theory of Gases, in which it is possible to make 
the most varied assumptions as to the accidental circumstances, and even the essential 
nature of the individual molecules, and yet to develop the general laws as to the behavior 
of gases.‖201 Sewall Wright likewise borrowed liberally from his predecessors in physics. 
He adopted the concept of ―adaptive landscapes,‖ which imagines evolutionary fitness as 
physical topography of relative adaptability, from Boltzmann‘s ―gradients‖ in 
thermodynamics, and he, like Maxwell and Boltzmann, preferred to speak in terms of 
populations and probability rather than individual entities and certainty. His language in a 
review of Fisher‘s work demonstrates this affinity, ―In such a population we can not 
speak of single equilibrium values but of probability arrays for each gene.‖202  
Because Fisher, Haldane, and Wright operated from within a new scientific 
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paradigm, they were less beholden to the antagonisms of the past. Many of the supposed 
contradictions between natural selection and genetics simply melted away when viewed 
through the lens of populational genetics, which transformed the vitriolic contest for 
intellectual supremacy that took place between biometricians and Mendelians into an 
irrelevant squabble. Therefore, the first step in their journey to establish a new foundation 
for evolutionary biology was to establish the compatibility of the former rival disciplines. 
After analyzing Pearson‘s data on the inheritance of physical characteristics among 
human beings, Fisher concluded, ―the hypothesis of cumulative Mendelian factors seems 
to fit the facts very nicely.‖203 He then sent his findings to his old mentor, who exclaimed 
(without even reading the paper), ―I am afraid I am not a believer in cumulative 
Mendelian factors as being the solution to the heredity puzzle.‖204 
Apparently there was no bringing the old guard with them, so Fisher and his 
colleagues continued to dismantle the old conflict on their own. Haldane, in a submission 
to Nature in 1929, succinctly stated their new, conciliatory perspective: ―Quantitative 
work shows clearly that natural selection is a reality, and that, among other things, it 
selects Mendelian genes, which are known to be distributed at random through wild 
populations, and to follow the laws of chance in their distribution to offspring. In other 
words, they are an agency producing variation of the kind which Darwin postulated as the 
raw material upon which natural selection acts.‖205 In a 1927 address to the Etymological 
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Society of London, Fisher argued ―It is now becoming increasingly widely understood 
that the bearing of genetical discoveries, and in particular of the Mendelian scheme of 
inheritance, upon evolutionary theory is quite other than that which the pioneers of 
Mendelism originally took it to be (which was support for saltationism as an alternative 
to natural selection).‖206  
Over the next few years each of the founders of the modern synthesis worked to 
mend the needless rift between Mendelism and natural selection. Fisher wrote his classic 
1930 The Genetical Theory of Selection largely ―to demonstrate how little basis there was 
for the opinion…that the discovery of Mendel‘s laws of inheritance was unfavorable, or 
even fatal, to the theory of natural selection.‖207 In 1931, Wright recognized that it was 
―not surprising that the phenomena of Mendelian heredity were looked upon as 
confirming de Vries‘ theory (of saltationism),‖ because of the exiting animus toward 
traditional Darwinism, yet he believed the time had come to reverse course, so he wrote a 
long paper titled ―Evolution in Mendelian Populations‖ to accomplish that task. Finally, 
in 1932 Haldane published The Causes of Evolution with the intent to, once and for all, 
―dispel the belief that Mendelism had killed Darwinism.‖208 In The Causes of Evolution’s 
closing statement, he argues that evolutionary biology could stop dwelling on the 
misguided dispute between biometricians and Mendelians and again look forward to a 
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bright future. He wrote, ―The permeation of biology by mathematics is only beginning, 
but unless the history of science is an inadequate guide, it will continue, and the 
investigations here summarized represent the beginning of a new branch of applied 
mathematics.‖209  
The founders of the modern synthesis did not agree on everything. Much like the 
―founding fathers‖ of the United States, their association is due more to a shared vision of 
the big picture than to identical thoughts. Fisher conceived of an animal species in 
abstract, numerical terms, perhaps due to his training as a statistician. Further, he and 
Haldane, who also had a mathematical background, sought to transform ―natural 
selection into a highly general, law-governed theory of evolution that could complete and 
supplant Darwin‘s account…in the new age of post-Newtonian physics.‖210 They 
theorized, consequently, that natural selection acted most effectively in large, randomly 
breeding populations (much like the numerous and indeterminate interactions of gases). 
This theory ensured enough variation among genes to drive evolutionary change and 
facilitated quantitative analysis by reducing the members of each species to the analog of 
a particle. Wright, however, had worked intimately with animals, and knew from 
experience that animals did not live or breed like that. He claimed that animals typically 
bred in small populations such as a wolf pack or a murder of crows.
211
 When Fisher 
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argued that small populations did not have enough genetic diversity for evolution through 
natural selection to occur, Wright responded that small populations allowed for mutations 
to become established in a process known as ―genetic drift,‖ and that genetic diversity 
was to be found not simply in the number of different genes under selection but also in 
the complex networks genes formed with one another.
212
 Selection, instead of operating 
upon single genes, operated upon entire genetic interaction systems, which explained 
why ―when selection acted directly upon some parts of an organism, it acted indirectly on 
others.‖213  
Wright and Fisher‘s debates persisted throughout their careers, and their 
disagreements were significant and over matters of fundamental importance; however, as 
founders of the modern synthesis, they, along with Haldane, had restored the credibility 
of evolutionary biology. By approaching evolution through the prevailing post-
Newtonian scientific paradigm of probability, they were able to move past the 
acrimonious divisions of the past and to establish the primacy of natural selection. In so 
doing, they established a new Darwinian paradigm in which a productive, Hegelian 
scientific discourse could take place. Within a short time, men inspired by the insights of 
populational genetics would develop the modern synthesis even further in what has come 
to be known as the ―late synthesis.‖ Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr, and Gaylord 
Simpson popularized the modern evolutionary synthesis by applying the theoretical 
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insights of their predecessors to case studies in the wild and by incorporating 
paleontology, which had previously been a recalcitrant supporter of natural selection, into 
the consensus.  
Born in 1900 in present day Croatia, Dobzhansky‘s formative training took place 
within the tradition of fieldwork prevalent in the Russian Empire‘s scientific community. 
Thus, he was naturally skeptical of the lab results that dominated population genetics, and 
upon arriving in the United States in 1927 he set out to conduct field experiments to 
verify the theory‘s veracity in the ―real world.‖ During extensive travels from Canada to 
Mexico he found that members of a species do not share identical genes—a fundamental 
assumption of Fisher‘s and Haldane‘s, who believed genetic consistency must be present 
in a species if they were to successfully replace the previous emphasis on phenotypic 
conformity. The species he studied, Drosophila Pseudoobscura, or ―fruit fly,‖ actually 
had quite different genes in different populations, and each population bore distinctive 
markers in its chromosomes that distinguished it from other populations.  In Genetics and 
the Origin of Species, Dobzhansky demonstrated that the theoretical brilliance of the 
modern synthesis must also take into consideration geographical variation to be complete. 
As an additional contribution, Dobzhansky was able to communicate the complex 
mathematics of population genetics into laymen‘s terms, so he was able to introduce a 
wide range of biologists to the modern synthesis who had remained outside its influence 
due to technical limitations.  
Genetics and the Origin of Species had a tremendous influence on an ornithologist 
from Germany working in New Guinea at the time named Ernst Mayr. Previously, Mayr 
held vague notions about the mechanism of evolution, but favored a sort of Lamarckism 
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because he, like a number of biologists, did not think natural selection was able to 
generate enough phenotypic change to establish a new species. The work of the 
population geneticists had remained beyond his capabilities (advanced statistics and 
genetics were entirely different disciplines, after all), and he was unimpressed by any 
theory of nature that did not deal directly with wild animals. Dobzhansky‘s merging of 
genetics and natural history, however, appealed to Mayr immediately, for it solved 
problems he faced in his research. Mayr had specialized in discovering new species of 
birds and mapping out their ranges. This was not an easy task, for a single species of bird 
can have tremendous phenotypic variation. On one mountain, for example, a bird may 
have a long tail or exhibit certain coloration, but on another mountain have short tails and 
be another color. The numerous subspecies of birds he discovered proved to be both a 
serious logistical and theoretical problem. Dobzhansky solved Mayr‘s categorization 
difficulties in one fell swoop by redefining what it meant to be a ―species.‖ In Darwin‘s 
era, many scholars struggled to accept evolution because they recognized a species as a 
fixed entity. These men were subconsciously committed to an Aristotelian vision of the 
earth comprising complimentary, discrete entities, and their perspective continued to 
influence biology until the modern synthesis. Inspired by the populational perspective of 
Fisher and his peers, Dobzhansky argued for a different conception of species. He 
claimed that a species exists ―when a once actually or potentially interbreeding array of 
forms becomes segregated into two or more separate arrays which are physiologically 
incapable of breeding.‖214 In other words, a species was a process, not a static entity, and 
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the salient attribute was the ability to mate, not physical, or even genetic, similarity. From 
this point of view, animal species were not an amalgam of characteristics (e.g., elephants 
have grey skin, tusks, trunk, etc.,), but were instead best seen as a group of potentially 
interbreeding populations that existed in particular geographical and historical contexts.  
 Mayr approved of Dobzhansky‘s populational definition of species because it 
reinforced his belief that environmental context plays a large role in the development of a 
species. Fisher‘s abstract, mathematical vision of a species as a large collection of genes 
interacting like subatomic gases in a vacuum might have reconciled natural selection with 
genetics, but it failed to take into account a fundamental characteristic of nature: the 
habitat in which the animal lived (Mayr condescendingly referred to Fisher‘s view as 
―beanbag genetics‖).215 How, for example, could Fisher explain the numerous subspecies 
of birds if genetic dispersion were truly random? By thinking of species as Dobzhansky 
did, as ―distinct spatiotemporal entities with reasonably well-marked beginnings and 
endings and finite geographic and ecological ranges,‖ subspecies were no longer a 
problem for Mayr.
216
 Instead, they were living testimony to the evolutionary process. In 
Mayr‘s 1942 Systematics and the Origin of Species, he demonstrated how geographical 
isolation led to the origin of a new species as each derivative population experiences its 
own genetic mutations and inbreeding until the two populations become incapable of 
mating with each other even in the case of reunification.  
 Another influential scientist in the ―late‖ synthesis was Gaylord Simpson, whose 
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research on horse fossils put an end to paleontology‘s stubborn commitment to 
orthogenetic evolution. This was a significant challenge, for paleontologists worked 
directly with physical evidence (fossils) and what they saw contradicted the theory of 
natural selection. To their eyes, goal-oriented ―macroevolution‖ clearly occurred at the 
higher taxonomic orders, even if on the level of species natural selection and adaptation 
led to random, context-specific evolution. For evidence, they pointed to the lack of 
transitional fossils. If indeed natural selection was guiding all evolution, there should be a 
fossil record of animals in each phase of development. Instead, however, an increasingly 
thick fossil record revealed ―jumps‖ from one phenotype to another, more ―advanced‖ 
form. For example, single-celled organisms existed without much change for billions of 
years and then, suddenly, around five hundred million years ago much of today‘s phyla 
emerged during the Cambrian explosion. It was hard not to see animals capable of flight 
or social networks as objectively more advanced than their bacterium predecessors.  
 Simpson detested orthogenetic explanations of evolution because he believed they 
were guided by a metaphysical teleology of progress rather than leading scientific 
principles. Raised in a strict Protestant home, Simpson developed strong antireligious 
sentiment as a child, resulting in a lifelong determination to remove any trappings of 
mysticism from his chosen discipline of paleontology. The modern synthesis had 
effectively established natural selection as the orthodox scientific explanation for 
evolution by this point; therefore, when confronted with evidence for punctuated and 
purposeful evolution, Simpson used the logic of the synthesis to form a rebuttal.  
To explain evolutionary ―jumps,‖ Simpson turned to Sewall Wright‘s concept of 
―genetic drift.‖ Wright claimed that smaller populations had a higher statistical 
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probability of developing a particular trait (think how much more likely it is to flip heads 
on a coin eight out of ten times versus eighty out of a hundred), and thus evolution would 
occur more rapidly in small, isolated populations. Simpson argued that the predictable 
result of evolution occurring rapidly in small populations was a dearth of transitional 
animals in the fossil record. There were no ―jumps,‖ just evolution via natural selection 
occurring at different speeds in different context in a process he termed ―quantum 
evolution.‖217 But what about the apparent progression paleontologists saw in the fossil 
record? Using Fisher and Haldane‘s quantitative method, Simpson demonstrated that 
evolution in fact took place in the irregular and undirected manner predicted by 
Darwinism. Any purpose or goal that previous paleontologists thought they saw was a 
reflection of their own values and not an objective depiction of reality.  
By using the tools of the modern synthesis to undermine support for alternatives 
to natural selection, Simpson completed the synthesis in an important sense. Fisher, 
Haldane, and Wright had introduced population genetics, which ended the bitter dispute 
that had kept evolutionary theory divided. Then Dobzhansky and Mayr combined the 
theoretical and quantitative tools of population genetics with the geographical and 
environmental insights of natural history. Now, Simpson had brought paleontology into 
the fold, turning the synthesis into a consensus in which it was possible for scientists of 
all disciplines to operate productively. In the course of developing the modern synthesis, 
many of the major questions of evolutionary theory had been answered. What drove 
evolution? Natural selection. How did it happen? Genes mutated, some of which 
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conferred a relative advantage. Where did evolution occur? Everywhere, all the time, but 
it happened more rapidly in small, geographically isolated populations. The last 
remaining, major question was ―Who?‖ Whom did natural selection operate upon, 
individuals, groups, or the species? The architects of the modern synthesis provided 
ambiguous, and at times contradictory, support for each of these plausible answers.
218
 
The debate to solve this question would define the immediate postsynthesis world of 
evolutionary biology, and in the process establish the scientific foundation for the return 
of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences.  
Fisher, Haldane, and Wright believed evolution took place at the level of the gene. 
This was central to their model of evolution, which, remember, had solved the conflict 
between biometricians and Mendelians by merging genetics with natural selection. To 
them, genetic mutations provided the phenotypic diversity that drove natural selection; 
thus, evolution occurred at the gene level. It was tautological. Although they rarely 
commented explicitly about which level evolution took place, their writing makes this 
basic assumption clear. Here is Fisher, writing in 1922, ―It is often convenient to consider 
a natural population not so much as an aggregate of living individuals but as an aggregate 
of gene ratios.‖219 The architects of the latter phase of the modern synthesis, however, did 
not make the same assumption.  
Because of his experience as a naturalist, Dobzhansky emphasized the 
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environmental context in which evolution took place. Unlike the statisticians Fisher and 
Haldane, who viewed gene fluctuations in abstract mathematical terms, he recognized 
that animals lived in a tremendously diverse and changing ecological theater, which led 
him to focus on evolution at a different stratum: the species. According to Dobzhansky,  
The environment does not remain constant, either in terms of geological 
periods or even from one year to the next. Selection and mutation rates, 
and hence genetic equilibria, are therefore in a state of perpetual flux. The 
nature of the genetic mechanisms is therefore such that the composition of 
the species population is probably never static. A species that would 





Here he has acknowledged the importance of ―mutation rates‖ among genes, but he also 
implied that genetic mutations and variability serve the larger purpose of species 
adaptability. To understand why he arrived at that slightly teleological conclusion, it is 
helpful to know that Dobzhansky was a fierce advocate of pluralistic, democratic 
societies. Progress to him, whether for an animal species or a modern nation, came 
through diversity and change, not the conservation of previously successful traits. And 
while Dobzhansky might have been subconsciously conflating his political values for 
biological truth, he was not alone in calling for a re-evaluation of the gene as the fulcrum 
of evolution.  
Ernest Mayr spent the majority of his scientific career observing birds in nature. 
Subsequently, he strongly opposed evolutionary theories that did not take into 
consideration the environment. He thought that Fisher and his colleagues had focused on 
genes because they suffered from ―physics envy‖ and it was easy to see genes as analogs 
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to particles. Reality, according to Mayr, was rougher, messier, and at the same time more 
accessible. One need not rely on complex equations or sophisticated laboratory 
experiments; it was possible to study the animal itself, for actual physical bodies in a 
challenging environment is where the rubber hit the road in evolutionary theory. ―Natural 
Selection favors (or discriminates against) phenotypes, not genes or genotypes. Where 
genotypic differences do not express themselves in the phenotype (for instance, in the 
case of concealed recessives), such differences are inaccessible to selection and 
consequently irrelevant.‖221 Mayr‘s arguments against genotype evolution struck a chord 
among those who longed for old-fashioned, common sense biology, and he would 
reiterate the same basic claims throughout his career. As late as 1984 he could be found 
declaring that ―(t)he target of selection does not consist of single genes, but rather of such 
components of the phenotype as the eye, the legs, the flower, the thermo-regulatory or 
photosynthetic apparatus, etc.‖222  
So, where did evolution take place? It was not possible to turn to Darwin for 
answers, for the patriarch of evolution himself had conflicting views on the matter. Of 
course, Darwin did not argue for evolution at the level of the gene because he was 
unaware that genes existed. He did, however, vacillate between evolution at the level of 
the individual and the species or group. Here he is in On the Origin of Species discussing 
the Malthusian struggle at the heart of evolution: ―More individuals are born than can 
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possibly survive. A grain in the balance will determine which individual shall live and 
which shall die.‖223 Yet, certain phenomena in nature such as sterile castes and self-
sacrificing behavior compelled Darwin to also advocate group selection at times.
224
 For 
bees, he speculated that ―the sterile conditions of certain members of the community has 
been advantageous to the community: consequently the fertile males and females of the 
same community flourished, and transmitted to their fertile offspring a tendency to 
produce sterile members having the same modification.‖225 And he explained self-
sacrifice similarly: ―It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality 
gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other 
men in the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and an 
increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense advantage 
of one tribe over another.‖226 The answer to the question of what level natural selection 
took place remained just out of reach.   
Then, in the early 1960s a British zoologist named V.C Wynne-Edwards 
published an influential book purporting to settle the issue once and for all in favor of 
group selection. Born in 1906 to the headmaster of Leeds Grammar School, young 
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Wynne-Edwards was exposed to natural history from an early age, and his thirst for 
scientific inquiry and exploration solidified into a career choice after listening to Sir 
Ernest Shackleton deliver a lecture on his upcoming (and ultimately fatal) expedition to 
Antarctica in 1922. For the next twenty-five years, Wynne-Edwards divided his time 
between academic responsibilities on campus and field research in one of the world‘s 
wildest and most remote places, the Arctic. Like Peter Kropotkin before him, the struggle 
for survival he witnessed took place primarily between animals and nature, not between 
the animals themselves like Darwin and Wallace had seen in the lush tropical climes they 
encountered on their journeys. In an article written for the journal Auk, he explained, 
―Except perhaps among carnivorous predators, competition between individuals for space 
and nourishment seems commonly reduced to a low level among members of the Arctic 
flora and fauna…In the Arctic the struggle for existence is overwhelmingly against the 
physical world.‖227  
During the course of his experiences in the Arctic, Wynne-Edwards came across a 
situation that problematized his pre-existing faith in individual selection: an inexplicable 
breeding restraint among fulmars, which are a type of seagull typical to the area. Clearly, 
the individual birds that withheld procreation were not maximizing their progeny, so the 
traditional Darwinian tropes about ―survival of the fittest‖ fell short. For the time being 
he had no alternative explanation for this queer phenomenon, but it remained an itch that 
needed to be scratched. Then, years later, after discovering population genetics and the 
modern synthesis, Wynne-Edwards felt he had the insight he needed to make sense of the 
bird‘s paradoxical breeding patterns: individual fulmars were not rearing chicks because 
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it benefited the group to manage their population in an environment with limited 
resources. Flush with enthusiasm, he delivered a paper to the Oxford Ornithological 
Society explaining how the modern synthesis led him to his novel conclusion, ―The 
fundamental new idea is that populations, rather than independent individuals, are the 
basic units upon which evolutionary processes act.‖228  
Clearly Wynne-Edwards considered his work a continuation of the modern 
synthesis and not a radical breach from accepted evolutionary theory. While at Oxford, 
his mentor was none other than Julian Huxley, the man who literally wrote the book The 
Modern Synthesis. What‘s more, Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Simpson, all luminaries in their 
respective fields and pillars of the modern synthesis, had previously theorized about 
selection at a level above the individual. Mayr‘s Systematics and the Origin of Species 
provides a good example of the theory‘s precedence in his own work, "Darwin thought of 
individuals when he talked of competition, struggle for existence among variants, and 
survival of the fittest in a particular environment. Such a struggle among individuals 
leads to a gradual change of populations, but not to the origin of new groups. It is now 
being realized that species originate in general through the evolution of entire 
populations."
229
 What differentiated Wynne-Edwards from his predecessors was the scale 
in which he envisioned group selection operating. Unlike Mayr and the others, who 
believed group selection was complementary to individual selection, he believed the 
group to be the level at which evolution occurred. ―For everything concerning population 
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dynamics, (group selection) is much more important than selection at the individual level. 
The latter is concerned with the physiology and attainments of the individual as such, the 
former with the viability and survival of the stock or race as a whole. Where the two 
conflict, as they do when the short-term advantage of the individual undermines the 
future safety of the race, group selection is bound to win, because the race will suffer and 
decline, and be supplanted by another in which antisocial advancement of the individual 
is more rigidly inhibited.‖230 In 1962, Wynne-Edwards published his tome, Animal 
Dispersion In Relation to Social Behavior, which he modeled after Darwin‘s On the 
Origin of Species. The book, magisterial in its length, scope of analysis, and eminence of 
its author, proved a resounding success in establishing the primacy of group selection. 
The success of Animal Dispersion, however, caused considerable consternation 
among a small number of evolutionary biologists. Scientists are human, and there is 
bound to be some level of resentment or jealousy whenever a colleague achieves 
widespread acclaim—especially for a rival theory, which would only diminish the 
relative importance of your own work. And while the conflict surrounding Animal 
Dispersion was certainly ripe with academic posturing, there was more to it; these men 
believed Wynne-Edwards had betrayed the very principles the discipline was founded on. 
Darwinism, according to them, held evolution to be the result of natural selection among 
diverse individual phenotypes caused by small genetic mutations. The painstaking 
quantitative analysis of Haldane and Fisher had established that fact. And it was now 
their responsibility to ensure that the errant speculations of a lone British ornithologist 
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did not derail evolutionary biology.
231
  
The first matador who stepped into the ring to kill the Wynne-Edwardsian bull 
was David Lack, another British ornithologist of similar age who also considered Julian 
Huxley a friend. While Wynne-Edwards was studying fulmars in the Artic, Lack was 
studying finches in the Galapagos Islands, where he witnessed far more individual 
competition than his peer and soon-to-be rival. At the conclusion of his trip to the 
Galapagos, Lack spent several months processing his research with Ernst Mayr in the 
United States. During this time he solidified his convictions that environmental context 
was critical to evolution and that natural selection dealt with phenotypes rather than 
genotypes. Unlike the elder and more established Mayr, however, Lack remained 
committed to the individual as the level of selection.
232
 Therefore, when he heard about 
the incredible popularity of Animal Dispersion (which he explained as the result of 
―ignorance by other biologists‖), he felt compelled to respond.233  
Immediately after the publication of Animal Dispersion, Lack‘s friend Charles 
Sibley implored him, ―This matter (group selection) needs to be exposed as the nonsense 
it is—and you‘re the one to do it!‖234 Despite Wynne-Edwards‘ efforts to associate his 
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work with Dobzhansky and Wright before him, Sibley thought Wynne-Edwards had 
strayed from the path of orthodox evolutionary biology by espousing group selection: ―I 
am fascinated to see how rapidly a person goes under and drowns as soon as he lets go of 
the firm rock of natural selection. In Wynne‘s case, the paradox is that he doesn‘t realize 
that he has let go of the rock.‖235 Needing no further encouragement, Lack began writing 
Population Studies of Birds, which he saw as the definitive rebuttal of group selection.
236
 
Essentially, he argued that there were equally plausible explanations for the small clutch 
sizes Wynne-Edwards had observed that did not require one to theorize outside the 
accepted doctrine of individual self-interest. Wynne-Edwards claimed that powerful birds 
policed others to do what was in the best interest of the group much like human beings 
regulated others to prevent overfishing or overgrazing; however, Lack reasoned, was it 
not more reasonable to assume individual birds restricted their reproduction in response 
to indicators that their offspring might not survive in high numbers?
237
 It was, after all, 
the number of offspring that reached sexually maturity that mattered from an 
evolutionary perspective, not simply how many are born.  
The lines in the sand were now drawn. The battle to determine at which level 







 In fact, Lack was already professionally and personally invested in group 
selection by this time. While developing his theory of group selection, Wynne-Edwards 
had negatively reviewed a book that Lack wrote explaining bird behavior through the 
lens of individual self-interest.  
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evolution occurred had distilled to a choice between individual and group selection. Lack, 
representing the individual selection camp, repeated his argument that ―clutch size has 
evolved through natural selection to correspond with the largest number of young for 
which the parents can on average find enough food. In this view, the upper limit of clutch 
size is set by the fact that, with more young, some are undernourished, and so the parents 
tend to leave fewer, not more, descendants than those with broods of normal size.‖238 
Wynne-Edwards‘ time as a field naturalist, however, had demonstrated unequivocally 
that ―animals often exist in the midst of plenty, (but) starvation is rare.‖239 It was, 
therefore, not the pressures of nature that kept populations in check. It was a result of a 
species‘ self control. ―Such density differences,‖ he wrote, ―arise from the activities of 
the animals themselves, and this implies that population-density is subject to effective 
internal control, i.e., it is self regulating.‖240 Flocks of birds, schools of fish, and swarms 
of insects were all examples of means by which a species assesses the size of their 
populations from this point of view.
241
  
Here, one can see why Sibley, Lack, and others believed Wynne-Edwards had 
abandoned Darwinism. His theory is reminiscent of Lamarckian self-determination and 
appears hostile to the influence of natural selection. To the contrary, Lack makes explicit 
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reference to orthodox Darwinism in his explanation for why group selection cannot work. 
In The Natural Regulation of Animal Numbers he argued, ―Natural selection operates on 
the survival-rate of the offspring of each genotype. If one type of individual lays more 
eggs than another and the difference is hereditary, then the more fecund type must come 
to predominate over the other.‖242 Appeals to convention, though, would not persuade 
Wynne-Edwards, who, while inspired by the modern synthesis, was not bound by its 
strictures. He believed there were significant limitations to individual selection. For 
example, he wrote that Lack‘s analysis failed to explain the presence of nonbreeding 
birds or why sexual maturity was more often deferred in males when females carry more 
of the reproductive capability.
243
 More importantly, perhaps, he was willing to chart 
unknown waters if that is where the truth lie.
244
 The preface to Animal Dispersion 
anticipated and accepted the anxiety his theoretical audacity was sure to generate among 
his colleagues, ―Needless to say, the reader is confronted with two or three fundamental 
principles that, on account of unfamiliarity alone, he may be expected to eye with a 
certain amount of skepticism, until they can by degrees be critically appraised in the light 
of each succeeding chapter.‖245  
There seemed to be no common ground, no way in which both theories could 
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work together. One had to support either individual or group selection. To make matters 
more difficult, some believed that Wynne-Edwards had brought into question the role of 
natural selection by advocating internal mechanisms for population control. This meant 
that those scientists who remained committed to natural selection as the primary 
mechanism of evolution found themselves supporting Lack for reasons outside the debate 
between individual and group selection. As the two camps began to resemble political 
coalitions, disparaging remarks towards the ―other‖ became common (although, to their 
credit, Lack and Wynne-Edwards themselves largely refrained from this behavior). For 
example, the American evolutionary biologist George Williams, who sided with Lack 
because Lack ―believed, as decisively as I did, that natural selection is a real scientific 
theory‖ wrote, ―the subject requires great care to avoid the appearance of sarcasm or 
ridicule. I know that when I got to the part about the epideictic function of the vertical 
movement of plankton I suddenly wondered if I had fallen for a really elaborate joke.‖246 
It appeared that evolutionary biology was in danger of entering another era of protracted 
dysfunction similar to the biometric/Mendelian conflict of an earlier generation.  
Academic conferences on the subject turned into partisan contests, as Lack and 
his supporters presented a unified front of opposition to Wynne-Edwards‘ theory of group 
selection.
247
 At the annual British Ornithological Union, Lack‘s men showed up en 
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masse. George Dunnett, a student of Wynne-Edwards, complained, ―There is no doubt 
that these people…came prepared to object strongly to your paper.‖248 According to 
Dunnett, one of them ―devoted the first half of his paper to an attack of your ideas, which 
by means of oratorical technique, seemed to carry the audience. It was not a nice or good 
attack (emphasis mine).‖249 Another sympathizer with the beleaguered scholar expressed 
frustration that Wynne-Edwards‘ ―whole concept is rejected out of hand, indeed … is 
laughed to scorn.‖250 For his part, Wynne-Edwards decided to take what he saw as the 
high road, which meant to ignore his critics and continue presenting his views. 
Unfortunately, this response only added fuel to fire, as Lack‘s supporters claimed, rightly 
so, that Wynne-Edwards was not responding to their critiques. Not for the last time, egos 
and unwavering certainty had led to a scientific standstill.  
The breakthrough to the impasse would come from an unexpected direction. 
Working alone, and supporting neither individual nor group selection, a graduate student 
at Oxford named William Hamilton determined that the gene, in fact, was the primary 
level at which selection took place. Born in Cairo, Egypt in 1936, Hamilton‘s early life 
makes his later professional iconoclasm seem normal, even predictable. His parents, an 
engineer and doctor from New Zealand, blessed him with a gifted analytical mind 
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capable of pondering a single subject for days at a time.  They also cultivated in him the 
joy of independent learning by giving him tremendous autonomy at a young age to 
explore. He and his siblings were exposed to different cultures, allowed to roam the 
wilderness without supervision, and given books of all sorts to read.
251
 One such book, by 
the nineteenth-century entomologist Jean Henri Fabre, left a lasting impact on young 
Hamilton. ―I was completely enthralled,‖ he reminisced, ―trying to imagine genes for all 
the behaviors he reported.‖252 Of course, an intrepid youth will occasionally misstep 
when venturing from the beaten path, and in Hamilton‘s case his mother and father‘s 
laissez faire approach to parenting resulted in the loss of several fingers on his right 
hand—casualties to an experiment with explosives in his backyard.  But the missing 
digits were a small price to pay if indeed these early efforts at trial and error prepared 
Hamilton to enter the vaunted halls of Cambridge with the temerity to challenge accepted 
scientific principles.   
During Hamilton‘s first year at Cambridge he spent countless hours browsing in 
the library, as he preferred learning on his own to attending lectures. Then, one day he 
came across a book that would establish the trajectory for his entire academic career, R.A 
Fisher‘s The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. The writing was dense and filled 
with complex mathematical formulas, and the time and effort it took Hamilton to fully 
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understand it caused his grades to drop significantly (Fisher was first and foremost a 
statistician, after all). Fisher‘s immediate hindrance to Hamilton‘s scholastic 
achievement, however, would pay dividends in the long run, for Hamilton now had a 
theoretical framework in which to operate: evolution at the gene level. Part of the reason 
he loved the book was its similarity to the gene-centered readings from his childhood 
(Hamilton called them ―echoes of my old opinions, which I never really abandoned‖), but 
it was much more than a simple affirmation of existing beliefs that caused him to declare 
The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection his ―grail‖.253 Fisher had given him the tools 
to continue his learning and to make discoveries relevant to contemporary problems in 
evolutionary theory.  
The faculty at Cambridge was almost universally supportive of group selection at 
this time. From their perspective, Fisher was no longer relevant to biology, so they 
focused on challenging David Lack‘s individual selection theories in their lectures.254 By 
emphasizing altruistic behavior in social species, they hoped to convince their students of 
the limitations inherent in theories based on individual self-interest. Sir Vincent 
Wigglesworth, for example, taught, ―Insects do not live for themselves alone. Their lives 
are devoted to the survival of the species whose representatives they are…We must now 
stand back and look at the insect as a member of the ‗population‘ or ‗species‘ to which it 
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belongs. Indeed we have now reached the heart of the matter—the aim and purpose (so 
far as we can understand them) of the life of the insects.‖255 Hamilton called this ―the 
Cambridge view of evolution‖ and he credits his anathema to it as the stimulus for his 
earliest academic papers.
256
 Regardless of their authority as professors, Hamilton just 
could not accept their argument because ―Fisher in the second edition of The Genetical 
Theory of Natural Selection (1958) rejects almost all explanations based on the ‗the 
benefit of the species.‖257 
Yet, how does one explain altruism, which surely exists, if not by group 
selection? Hamilton himself recognized this was a thorny issue. In ―The Evolution of 
Altruistic Behavior,‖ he acknowledged the blind spot in Fisher‘s evolutionary lens: ―The 
kinds of behavior which can be adequately explained by the classical mathematical 
theory of natural selection are limited. In particular this theory cannot account for any 
case where an animal behaves in such a way to promote the advantages of other members 
of the species not its direct descendants at the expense of its own.‖258 Of course, one 
solution to the problem of altruism was group selection. In fact, altruism ceases to be a 
problem at all if one accepts the popular explanation that natural selection favors ―the 
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most stable and cooperative groups,‖ which explains why so many biologists supported 
Wynne-Edwards. Hamilton, however, was convinced they were on the wrong tack. 
Despite the fact that traditional natural selection allowed ―no possibility of the evolution 
of any characteristics…to the disadvantage of the individuals possessing them,‖ Fisher 
and Haldane had hinted at the possibility of a gene-level explanation of altruism, and 
Hamilton was determined to deduce exactly what that explanation was.
259
 
Haldane suspected his contributions to population genetics had implications for 
the understanding of self-sacrifice. For example, he was known for exclaiming 
(drunkenly, the stories go), ―I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins!‖ 
Likewise, Fisher, when contemplating why some insect larvae were noxious, concluded 
that this particular adaptation, while providing no benefit to the individual larva being 
eaten, ―increased protection (to the) brothers and sisters of the attacked.‖260 Somewhat 
inexplicably, however, neither Haldane nor Fisher developed mathematical models to 
support their ruminations on altruism—although they specialized in quantitative analysis! 
The best explanation for their inattention to such an important concept is to remember 
that Haldane and Fisher were primarily statisticians, not naturalists; they never spent time 
observing animals in nature, as many of their peers in biology did as a matter of course. 
Therefore, when they theorized about evolution, they focused on probabilities of genetic 
mutations and rarely thought about the actual behavior of animals. Hamilton, like any 
ambitious graduate student, saw this gap in the scholarship as an opportunity, for he knew 
                                                     
259
 William Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour,‖ Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 7 (1964): 1-16.  
 
260




that ―the behavior characteristic of a species is just as much the product of evolution as 
the morphology,‖ and as such required sufficient explanation.261  
After deciding to investigate the ―problem‖ of altruism, Hamilton then had to 
decide how to proceed. No one had systematically studied altruism from a genetic 
perspective before, so there was no clear precedent to follow, which was both exciting 
and terrifying to the young scholar. Aware that human beings were a species that engaged 
in altruistic behavior, he decided to contact the anthropology department at Cambridge to 
see what they could teach him about human nature and altruism. Big mistake. The head 
of the department, Edmund Leach, like almost anthropologists at the time, ―believed that 
all human behavior was culturally derived and that genetics had no bearing on the 
behavior of our species.‖262 When Leach realized what Hamilton was up to, he became 
unreceptive, if not hostile to the young man. The genetics department at Cambridge also 
opposed Hamilton‘s proposal to blend genetics with anthropology, so they counseled 
Hamilton, ―You have to realize that those people over there won‘t teach you 
science…social anthropology is done more like poetry.‖263 Lacking support from the 
establishment, Hamilton feared he might be ―a crank.‖ ―How could it be,‖ he wondered, 
―that respected academics around me, and many manifestly clever contemporary graduate 
students I talked to, would not see the interest in studying altruism along my lines unless 
it were true that my enterprise were bogus in some way obvious to all of them but no 
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With no guidance for his project, Hamilton began constructing mathematical 
models on his own depicting the conditions in which altruistic behavior among relatives 
made sense from a genetic perspective. To do so, he first had to learn theoretical 
population genetics, which ―often drove (him) to despair‖ because, according to him, ―I 
had little talent in mathematics and even less training for it, so my efforts…were tedious 
in the extreme.‖265 During this difficult time, he discovered Sewall Wright‘s ―The 
Biometric Relation between Parent and Offspring,‖ and he realized that he had found his 
answer. Wright had constructed a simple, mathematical way to visualize the degree of 
relatedness between individuals using what he called the ―coefficient of relationship,‖ 
denoted as r. To understand his concept, imagine a mother and son. The son shares half 
his genes with his mom, so for them r =.5. When that son has a child of his own, the baby 
and grandmother, who share a quarter of their genes, have an r of .25. From these 
rudimentary examples, Wright deduced his general formula for people of direct ancestry, 
r =.5
n
, where n is the number of generations that separate them. Hamilton, building off 
the logic of this formula, then derived ―Hamilton‘s Rule‖ for altruistic behavior, which is 
r × b > c. Here, the variable r is the same, while c is the cost of altruism and b is the 
benefits accrued by blood relatives of the altruists. In other words, altruism is 
evolutionarily logical when the person needing help is more closely related to the person 
doing the helping.
266
 For the modern reader, this may seem like common sense, and, 
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indeed, Hamilton feared that the critical reception to his work might be along the lines of 
―True; but, of course, all fairly obvious.‖267 By presenting a mathematical formula to 
explain altruism without group selection, however, Hamilton had accomplished 
something significant.
268
 He had answered the last, major remaining question left 
unanswered by the modern synthesis, ―At what level does evolution operate?‖ He had 
also, somewhat unintentionally, re-opened the door for speculation about human affairs 
from an evolutionary perspective, at least within the hard sciences.
269
  
Success did not come without struggle for Hamilton. From his earliest days as a 
graduate student he sensed ―that there existed a prejudice against my topic.‖270 Before 
the second world war, Francis Galton, a pioneering eugenicist, had established the 
genetics department where Hamilton was earning his degree; however, ever since the 
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war the current director, Lionel Penrose, had been desperately trying to remove any hint 
of eugenics from the department. For example, he changed the name of the journal from 
the Annals of Eugenics to the Annals of Human Genetics. Therefore, when Hamilton 
approached Penrose about the prospect of studying the role of genetics in altruism, 
―Penrose emphatically told (him) no and that he doubted there was such a problem to be 
studied (presumably because altruism could be explained by cultural conditioning).‖271 
Hamilton was convinced that Penrose ―saw me in the eugenical spectre‖ and as a result, 
despite working at genetics department for two years, Hamilton ―never had a desk there 
nor was ever invited to give any presentation to explain my work.‖272 Eventually, when 
the time came to renew Hamilton‘s funding, the genetics department refused, leaving 
him to continue researching his project alone.  
During this ―dark time,‖ the London School of Economics (LSE) mercifully 
decided to award Hamilton a grant, and for the first time he began to feel supported.
273
 
In The Narrow Roads of Gene Land, he fondly recalls how Norman Carrier, a human 
demographer at LSE ―listened to my confused ideas with an unfamiliar sympathy, 
speaking as though quite unaware of even a possibility that I might be a sinister new 
sucker budding from the roots of the recently felled tree of fascism.‖274 It appears that 
Hamilton, a shy, young man, needed no more than a lack of active hostility to feel relief 
from his long struggle. Additional encouragement came when he discovered the work of 
                                                     
271
 Ibid., 14. 
 
272
 Ibid., 11. 
 
273
 Ibid., 3. 
 
274




George Williams, an American biologist who was also studying genes and altruism.
275
 
Finally, Hamilton could confide in someone who understood both the theoretical and 
social challenges he faced. In a letter to Williams he gushed, ―The discovery of your 
work has been a considerable encouragement to me. My own has been carried out in the 
face of widespread skepticism and even contempt, making me doubt at times whether 
my approach to these problems could really be as fundamental and as correct as it 
seemed to me.‖276 Buoyed by a new academic environment and new friendships, 
Hamilton came to see his earlier difficulties as the result of irrational attachment to 
―almost essential human myths.‖277 Although he did not see them this way, he 
understood that others believed his papers to be ―solvents of vital societal glue.‖278  
Hamilton himself never believed kin selection, the term he gave for gene-
maximizing altruism, to be a threat to Progressive values because he held a different view 
of history than the liberal academic establishment. As we have seen, many thoughtful 
people, including most academics, blamed the holocaust (which was an effort to 
―improve‖ the genetic makeup of Germany) on the influence of applied evolutionary 
thinking. Hamilton, like almost everyone else, was appalled by the horrors of fascism; 
however, he believed the root of the evil was not the scientist Charles Darwin but rather 
the revolutionary Karl Marx, who had ―recast (evolution) into terms of his own 
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preoccupation with group struggles.‖279 Hamilton knew that evolutionary success 
depended on genetic diversity, not conformity, and as someone intimately familiar with 
the subtleties of Darwin‘s work, he was sure Darwin would have agreed.280 For this 
reason, ―it hardly crossed (his) mind that Galton and Darwin were considered by many to 
have laid the intellectual foundation for Nazi racial crimes‖ when he first set out to 
establish a Darwinian explanation for altruism.
281
 Ironically, in fact, one of the reasons 
Hamilton was so determined to attack group selection theory was his disdain for the 
collectivist rhetoric of the Axis powers.  
This is not to say that Hamilton‘s critics were entirely wrong about him. He 
admitted, ―As an avowed adversary of eugenics, Penrose may really have had good 
reasons to distrust me. When I first met him I was quite a strong believer in eugenics. 
More than most people I still am.‖282 As far as he was concerned, there was no inherent 
racism, sexism, or large-scale discrimination of any sort in eugenics. In fact, he saw 
eugenics as positive concept, one he came to support as part of his ―youthful wish to 
improve the world.‖283 ―I much liked the notion,‖ he wrote, ―that human-directed 
selection, whether to maintain standards or to speed the intellectual and physical 
progress of humanity, could be made both more effective and more merciful than the 
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obviously inefficient and cruel natural process.‖284 Clearly, Hamilton‘s theory of genetic 
altruism was touching on some very delicate political issues, such as the presence of a 
biological human nature and the question of whether individual liberty or collective 
support was best for democracy. And, while Hamilton himself may not have been 
concerned with the implications of his work, others were concerned that altruism had 
been reduced to self-serving actions among family members. Was true selflessness to be 
crushed by the logic of evolution?
285
 
 When it came to his own life, Hamilton wished for something more. He disliked 
―the idea that my own behaviour or behaviour of my friends illustrates my own theory of 
sociality. I like always to imagine that I and we are above all that.‖286 He lamented, ―I 
have to admit that at the time the thoughts were painful to me,‖ because general 
compassion was ―a plane of perfection to which all civilized cultures are thought to be 
striving.‖287 Yet, he refused to succumb to negativity. It might be easier to say one‘s 
genes have no role in behavior or that group selection would better facilitate cooperation, 
but those ideas were wrong and he ―continue(d) to believe that only from a basis of 
honest description can there be hope of taming what we have an may not like.‖288 To set a 
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personal example he attempted to transcend gene-based altruism by adopting two 
children and providing them with unconditional love. It would not be easy, but there was 
a way to create a better world.  
 The ―hard truth,‖ it appeared, was that animals, including human beings, were 
predisposed to help others, but only to the extent that it benefits their own genes. To test 
this theory, biologists the world over began researching altruism in nature, and their 
findings confirmed Hamilton‘s uninspiring insight. For example, researchers found that 
the cannibalistic spadefoot toad can ―taste‖ relatedness, and will spit out the tadpoles of 
its relatives, but not others.
289
 Of course, there are countless instances of kindness toward 
non-kin; however, Hamilton believed, these could be explained by the self-serving logic 
of Adam Smith and did not warrant biological analysis. From Smith‘s perspective, ―It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest…nobody but the beggar chooses to 
depend chiefly on the benevolence of his fellow citizens.‖290 Then, at a party hosted by 
theoretical biologist Mary Jane West-Eberhard (who would later gain fame for her 
remarkable insights on the phenotype plasticity), Hamilton met a graduate student named 
Robert Trivers, and the young man ―changed (his) dismissive attitude‖ about nongenetic 
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 Trivers did this by introducing Hamilton to his concept of ―reciprocal altruism,‖ 
which provides the evolutionary logic for cooperative networks beyond kinship ties. 
Reciprocal altruism is a fairly straightforward idea, and it builds off the gene-
maximization logic Hamilton introduced. Before discussing the nuances of Trivers‘ 
theory and the tremendous social implications it held, however, it is worthwhile taking a 
look at how he found himself lecturing Hamilton, who by this time was a widely 
respected theoretician, while drinking beer in someone‘s backyard.  
  Trivers was brilliant, which might be typical for Harvard graduate students, but 
his path to eminence within biological circles (Stephen Pinker called him "one of the 
great thinkers in the history of Western thought") was anything but. A schizophrenic, 
white member of the Black Panther party, he certainly did not fit the mold of an aspiring 
scientist. In fact, he initially wanted to be a lawyer. After graduating college he said to 
himself, ―All right, I‘ll become a lawyer and fight for civil rights and against poverty! 
Someone suggested that I take up U.S. history, but you know at that time, in the early 
1960s, their books were entirely self-congratulatory. I ended up in biology.‖292 This 
apparently rash decision took its toll on the sensitive young man. The new material 
caused him tremendous anxiety, and he fell into fits of mania, staying up for days at a 
time reading Wittgenstein before collapsing on the floor. Other mental breakdowns 
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followed that were ―so painful that I had resolved that if I ever felt another one coming 
on, I would kill myself.‖293  
 His first graduate paper was actually on theoretical ecology. It was a critique of 
the Harvard biologist Richard Levins‘ work; however, when Levins‘ close friend, famed 
population geneticist Richard Lewontin, bullied him at a conference, he decided to 
change course.
294
 According to Trivers, Lewontin had been ―arrogant and 
condescending‖ toward him, which naturally made Trivers want to defend his position, 
yet he recognized that to do so effectively would require a tremendous amount of time 
and effort.
295
 ―To make progress in this area you needed mathematical skills and 
discipline that I was not about to develop, and you would also greatly benefit greatly 
from twenty or thirty years of running around in the woods. That is, if you could combine 
intuition and real knowledge of nature with the kind of mathematics required to handle 
complex interactions, then perhaps you could make some headway.‖296 Further, he 
recognized that his paper, although accurate, was entirely negative—―I had, at best, only 
a bag full of their errors.‖297 He wanted to commit to something constructive, so he asked 
himself ―What positive thought (do) I have?‖ and he immediately thought of 
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 ―I came into biology at the age of twenty-two,‖ he recalled, ―never having had a 
course in biology and knowing next to nothing about animal behavior, my knowledge 
was almost entirely restricted to our own species. In adult humans it was obvious that, 
though kinship was a very important factor—blood being thicker than water—it could not 
explain all phenomena. We had strong positive feelings toward friends, and we were 
willing to act altruistically toward them and others. Kinship could not explain this. What 
could?‖299 Thus, ―I saw that what in the human species was obviously a major area of life 
involving deep and complex behaviors not explained by Hamilton‘s theory, and required 
some new explanation.‖300 The next step for Trivers was to find examples in nature that 
supported his theory, which he did in the least likely of places, a book titled The Biology 
of the Mouth. Apparently, the endlessly curious Trivers saw an advertisement for the 
book and thought to himself, ―Who wouldn‘t want to understand the biology of the 
mouth?‖301 And while reading the mostly disappointing articles (they focused mostly on 
dentistry), he came across a chapter on fish symbiosis in the ocean. Eureka. In the 
following months Trivers gathered evidence that host fishes give a warning to their 
parasite-eating companions when a predator is near. These fish had demonstrated 
―concern for the life of the cleaner, even at some cost to (their) own life,‖ and because 
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they were different species, kinship could be ruled out.
302
 
 Trivers was thrilled. For years evolution had been associated with unbridled, often 
violent competition, and, although Hamilton‘s work had changed the tone somewhat by 
demonstrating the evolutionary logic of personal sacrifice, the boundary of goodwill 
appeared to lie just outside a family‘s front door. Trivers knew well the history of applied 
evolutionary thinking, and he hoped his theory could reverse the perceived social 
implications: ―For me, emotionally, to see that just pursuing this scratch-my-back 
argument would generate rather quickly a reason for justice and fairness was very 
gratifying because it was on the other side of the fence of that awful tradition in biology 
of the right of the strongest.‖303 No longer would people perceive fairness as ―some 
arbitrary cultural construct or an easily changed effect of socialization.‖304 Reciprocal 
altruism, instead, suggested ―that there were deep biological roots to our sense of fairness 
that to me would seem to encourage a commitment to fairness or justice.‖305 
In order to convince the majority of biologists, however, Trivers had to do more than 
provide a few examples from nature that appeared to support his theory. He had to 
provide a model to ground his theory in the cold logic of mathematics. When his friend 
and mentor, the accomplished entomologist E.O. Wilson, encouraged him to imitate 
Hamilton‘s convincing use of math, Trivers responded petulantly. He did not want to 
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engage in the tedium of mathematics, and, besides, he thought reciprocal altruism was 
less amenable to quantitative methods than kin selection due to the increased number of 
variables. Fortunately, Hamilton and the political scientist Robert Axelrod did not suffer 
from the same ―lack of imagination‖ (this was E.O. Wilson‘s criticism of Trivers when he 
said it was not possible), and in 1981, they constructed the mathematical model to 
support reciprocal altruism in ―The Evolution of Cooperation.‖306 When Trivers, who 
was by then a professor at the University of California, received a copy, he ―sat down at 
around eight o‘ clock at night, turned on some classical music, read the paper, and…my 
heart soared…To me the paper had almost biblical proportions, That is, you could see 
how a kind of social heaven…could evolve right here on earth.‖307 
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Trivers was not alone in his enthusiasm. Even as he sat silently in his study, 
basking in the glow of reciprocal altruism‘s profoundly optimistic implications, 
rumblings of great change grew loud just outside his door. By providing evolutionarily 
logical explanations for altruism among relatives and friends, he and Hamilton had laid 
the groundwork for innumerable studies into animal behavior, and the scientific 
community at-large rushed to stake their claims in the newly charted territory. Foremost 
among these men and women was the American entomologist E.O. Wilson, whom the 
reader first met in the introduction. Back then Wilson was in the unfortunate predicament 
of having angry activists pour water over his head, chanting that he was a racist who 
―could not hide.‖ Now that the historical context has been set, we can return to that 
moment in time and properly introduce the man, to situate him as an important 
popularizer of Hamilton and Trivers‘ work, and to gain an understanding of the role he 
played in the return of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences.  
 Born in Birmingham, Alabama in 1929, Edward Osborne (E.O.) Wilson spent 
countless hours as a child exploring in the forests and along the ocean shores. His parents 
fought frequently, eventually divorcing in 1936 despite a strong taboo against doing so 
during that era, so perhaps he used this time to escape the tension at home. In his 
autobiography, Wilson recalls how he enjoyed being outside and discovering ―monsters‖ 





 One such discovery, of a jellyfish, or ―scyphozoa,‖ left a lasting 
impression on the young boy. The bizarre features of the animal, so different from a 
human‘s, filled him with wonder for unique ways of being and thinking, and he carried 
this perspective with him throughout his life.
309
 Wilson, however, did not experience the 
same support for intellectual development as Hamilton had while growing up, so an 
academic career was not likely. Instead of trips to museums and homemade science 
experiments, his parents raised him according to the traditional values of the South: 
discipline, physical courage, and Christian piety.
310
 When he was sent to a military 
academy at the age of eleven, the expectation was that he would develop the fortitude 
necessary to become an officer in the United States military. He likely would have done 
so, too, but a fishing accident damaged the sight in his right eye, causing the army to 
reject his application. Serendipitously, this physical limitation allowed him to pursue his 
intellectual dreams, and before long the child who loved animals had become a professor 
of biology at Harvard University.  
  In 1956, the very year he earned his doctorate, Wilson was asked to chair the 
PhD committee for a graduate student named Stuart Altman. Academic departments 
typically wait a few years before asking their new professors to take on such a 
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responsibility because they already have quite a bit on their plate, but in this case none of 
the other faculty felt adequately prepared to mentor Altman. The reason for their 
collective hesitation was the nature of the project—he wanted to study the behavior of 
wild rhesus monkeys on a small island off the coast of Puerto Rico—and Wilson‘s 
colleagues had never studied primates out of captivity. Some members questioned 
whether the project was even sufficiently academic (Remember, this is years before Jane 
Goodall‘s groundbreaking research in the Gombe Reserve). Wilson, however, eagerly 
took on the project.  
 During the course of the field research Wilson became convinced that animal 
behavior was as intrinsic to a species as its physical characteristics. He and Altman, one a 
specialist in ants and one in primates, often talked late into the Caribbean night about the 
possibility of a unifying theory for all social animals. Other zoologists such as Walter 
Clyde Allee had provided descriptive accounts of animal behavior before, but Wilson and 
Altman wanted to do more than describe; they wanted to explain why animals behaved as 
they did. The name for their theory: ―sociobiology.‖311 Unfortunately, however, the two 
men had to shelve the project despite their enthusiasm, for they came to recognize that 
they lacked the conceptual tools to advance the work of their predecessors.  
 Even as he continued to focus on entomology, Wilson kept his pet theory in the 
back of his mind. Over the coming years he saw potential in different sources but they 
each had their limitations. His first hope came from population biology, which he saw as 
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―a possible foundation for sociobiology.‖312 He theorized that caste systems among social 
insects resulted from a population-level regulation of the birth rates of individuals with 
different phenotypes.
313
 Here Wilson is clearly under the influence of Wynne-Edwards‘ 
group selectionist arguments. This is not surprising due to the tremendous popularity of 
Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior at the time, yet for Wilson—and most 
of the biological community—group selectionism proved to be a dead end. Next, Wilson 
looked to ethology. Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen, the modern-day founders of 
the discipline, were achieving great success studying animal behavior (they would share 
the Nobel Prize in 1973), and their work seemed to be a natural source of inspiration. 
Wilson, however, found their theoretical model to be lacking, as it was too mechanical 
and relied too much upon input from external cues. What he needed was a theory to 
explain the internal, subconscious motivation behind animal behavior.     
 In 1965, Wilson took a long train ride from Boston to Miami, and as a matter of 
course he brought along several books and articles to read, one of which happened to be 
Hamilton‘s paper on kin selection. Wilson was not expecting much from the British 
graduate student, so he ―riffled through it impatiently.‖314 He was anxious to get the gist 
of the argument and return to what he intended to be his primary reading material, but it 
didn‘t work out that way. Wilson‘s recollection of the experience is worth quoting at 
length: 
Impossible, I thought; this can‘t be right. Too simple. He must not know 
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much about social insects. But the idea kept gnawing at me early that 
afternoon. As we departed southward across the New Jersey marshes, I 
went through the article again, more carefully this time, looking for the 
fatal flaw I believed must be there...Hamilton, whoever he was, could not 
have cut the Gordian knot...And because I modestly thought of myself as 
the world authority on social insects, I also thought it unlikely that anyone 
else could explain their origin, certainly not in one clean stroke. The next 
morning, as we rolled on past Waycross and Jacksonville, I thrashed about 
some more. By the time we reached Miami, in the early afternoon, I gave 
up. I was a convert, and out myself in Hamilton‘s hands.315  
 
Much like Darwin a century before, Wilson had found his ―theory by which to work.‖  
Thanks to Hamilton, he had an opportunity to transform his dream of sociobiology into 
reality. Fueled by the ―amphetamine of ambition,‖ Wilson set out to establish 
sociobiology as a new discipline, one grounded in the theory of kin selectionism.
316
 His 
first effort, Insect Societies, was a sociobiological analysis of, well, insects, yet he had far 
grander plans. In the final paragraph he writes, ―The optimistic prospect for sociobiology 
can be summarized briefly as follows. In spite of the phylogenetic remoteness of 
vertebrates and insects and the basic distinction between their respective personal and 
impersonal systems of communication, these two groups of animals have evolved social 
behaviors that are similar in degree of complexity in many important details. This fact 
conveys as special promise that sociobiology can eventually be derived from the first 
principles of population and behavioral biology and developed into a single, mature 
science.‖ 317 
 Wilson then spent the next two years writing Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. 
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The workload was incredible, as he could not neglect his teaching responsibilities at 
Harvard nor his ongoing research in ant biology, but he was committed to making a mark 
in the scientific community and was willing to put in the long hours. He did not have any 
illusions about the nature of the project. Sociobiology did not propose a new theory; that 
recognition would go where it belonged, to Hamilton. Yet he saw two paths to success, 
―breakthroughs for the extremely bright, syntheses for the driven,‖ and, ―knowing where 
(his) capabilities lay,‖ he was comfortable with the latter.318 During this time Wilson had 
the incredible luck to serve on the PhD committee for precisely the person who could 
most help his project, Robert Trivers.
319
 Trivers, of course, enabled Wilson to expand his 
synthesis much further, as reciprocal altruism explained cooperation among friends in 
addition to kin. The resulting book was a tome of erudition, encyclopedic in depth and, 
for those unfamiliar with the work of Hamilton and Trivers, a shocking new perspective. 
Wilson achieved widespread acclaim upon its publication. In 1977, President Carter 
awarded Wilson the National Medal of Science and, later that year, Time magazine 
placed Sociobiology on the cover.  
So, you might be wondering, how did any of this land Wilson on the wet end of a 
water bucket protest against racism? Well, the book‘s success was only half the story. 
Behind the praise lurked vehement opposition, for Wilson‘s ambition had taken him to 
the heart of taboo thinking: an evolutionary analysis of human beings. To Wilson, it was 
only natural to include human beings in a work purporting to cover the entire animal 
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157 
kingdom. Humans are animals, are they not? And to understand them it makes sense to 
take into account the vast majority of their existence. ―History,‖ he explained, ―did not 
begin 10,000 years ago in the villages of Anatolia and Jordan. It spans the 2 million years 
of the life of the genus Homo. Deep history—by which I mean biological history—made 
us what we are, no less than culture.‖320 By including humans in Sociobiology, however, 
he had, somewhat naively, he later admitted, threatened those who believed that 
intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth-century had demonstrated how fallacious—
and dangerous—evolutionary thinking was when applied to human beings.  
What remained to be seen at this point was whether or not the taboo would hold, 
for it was certainly possible that the popularity of Sociobiology could cause reasonable 
people to again consider human beings‘ evolutionary heritage when contemplating their 
contemporary condition. The opponents of sociobiology (a diverse group, but primarily 
Marxists and ―radical‖ feminists) saw the new theory as a disingenuous effort to justify a 
hierarchical world order benefitting those in power. Sociobiologists, they claimed, were 
exploiting the authority of science to revive prior claims that white male privilege was 
somehow ―natural‖ and thus resistant to change.321 Wilson‘s response to the attacks was 
to claim that it was all a misunderstanding, that the protestors were conflating 
sociobiology, which was inspired, after all, by Hamilton and Trivers‘ insights into the 
evolutionary logic of cooperation and self-sacrifice, with the discriminatory evolutionary 
theories of the past. Sociobiology was not eugenics. It was not scientific racism. And it 
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certainly was not an apology for the holocaust. Which brings us back to February of 
1978, with a bucket of water—and the legacy of sociobiology—hanging in air. At the 
time, of course, no one knew with certainty what the future of the new discipline held. 
Now, looking back, it is possible to discern whether it engendered a paradigm shift in the 
American intellectual community by revealing the genetic influence on human behavior 
or whether the activists were able to douse the flame of discriminatory science.  
My argument is that sociobiology did usher in a new era of evolutionary analyses 
of human beings. It is not enough, however, to simply claim that the new discipline had a 
tremendous impact on the social sciences; an observant person could induce that fact 
after a careful reading of the trends in the popular and academic press during the last 
forty years. The goal of the current chapter is to demonstrate why sociobiology was 
successful.
322
 Why were social scientists, who had almost unanimously rejected 
evolutionary thinking in the 1950s, now willing to entertain these notions again? The 
decision to do so could not have been made lightly, as a strong institutional commitment 
to strictly cultural explanations for human behavior had existed since the United Nations 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Statement on Race in 1950 
admonished efforts to craft policy from biological principles.     
 To successfully reintroduce biological thinking in the social sciences the 
sociobiologists would have to, at the very least, convincingly respond to the early 
twentieth-century critiques of Social Darwinism and eugenics. The reader will recall that 
in the early 1900s an entire generation of intellectuals framed their arguments in 
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evolutionary terms until a series of challenges to this way of thinking led to its decline 
and, ultimately, disavowal. The philosophers Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore led the 
way in this effort by challenging the logic of applying biology to human affairs. 
Specifically, Sidgwick, who was inspired by the logic of the great David Hume, claimed 
that evolutionary ethics (philosophy‘s focal interest in evolution) violated the ―is/ought‖ 
fallacy; in other words, it mistakenly presupposed that what exists is the best possible 
outcome. In the search for lasting, meaningful ethical standards, Sidgwick insisted, one 
should not accept the world as Panglossian optimists, but should critically assess, probing 
for weaknesses.
323
 Later, Sidgwick‘s student G.E. Moore joined in the assault, arguing 
that what is good for society can‘t possibly be elucidated through scientific inquiry 
because the concept of ―good‖ is irreducible. Thus, evolutionary ethics suffered from a 
violation of the ―naturalistic‖ fallacy.324   
 Despite the increasingly narrow scope of philosophical inquiry throughout the 
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, academia has continued to respect 
philosophy‘s authority; thus, Sidgwick and Moore‘s critiques of evolutionary ethics stood 
as a formidable obstacle to sociobiology‘s acceptance among social scientists. The 
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sociobiologists, however, managed to repel the philosophical attack by simply agreeing. 
―Of course,‖ they responded, ―what one finds in nature does not represent humanity‘s 
highest ideals. It is impossible to take such a notion seriously when aware of the wanton 
violence throughout the animal kingdom.‖ Michael Ruse, the first philosopher to embrace 
sociobiology, reassured those who feared a philosophical justification for the ―survival of 
the fittest‖ by acknowledging, ―it is still legitimate and proper to make the distinction 
between ‗is‘ and ‗ought‘.‖325 E.O. Wilson later ruffled feathers with his call to 
―biologize‖ ethics, but even he admitted ―there is a dangerous trap in sociobiology, one 
which can be avoided only by constant vigilance. The trap is the naturalistic fallacy of 
ethics.‖326 Although these mitigating claims did serve as effective responses to 
philosophical concerns, it would be cynical to see them as calculated conciliation; these 
men believed, like Thomas Huxley before them, that an accurate understanding of 
evolution was necessary for resistance, not emulation. 
 Another major challenge to the previous application of evolutionary thinking was 
the conflict between biometricians and Mendelians (not to mention the substantial 
factions of scientists who favored orthogenesis or some variant of Neo-Lamarckism). 
With no consensus on how evolution occurred it was impossible for responsible 
intellectuals to justify incorporating the insights of evolution into their analyses of human 
beings. Which evolutionary theory would they base their argument on, and what would 
they do if that theory eventually became discredited by its competitors? Fortunately for 
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sociobiologists, the modern synthesis had repaired the schisms that previously fractured 
the discipline and undermined its authority. This is not to say that there were no 
important disagreements between evolutionary biologists, but by the 1960s these 
disagreements took place within the context of a broadly shared understanding of the 
major tenets of evolution. ―All participants agreed that a consensus concerning the 
mechanism of evolution appeared among biologists during the 1920-1950 period,‖ 
concluded William Provine after bringing together the world‘s leading evolutionary 
biologists for The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of Biology.
327
 
With recourse to a unified core of evolutionary principles, sociobiology, while 
controversial, benefitted from far greater scientific legitimacy than its precursors.  
 Perhaps the most devastating critique of incorporating evolutionary theory into 
human affairs was the claim that it had led to prejudicial treatment of large numbers of 
people based upon their gender, ethnicity, or skin color. Eugenics, the well intentioned 
yet short-sighted and cruel policy of managing birth rates among the population, was 
certainly inspired by the notion that society needed to artificially replicate natural 
selection in order to ―evolve.‖ Due to the existence of welfare in modern Western 
nations, the thinking went, lazy and incompetent people avoided the ruthless justice 
found in nature and, in the long run, this would result in an ―inferior‖ population. Thus, 
eugenicists sought to minimize the birthrates among the supposedly dull and weak while 
simultaneously encouraging reproduction among the ―best‖ people. And while this might 
seem like a bad science-fiction novel to the modern reader, it was very influential 
thinking in the early twentieth-century, ultimately leading to the sterilization of over sixty 
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thousand people in the United States alone.    
 Eugenics was only one of the regretful applications of evolutionary thinking in 
human affairs at this time.
328
 Throughout the turn of the century advocates of white 
supremacy used ―scientific racism‖ to justify discrimination against all sorts of people.329 
For instance, Italians and other immigrants from the south or east of Europe suffered 
from claims of intrinsic inferiority such as a purported propensity for crime. The leading 
expositor of scientific racism, Madison Grant, wanted to restrict immigration because he 
thought miscegenation would weaken the United States. ―What the Melting Pot actually 
does in practice can be seen in Mexico,‖ Grant argued, ―where the absorption of the 
blood of the original Spanish conquerors by the native Indian population has produced 
the racial mixture which we call Mexican and which is now engaged in demonstrating its 
incapacity for self government.‖330 Eventually, the Nazis took scientific racism to its 
gruesomely logical conclusion, and they attempted to cull members of the population 
seen as inferior, e.g., Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals. The holocaust became the 
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gruesome final chapter of applied evolutionary thinking in the first half of the twentieth-
century, as decent people around the world officially declared that ―mankind is one.‖331 
No less a global authority than UNESCO declared, although ―the characteristics in which 
human groups differ from one another have often been exaggerated and used a as a basis 
for questioning the validity of equality in the ethical sense,‖ it was now time to disregard 
these physical differences and focus exclusively on cultural variables.
332
 
This would be a tough hill to climb for sociobiology, as the resulting taboo 
against evolutionary thinking in human affairs held strong moral undertones. To speak in 
in biological terms was, however implicitly, to defend white male supremacy—which of 
course almost no intellectuals wanted to do. So, how did sociobiology gain an 
opportunity to be heard with an open mind? Again, by agreeing! Sociobiology 
differentiated itself from the evolutionary thinking of the past by rejecting notions that 
there existed significant differences between people of different colors or genders. 
Instead, it emphasized the common humanity shared by all people around the world, just 
like the early to mid-twentieth-century critics had been saying all along. You can see how 
similarly social scientists and sociobiologists viewed the relationship between biology, 
race, and culture by juxtaposing UNESCO‘s official statement on the ―biological aspects 
of the racial question‖ with an early sociobiologist‘s take on the subject.333 Here is 
UNESCO:  
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The genetic capacity for intellectual development depends on biological 
characteristics which are of universal value on account of their importance 
for the survival for the species in any natural and cultural environment... 
(Further), in the light of present knowledge, the differences in cultural 
achievements seem to be accounted for entirely by the cultural history of 




And here is the sociologist Pierre van den Berghe: ―By stressing how fundamentally alike 
humans are beneath their cultural differences…sociobiology could be a powerful antidote 
to racism.‖335 Other than van den Berghe‘s brevity, the message is essentially the same.  
 The only critique of evolutionary thinking in human affairs that remained 
unanswered was the claim that the social sciences were distinct from the natural sciences 
and functioned most effectively with their own methodology. Perhaps there was no way 
to avoid conflict around this sensitive issue, as sociobiology, by definition, represented an 
incursion on previously autonomous disciplines; however, Edward Wilson and the 
sociobiologists certainly exacerbated the tension. There were no olive branches here, no 
mitigating statements limiting the reach of sociobiology. Instead, Wilson led a direct 
assault, arguing that ―it may not be too much to say that sociology and the other social 
sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches of biology waiting to be 
included.‖ Not everyone was as confident (or naïve, depending on your point of view) as 
Wilson. Anthropologist and sociobiologist Jerome Barkow counseled moderation. He 
recognized that ―historically, Durkheim‘s principle helped protect the nascent social 
sciences from the racist pseudo-biology and pseudo-psychology of the time,‖ and sought 
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to temper the resistance to sociobiology by advocating more realistic goals.
336
 ―Although 
Wilson ambitiously threatens that sociobiology is going to incorporate the social 
sciences, a more modest program would suggest that the paradigm of evolutionary 
biology is likely to be relevant to these disciplines,‖ he argued in 1978.337  Despite 
Barkow and others‘ restraint, the storm was on the horizon, for all sociobiologists 
believed that ―evolutionary biology has profound implications for the social sciences.‖338  
 Despite their largely satisfactory answers to the questions surrounding applied 
evolutionary thinking, sociobiology‘s invasion of the social sciences would have failed if 
its sole advantage over previous evolutionary theories of human behavior was simply the 
accommodation of critics‘ complaints regarding ethics, race, and gender. Other people, 
primarily scientists, had been advocating the importance of biology in human affairs for 
years and they were unable to make any headway because more than compromise and 
intellectual persuasion was needed. What differentiated sociobiology was the fact that 
Hamilton and Trivers had established viable grounds for a biological social science. By 
demonstrating the evolutionary logic of sacrifice and cooperation they gave others the 
impression that evolution could account for the entire spectrum of human behavior—not 
just cruelty and competition. Further, the emphasis on the evolutionary logic of kindness 
allowed social scientists to once again speculate about human behavior through an 
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evolutionary lens without worrying that they would be associated with the ugliness of 
cutthroat competition, racism, sexism, or xenophobia.  
The cruel governmental policies and discriminatory social attitudes of the early 
twentieth-century had repulsed social scientists, many of whom saw their disciplines as a 
vehicle for social progress. Consequently, social scientists recognized the taboo against 
evolutionary thinking in their disciplines as a necessary barrier to hateful ideas and not as 
a restriction of their intellectual liberty. Hamilton and Trivers, however, began to change 
the perception of evolution‘s implications for humans, which allowed some social 
scientists to question the taboo. A new possibility had arisen: one could now combine 
evolutionary analysis with progressive values.
339
 Still, a powerful, institutionally backed 
taboo does not go away over night. In order for evolutionary thinking to return to the 
social sciences a small number of intellectuals had to have the temerity to take the first 
steps—and face the inevitable condemnation from peers. I had the honor to speak with 
many of the principle protagonists in this effort. After almost forty years, these men and 
women had gained valuable perspective. Some had recently published books chronicling 
their role in the return of evolutionary thinking, while others were happy to have me craft 
the first historical account of their experiences. Still others were reluctant to talk about 
sociobiology at all because ―Answering your questions brought back many unhappy 
memories.‖340 Taken together, these writings and interviews reveal how the scientific 
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developments behind sociobiology inspired a cadre of intrepid academics to attempt a 
transformation of the social sciences, and, subsequently, the way in which educated 
Americans view the world.  
Perhaps the most influential early ―sociobiologist‖ was Richard Alexander, an 
entomologist at the University of Michigan who came to focus on human beings after he 
saw that an ―inexcusably small percentage of the people writing about man today have 
not done their homework on the facts and the theory of evolution.‖341 Alexander had 
decided early in his career that he wanted to ―address broad questions concerning 
evolution,‖ and that he was ―going to proceed, for as long as I can, under the assumption 
that every trait of life can be explained by the process of organic evolution.‖342 He soon 
realized, however, that evolution, despite its universal importance for all aspects of life, 
had been pigeonholed in biology. ―As a student‖ he recalled, ―evolution was never 
mentioned in the philosophy courses, and only as a nasty word in the psychology 
courses.‖343 The disconnect in the social sciences from arguably the most important 
scientific theory in history baffled young Alexander, who believed that ―because of its 
all-encompassing character, evolutionary theory is by nature philosophical in its 
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application to man.‖344  
Alexander was aware, of course, of the acrimony following Wilson after his 
exposition of sociobiology, yet, as someone educated in the hard sciences (where 
evolution had not, indeed, could not, be shunned), he had not been inculcated with the 
same values as his colleagues in the social sciences and thus the taboo that they held dear 
held little meaning for him. ―It is hardly reasonable to accuse a man of being a Social 
Darwinist,‖ he lamented in ―The Search for an Evolutionary Philosophy of Man,‖ 
―because he argues for certain causes of historical events (if) the appellation has nothing 
to do with his views of what is desirable for the present and future of man. It is even less 
reasonable to imply that he must not analyze human behavior if his analysis—right or 
wrong—can be distorted or misused by others.‖345 For Alexander, the time for academic 
politics was over; it was time to sincerely investigate the implications of evolution. He 
explained, ―Prior to 1859 there simply was no general explanation of life, including man, 
that made any real sense,‖ then Darwin changed everything, and now, thanks to recent 
developments in evolutionary biology, it was possible to begin the critical task of 
developing a general theory of behavior that encompassed all the disciplines.
346
  
In the eyes of Alexander, a young scientist who loved to probe the nature of 
reality, the 1970s were a great time to be alive, for ―the latter part of the twentieth-
century witnessed great progress in our understanding of how organic evolution has 
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shaped the behavioral and social aspects of the human species.‖347 And whom did 
Alexander credit for the sudden leap forward? Hamilton.
348
 Alexander revered the shy 
British iconoclast as ―the greatest evolutionary biologist of his generation,‖ as the 
―revolutionary thinker (who) gave biologists the tools for understanding sociality in all 
organisms.‖349 By elucidating the evolutionary logic behind eusociality in insects, 
Hamilton had ―affected the way biologists approached far broader issues, such as our 
views of the levels at which natural selection has operated--from genes to individuals and 
species, as well as from families to tribes and nations--and thus the basic reasons for 
organisms acting as they do.‖350 To Alexander, Hamilton had brought science to the cusp 
of a viable evolutionary philosophy of man, and it was now ―up to the rest of us to use 
and develop all such glimpses into the human condition to generate a self-understanding 
adequate to the task of significantly reducing human misery and strife across the 
globe.‖351 
Not all scientists shared Alexander‘s missionary zeal, as the potential for personal 
and professional condemnation remained high. Discouraged by his colleague‘s reticence, 
Alexander complained that ―people who understand evolution profoundly often are 
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reluctant to openly deliver honest, detailed, or complete descriptions of evolution and its 
past.‖352 Even Will Hamilton, his inspiration, hesitated to take a stance. ―I once heard Bill 
assert,‖ Alexander recalled, ―that he avoided applying his theories to humans because he 
thought such extrapolation was too difficult and too subject to misinterpretation.‖353 
Nonetheless, Alexander remained committed to analyzing human behavior through an 
evolutionary lens, for he believed that evolution was ―no longer the property of a small 
group of biologists: to understand it thoroughly has become the responsibility of every 
person with a potential role in man‘s future.‖354 Over the next forty years he would 
fearlessly speculate on evolution‘s role in morality, communication, culture, and a 
number of other pillars in human society. His papers serve as the seminal works of 
sociobiology today. 
The time had come. Inspired by E.O. Wilson and the scientists upon whose 
shoulders he stood, Richard Alexander had violated the taboo against evolutionary 
analyses of human behavior. He, in turn, would inspire a new generation of thinkers to 
question, and then transcend, the existing boundaries of academic respectability. Over the 
next decades, the social sciences experienced significant upheaval as waves of 
sociobiologists introduced evolutionary perspectives to their disciplines. The first 
discipline to be so effected, and the one which experienced perhaps the greatest 
transformation, was anthropology. Here, in the discipline Franz Boas founded as a defiant 
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response to evolution-inspired models of white supremacy, three young anthropologists 
dared to claim that human beings were animals with a lasting evolutionary heritage. 
Napoleon Chagnon, Sarah Hrdy, and Martin Daly came from diverse backgrounds and 
studied in separate schools; however, sociobiology motivated them all to think the 
unthinkable. After initial resistance to their work, they would each achieve academic 
acclaim for their iconoclastic speculations.  
Napoleon Chagnon is not your typical academic, that is, unless Indiana Jones is your 
archetype of a professor. Born in 1938 in Port Austin, Michigan, Chagnon spent his time 
as a graduate student not sitting in dimly lit archives or staring at computer screens, but 
living with the Yanomami, an indigenous tribe in the remote Amazon jungle. Before he 
met the Yanomami, Chagnon eagerly imagined them to be a peaceful, loving community 
free from the sins of the technologically advanced world.
355
 This rose-colored optimism 
resulted from his education in post-World War II anthropology, a discipline that 
embraced the notion that all people were inherently good and that the violence and greed 
plaguing modern nations was the by-product of capitalist competition rather than a 
reflection of human nature.  
As Chagnon paddled up the river and introduced himself to the Yanomami, however, 
the reality of an angry villager, high on psychedelics and pointing a spear at him, caused 
him to begin reevaluating his preconceived notions. Remembering that fateful encounter 
almost forty years later, Chagnon explains, ―The Yanomami were decidedly different 
from what I had imagined them to be in my Rousseauian daydreams‖ and, as such, he 
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was forced to accept that his ―assumption about the alleged social tranquility of the past 
may be idealistic and incorrect.‖356 The more time he spent with them, the more he 
realized, ―Among the Yanomami, native warfare was not just occasional or sporadic but 
was a chronic threat, luring and threatening to disrupt communities at any moment.‖357 
How could he explain the radical discrepancy between reality and anthropological 
theory? 
Chagnon was well aware that ―the standard, almost solemn, epistemological position 
in cultural anthropology when I was in graduate school was that humans have only a 
cultural nature.‖358 So, at first, he tried to reconcile his findings with what he had learned 
in school. And, according to the ―most scientific anthropological theory of primitive war 
of the 1960s…tribesmen, just like members of industrialized nations, fought only over 
scarce material resources—food, oil, land, water supplies, seaports, wealth, etc.‖359 Yet, 
try as he might, Chagnon did not see members of the Yanomami fighting over these 
things. Instead, he found that ―most Yanomami arguments and fights started over 
women.‖360 Chagnon knew that his finding, that ―warfare was common among the 
Yanomami and that it was apparently not caused by capitalist exploitation, nor was it a 
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reaction to oppression by Western colonial powers‖ was dangerous for his career.361 
―Most anthropologists… believed that warfare and fighting were entirely determined by 
culture‖ and here he was, a young graduate student, raising the ―possibility that warfare 
was, in a sense, a ―natural‖ or ―predictable‖ condition among tribesmen who not been 
exposed to or corrupted by capitalistic, industrialized, and/or colonial cultures.‖362 Yet, 
despite the professional risks, Chagnon remained committed to describing the Yanomami 
as he found them. 
 A major source of strength for Chagnon‘s conviction to accurately depict the 
Yanomami came from the ―major theoretical breakthroughs in evolutionary theory (that) 
occurred just prior to or during the time I began studying anthropology at the University 
of Michigan.‖363 As the reader probably has already guessed, these breakthroughs were 
―a pair of papers that William D. Hamilton, an English biologist, published in 1964 in the 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, a journal that most anthropologists were not familiar with 
and did not read.‖364 After the clear incongruence between what he found in the field and 
existing anthropological theory, Chagnon‘s ―theoretical views on the anthropology of 
human behavior became increasingly affected by (these) new discoveries in theoretical 
biology.‖365 In particular, he was ―interested in Hamilton‘s theory of ―inclusive fitness, 
also known as ‗kin selection,‘ because it laid a new basis for understanding why kinship 
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relationships provided the rock-bottom source of social solidarity.‖366 Now, armed with 
the tools of evolutionary biology, Chagnon could finally make sense of the violence he 
saw in the Amazon: ―human warfare had as much to do with the evolved nature of man 
as it did with what one learned and acquired from one‘s culture.‖367 
Chagnon‘s time in the Amazon jungle convinced him that the Yanomamo were 
without question a warlike people.
368
 On an almost daily basis he witnessed examples of 
their aggression, which ―ranged in seriousness from the ordinary incidents of wife 
beating and chest pounding to dueling and organized raiding by parties that set out with 
the intention of ambushing and killing men from enemy villages.‖369 These raids were not 
ceremonial or symbolic, as over thirty percent of adult males died from the violence, and 
they had a tremendous influence on Yanomamo culture. Indeed, Chagnon claimed, ―the 
thing that impressed me most was the importance of aggression in their culture.‖370 
Yanomamo mythology, settlement patterns, politics, and even marriage practices all 
reflected this martial spirit. To prove these assertions, Chagnon provided several 
anecdotes of the violence he witnessed. The combat ritual for infidelity serves here as a 
representative example: ―The enraged husband challenges his opponent to strike him on 
the head with a club. He holds his own club vertically, leans against it and exposes his 
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head for this opponent to strike. After he has sustained a blow on the head, he can then 
deliver one on the culprit‘s skill. As soon as blood starts to flow, almost everybody rips a 
pole out of the house frame and joins in the fighting, supporting one or the other of 
contestants.‖371 
 Reading Chagnon‘s field report one gets the feeling that his experience with the 
Yanomamo left a bad taste in his mouth. ―Primitive man is not always as noble as you 
originally thought,‖ he reveals in Yanomamo: The Fierce People.372 It is not hard to 
understand why he had a negative impression of his hosts, as it appears that his time in 
the field was beset by constant strife and interpersonal difficulty. After almost a year of 
dedicated genealogy research, he discovered that the Yanomamo had been lying to him 
about each other‘s names the whole time. He bitterly recalled, ―They enjoyed watching 
me learn these names. I assumed, wrongly, that I would get the truth to each question and 
that I would get the best information by working in public. This set the stage for 
converting a serious project into a farce. Each informant tried to outdo his peers by 
inventing a name even more ridiculous than what I had been given earlier.‖373 Then they 
would roar in hysterics when he would inadvertently refer to people as ―hairy vagina,‖ 
―long penis, ―feces of the harpy eagle,‖ or ―dirty rectum.‖374 And while this may seem 
harmless, not everything he witnessed was so benign. In a culture where ―men in general 
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are cruel to their wives,‖ Chagnon saw more than enough domestic abuse.375 In one 
particularly gruesome incident the husband ―commanded his wife to prepare food for 
them, but the woman moved a little too slowly to suit him (so Paruriwa, the man) grabbed 
an axe, and swung it wildly at her. She ducked and ran screaming from the house. 
Paruriwa then recovered his balance and threw the axe at her as she fled.‖376 Incidents 
like these, combined with descriptions of malevolent personalities and continual 
harassment, give Chagnon‘s writing a critical tone.377 
Chagnon‘s exciting stories of primitive violence made him one the country‘s most 
popular academics. Among fellow anthropologists, however, he achieved more notoriety 
than praise, as a discipline that remained committed to cultural analysis questioned his 
findings, his methods, and even his ethics. Jacques Lizot, a French anthropologist who 
spent more than fifteen years in a village near Bisaasi-teri, expressed his desire to ―revise 
the exaggerated representation that has been given of Yanomami violence.‖378 According 
to Lizot, ―the Yanomami are warriors; they can be brutal and cruel, but they can also be 
delicate, sensitive and loving.‖379 As the debate surrounding Chagnon grew, a conference 
titled "Tragedy in the Amazon: Yanomami Voices, Academic Controversy and the Ethics 
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of Research" brought together a number of those critical of Chagnon. David Maybury-
Lewis, an anthropologist at Harvard University, established the negative tone of the 
conference, claiming that Chagnon‘s ―dehumanization of the Yanomami is shocking,‖ 
while Leslie Sponsel made explicit the liberal political values behind the opposition: 
―Future research with the Yanomami needs to pay far more attention to promoting their 
survival, welfare, self-determination and other human rights.‖380 Eventually, the 
prestigious National Academy of Sciences awarded Chagnon membership for his 
groundbreaking work, but he could never shake the cloud of controversy that had 
followed him since he left the jungle.
381
 The message was clear: anybody who introduced 
evolutionary thinking to anthropology was in dangerous waters. 
Today Sarah Hrdy lives on her walnut farm in northern California. From there, 
she and her husband, David, aim to produce ―the best quality walnuts in the world.‖382 
The farm appears to do quite well, shipping large quantities of walnuts all over the world. 
Despite the success of the farm, however, Hrdy‘s current dusty environs might surprise 
those who know her first and foremost as one of the country‘s most accomplished 
anthropologists. A closer look at Hrdy‘s early years, however, reveals that she is 
accustomed to, and perhaps feels most comfortable in, life outside a big city. Born in 
Dallas in 1946, she ―grew up in Houston when it was still a fairly sleepy city with 
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graceful oaks, long lazy gar and alligators swimming in the bayous, and cattle grazing 
along Buffalo Speedway.‖383 The prevailing values of her childhood ―were distinctly 
‗Southern,‘‖ meaning ―genteel manners, extreme segregation, and patriarchal 
institutions.‖384 A younger child, and a daughter, her education was somewhat an 
afterthought, so her parents willingly indulged their daughter‘s love of horses and sent 
her to St. Timothy‘s all-girls school primarily because of its equestrian offerings. 
Fortunately, the headmaster took the academic aspects of the school seriously as well, 
and it was there young Hrdy developed a sincere, personal ―lust to learn.‖385  
 Following in her mother‘s footsteps, Hrdy went to Wellesley College in 
Massachusetts in 1964. Befitting her infectious love of learning, she majored in 
philosophy, but her favorite class was on creative writing. Her major undergraduate 
project was a novel on ―modern Mexicans of Mayan descent who were torn between their 
contemporary worlds and ancient heritages.‖386 Specifically, her book was about the 
ancient legends that continued to haunt the people of Guatemala and Honduras because 
she was ―interested in learning how and why human imagination invented demons.‖387 
Demonstrating an uncommon humility for someone her age, Hrdy realized that in order 
to write effectively about this fascinating subject ―it would be helpful to actually learn 
                                                     
383
 Sarah Hrdy, Myths, Monkeys, and Motherhood: A Compromising Life, in 
Leaders in Animal Behavior, eds. Lee Drickamer and Donald Dewsbury (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 344. 
 
384
 Ibid., 344.  
 
385
 Ibid., 345. 
 
386
 Ibid., 346. 
 
387




something about Mayans and their mythology,‖ and this meant changing her major to 
anthropology.
388
 For good measure, she also transferred to the women‘s branch of 
Harvard, Radcliffe, to study with Evon Vogt, who was then the world‘s expert on Mayan 
cosmology.  
 The book Hrdy eventually wrote, The Black-man of Zinacantan, was a 
conventional structural analysis in the manner of Claude Levi-Strauss, whose ideas 
dominated anthropological at the time. Hrdy‘s time at Harvard, however, exposed her to 
new ways of thinking that would cause her to eventually challenge traditional 
anthropological methods and perspectives. Thanks to her switch from the humanities to 
the social sciences, Hrdy began to think biologically, as the change in degree entailed a 
new set of required courses. During these classes Hrdy recognized a gender bias in the 
sciences, both in the lack of female scientists and in the depictions of female primate 
behavior. Again and again, she ―would read that ‗the most important, time-consuming 
role of the nonhuman primate female, and her primary focus as an adult, is motherhood. 
She raises one infant after another from the time she assumes adult roles ... until the time 
she dies.‖389 Hrdy, however, felt something was amiss. Perhaps Clemence Royer, the 
French translator of On the Origin of Species, was right; scientists have misunderstood 
the role of females in nature all along because ―science, like law, has been exclusively 
made by men (who) considered woman too often an absolutely passive being, without 
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instincts or passions, or her own interests.‖390  
 Hrdy‘s nagging doubts about the ―naturalness‖ of motherhood grew stronger after 
the discovery of infanticide among langur monkeys by The Japan India Joint Project, a 
research team led by Yukimaru Sugiyama. Infanticide was problematic for several 
reasons. Most importantly, it seemed a clear violation of the group selectionism still 
prominent at the time. Why on earth, evolutionary biologists speculated, would a 
dominant male member of a species kill a newborn? It seemed to serve no purpose. 
Female langur behavior also proved puzzling in this circumstance, as Sugiyama reported 
that they engaged in promiscuous sex with their own babies‘ killers. This was clearly not 
the ―maternal‖ response scientists had expected to see. Intrigued, Hrdy, after a brief stint 
considering a career as a documentary filmmaker, decided to pursue a PhD researching 
infanticide.  
 Like Chagnon only a few years before, Hrdy recognized that the traditional 
explanations she learned in school had fundamental flaws. Fortunately, she would also 
come across the tools needed to unravel the paradoxes into logical explanations. The very 
first semester of graduate school she handed in a paper to a ―cocky graduate student‖ that 
bluntly critiqued her work.
391
 His name: Robert Trivers. The unflinching feedback had set 
the two off on rocky footing, but even then Hrdy ―had a dawning awareness he might be 
someone worth learning from.‖392 Trivers soon established himself as ―the most 
inspirational teacher (Hrdy) ever had‖ and, by the end of the academic year, she had to 
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come to understand ―how important Trivers' stunningly original ideas about the 
connection between parental investment and Darwinian sexual selection were for 
understanding infanticide‖ among the langurs.393 The next spring, Hrdy took a seminar 
taught by none other than E.O. Wilson. According to Hrdy, Wilson‘s ―sense of mission 
was infectious,‖ and the class devoured the writings of the ―prophet,‖ W.D. Hamilton, 
and contemplated the integration of ―ecology, demography, genetics, development, 
behavior, and evolutionary theory in one grand explanatory framework.‖394 It was a 
perfect storm of intellectual influences, and Hrdy emerged a powerful, controversial 
anthropologist. In her own words, ―I already felt a profound debt to Trivers and Wilson 
and considered myself a sociobiologist.‖395  
 For the next five years Hrdy would spend over fifteen hundred hours in the 
jungles of India in order to learn more about langur monkeys. During this time she 
became convinced that infanticide occurred on a regular basis and could not, therefore, be 
considered a pathological aberration. In fact, after one abandoned the logic of group 
selectionism, the behavior appeared perfectly logical. From a gene-centered evolutionary 
perspective the murder of an infant by a new dominant male makes sense, as the removal 
of nursing dependents returns the females to estrus sooner. Essentially, according to 
Hrdy, ―Infant-killing is a reproductive strategy whereby the usurping male increases his 
own reproductive success at the expense of the former leader (presumably the father of 
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the infant killed).‖396 Gruesome? Yes. But no longer an evolutionary mystery. 
 What was not understood, what had not really been studied, actually, was the 
female‘s response to the murder of her offspring. Hrdy observed that ―after a new male 
takes over, females may form temporary alliances to prevent him from killing their 
infants.‖ No surprises there; a new mother would be expected to protect her offspring. 
Unfortunately, however, while the females ―are often able to delay infanticide. Less often 
are they able to prevent it. Pitted against a male who has the option to try again and again 
until he finally succeeds, females have poor odds.‖397 So, how do they respond? The 
answer is, incredibly, that ―in many cases when a usurper does attack and injure an infant 
despite the mother‘s efforts at protection, the mother abandons it.‖398 According to Hrdy, 
the ―desertion reflects a practical evaluation of what this infant‘s chances are weighted 
against the probability that her next infant will survive.‖399 Far better to move on and rear 
successful offspring than expend valuable resources on an infant with no future.  
 And what about pregnant females? How did they behave in these scenarios? 
Writing in classic understatement, Hrdy claims, ―It may be significant then that at 
Dharwar, Jodhpur, and Abu, pregnant females confronted with a usurper displayed the 
traditional langur estrous signals: the female presents her rump to the male and 
frenetically shudders her head. These females mated with the usurper even though they 
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could not possibly have been ovulating at the time. Postconception estrus in this context 
may serve to confuse the issue of paternity.‖400 In other words, she had sexual intercourse 
with the new dominant male in order to make him think he was the father of her baby! 
The female langurs that Hrdy studied were clearly not passive breeders, patiently waiting 
to see which male would gain access to them. Conversely, they were active and strategic 
players in the competition of genetic reproduction.  
 Hrdy‘s controversial findings generated a firestorm of debate.401 Forty years later, 
she is able to recall the emotional experience with objective detachment, ―my proposal in 
the January-February 1977 issue of the American Scientist provoked a series of 
rebuttals.‖402 At the time, she admits, ―the controversy caught me by surprise‖ and caused 
her much distress.
403
 Hrdy now believes she can ―divide the saga into two phases.‖404 The 
first phase of the critiques was primarily scientific in nature, as critics believed Hrdy had 
mistakenly labeled infanticide as adaptive. Because she was a sociobiologist, they argued, 
Hrdy was intent on providing evolutionary explanations for behavior even when the 
evidence did not support it. For example, the first Western primatologist to study langurs 
in the wild, Jay Dolhinow, opined, ―It comes as great surprise that infanticide might be 
considered a normal adaptive evolutionary strategy…because ‗normal‘ langurs do not kill 
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infants.‖405 In a similar vein, another scientist claimed, ―Most witnessed cases of infant 
killing appear to be simply genetically inconsequential epiphenomena of aggressive 
episodes.‖406  
In Hrdy‘s opinion, these early critiques were ―useful, (and) ultimately 
constructive‖ because they ―made me think harder about my main underlying 
premise.‖407 The second phase of the controversy, which she views as ―far less 
constructive,‖ occurred largely outside the natural sciences, as anthropologists took 
umbrage at the implications her work held for human beings.
408
 In articles like ―Monkey 
‗Murderers‘ may be Falsely Accused,‖ they refused to acknowledge any scientific 
legitimacy to claims of adaptive infanticide, arguing that ―there was no evidence for a 
genetic basis for infanticidal behaviors.‖409 When other scientists began to explicitly test 
Hrdy‘s theories on human beings, the ―anthropologists began refusing to sanction 
publication of data on infanticide in traditional societies.‖410 At first, Hrdy tried to be 
conciliatory toward her detractors, writing that she and they represent ―two different 
world views, both of them defendable.‖411 In the face of unrelenting attacks, however, 
she decided to throw caution to the wind and focus almost entirely on human 
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Hrdy‘s next books all analyzed human behavior from an evolutionary perspective. 
Specifically, she focused on women. And, counter to the anxieties of sociobiology‘s 
feminist critics, her findings did not justify patriarchy. In fact, one of her central claims 
challenged a long-standing biological explanation of gender roles: the myth of sexually 
―coy‖ women courted by undiscriminating men. According to Hrdy, this myth began 
when Darwin painted nature with a Victorian brush and was given further validation by 
A.J. Bateman‘s research on the Drosophila fly, which showed that ―males improved their 
genetic representation in succeeding generations by mating with as many partners as they 
could, while females did not so benefit.‖412  
Over time, most evolutionary biologists accepted Bateman‘s findings as proof of 
the two sexes differing reproduction strategies. The resulting, unquestioned narrative 
depicted women as highly particular in their choice of sexual partners because they 
invested so much more in offspring than fathers. In monetary terms, sperm was ―cheap,‖ 
as men can conceivably father dozens or even hundreds of children without any 
necessary personal sacrifice. Women‘s reproductive potential, on the other hand, was 
limited by their relatively small supply of gametes and pregnancy. Thus, there might be 
some scientific support for the trope of eager boyfriend and reluctant girlfriend. In her 
extensive research, however, Hrdy found that ―a polyandrous component is at the core of 
the breeding systems of most troop-dwelling primates: females mate with many males, 
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each of whom may contribute a little bit toward the survival of offspring.‖413 
If, indeed, Hrdy was right, and female promiscuity is quite common in the natural 
world, how on earth did so many scientists get it so wrong for so long? Hrdy believes, ―It 
is impossible to understand this history without taking into account the background, 
including the gender, of the researchers involved.‖414 Until very recently, men have 
dominated scientific inquiry. In her own education, Hrdy recalls ―sitting in a simian 
seminar at Harvard and the discussion revolved around women being exchanged between 
groups as a way of connecting male brotherhoods and achieving alliances between 
groups. I remember thinking to myself, ‗This is what it must be like to be a black person 
listening to a lecture in support of the Ku Klux Klan.‘‖415 Having experienced such a 
gendered bias in science personally, Hrdy became convinced it was not ―just chance or 
just historical sequence that caused a small group of primatologists in the 1960s, who 
happened to be mostly male, to focus on male–male competition and on the number of 
matings males obtained.‖416 By bringing a woman‘s perspective to a male-dominated 
discipline, Hrdy was able to open the window on an entirely new side of sexual selection, 
one that recognized the myriad options available to females attempting to maximize their 
reproduction.  
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A woman‘s reproductive calculation does not stop at intercourse. After the child 
is born she is faced yet again with an important decision: whether or not to keep the baby. 
Sure, women can choose to devote themselves to their children, and many of them do; 
however, in reality ―how much a mother commits to an offspring depends on the 
circumstances.‖417 Young girls have many fertile years ahead of them and it is not always 
in their best interest, evolutionarily speaking, to commit to an infant if she is of low status 
or lacking resources. Like the female langur who abandons her infant when a new 
dominant male arrives, women have throughout history found themselves in situations 
that cause them to withhold the necessary care from their baby. Perhaps the newborn is 
sickly or perhaps the father has died or fled. There are numerous reasons a mother might 
make this tough decision.
418
 The prevalence of infanticide in human history, however, 
does not mean the choice is easy: 
Just because Homo sapiens mothers have a ―long history‖ of opting not to rear 
specific infants born at specific times, does not mean this was ―routine‖ or typical. 
Post-partum abandonment or infanticides, or retrenchment later, were situation-




It is important to remember that the women who chose to abandon or kill their infants 
were not necessarily rejecting motherhood. Many of them hoped to raise healthy children 
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one day but realized they were not able to do so in their present circumstances. Hrdy 
explains the paradox of hopeful mothers committing infanticide quite well, ―In species 
where survival of young requires extensive care, the single most important source of 
variation in female reproductive success is not how many young are born; what matters is 
how many survive and grow up to reproduce themselves. For such creatures, survival of 
at least some young requires reproductive discretion. This is why being pro-life means 
being pro-choice (my italics).‖420  
 Ironically, Hrdy did not experience the same degree of resistance to her theories 
about human infanticide as she did after the publication of her work on infanticide among 
langur monkeys. By this time she was a self-described ―outspoken supporter‖ of 
sociobiology, so one might have expected the critics to rally against her.
421
 Hrdy certainly 
did. Now safely retired on her farm, she can humorously recall, ―When The Woman That 
Never Evolved first appeared, in 1981, I feared that it would terminate a promising 
academic career—namely, my own.‖422 However, at the time, the threat of professional 
demise felt very real to Hrdy. The ―fierce controversy over sociobiology‘s supposed 
conservatism, racism, and sexism was raging‖ all around her and Hrdy was well aware 
that ―a McCarthyesque smear campaign (from the Left this time) was under way.‖423  
 Potentially she could have mitigated any potential attacks by condemning her 
sociobiological mentors and explicitly aligning her research with feminism, but that 
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would have been disingenuous as ―feminism per se had little to do with the conclusions 
(she) reached.‖424 Besides, despite her critique of gender bias in the natural sciences, 
Hrdy had a favorable view of the men she worked with and the scientific method in 
general—both of which were viewed with considerable skepticism by feminists. To 
Hrdy, science was inherently ―inefficient, biased, frustrating, replete with false starts and 
red herrings, but nevertheless responsive to criticism and self-correcting, and hence better 
than any of the other more unabashedly ideological programs currently being 
advocated.‖425 When she ―did encounter feminist writings (she) was often put off by the 
poor quality of the scholarship,‖ and she didn‘t identify with their emphasis on conflict to 
achieve equality.
426
 In her own experience, what stood out most was the support of 
―prominent biologists like George Williams, John Maynard Smith, and William Eberhard 
who joined their women colleagues in urging more open discussion about how 
‗inadvertent machismo‘ had affected the way sexual selection theory had been 
applied.‖427 In fact, to Hrdy, it was remarkable ―how little resistance researchers in (her) 
own field have exhibited when biases are pointed out.‖428  
 This is not to say that Hrdy aligned herself with sociobiology and against 
feminism. To her, that was a false binary. She hoped instead to carve out a new path 
forward that incorporated the best of both perspectives. Hrdy saw herself as a lonely 
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voice hoping to engage in the ―dialogue between evolutionists and feminists that has to 
happen if we are to build the current experiment in women's rights on a more secure 
foundation, based on a deeper understanding.‖429 As a young academic she was certainly 
in a tough position. Nonetheless she set two major goals for her initial effort at 
reconciliation: ―On the one hand I wanted to convince fellow sociobiologists that we had 
to widen our field of vision to include the interests and perspectives of both sexes if we 
were to have a comprehensive understanding of the evolutionary process. On the other 
hand, by broadening Darwinian stereotypes of female nature to be more realistic, I hoped 
to reach out to women long skeptical about the proposition that biology was irrelevant, 
but nevertheless felt compelled to reject explanations they viewed as irredeemably biased 
by patriarchal preconceptions.‖430 
 With one foot in two seemingly irreconcilable camps, how was Hrdy able to avoid 
significant backlash against her sociobiological research on humans? Looking back, she 
explains the lack of vitriol as a ―stroke of good fortune, (as) an early review appeared in 
the radical Washington D.C., newsletter Off Our Backs. The reviewer had a background 
in biology, grasped my intentions, and declared that ‗every aspect‘ of the book reflects 
feminist perspective.‖431 Thereafter, Hrdy was met by those in women‘s studies and 
related fields with ―polite nods.‖ Many feminists still challenged her findings, of course, 
but the general tone of the discourse was respectful, if not friendly, from that point 
forward. She had the green light to proceed—not that she needed it—and she continued 
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to utilize sociobiology to provide novel, feminist interpretations of evolutionary history.   
The next target in her aim was the nuclear family. Long hailed as the most 
―natural‖ arrangement in which to rear children, Hrdy set out to demonstrate that, in fact, 
the concept of a nuclear family was relatively new and that humans actually evolved in 
complex intergenerational families comprising both relatives and friends. According to 
Hrdy, the immense size of human heads, which are due to our disproportionate brain 
development, meant that babies must be born incredibly premature relative to other 
animals. It takes over ten years before a human becomes capable of caring for itself and 
this dependency places an inordinate burden on others. A mother alone, or even a mother 
and father, would have been hard pressed to raise their children in prehistoric times 
without help (it‘s pretty darn hard today, for that matter).  
Hrdy argues that parents have not done it alone for the vast majority of our 
history.
432
 While many species have alloparents, which are nongenetic caregivers, ―no 
other immatures depend on others to provision them for years the way that human 
children do.‖433 In fact, human beings evolved to both elicit and provide this help. 
―Mirror neurons‖ are so named because they are activated when you do something—or 
when somebody else does. They are, literally, the physiology of empathy, and they are 
responsible for your anguish when your favorite sports team loses as well as the joy you 
feel when the boy gets the girl in the movie. And while these examples might seem 
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trivial, mirror neurons were a critical adaptation for our early ancestors because ―the 
neuro-cognitive machinery of imitation lies at the origins of empathy‖ and it was human 
beings‘ strong emotional bonds that allowed them to successfully work together in groups 
and hunt larger animals—no small feat.434   
Hard-wired to empathize with one another, it was natural that other humans 
would participate in the care of helpless infants.
435
 Despite the current emphasis on 
nuclear families in the West, societies throughout history have embraced the alloparental 
model. For example, in eighteenth-century France only five percent of mothers nursed 
their own babies thanks to the prevalence of ―wet nursing.‖ Across the ocean and a 
century later, the Comanche Indians also established networks of care giving. But watch 
out! The Comanche depended on alloparents to such an extent that they kidnapped new 
ones from neighboring towns when their numbers fell due to war or illness.  
Hrdy‘s unprecedented scientific feminism stands as one of the seminal 
sociobiological contributions of the 1970s. She complicated notions of motherhood, 
demonstrating that females are not uniformly devoted to their offspring—as had been 
supposed—but are in fact quite strategic in their commitment. Similarly, she undermined 
the scientific rationale for sexual double standards by proving the now obvious fact that 
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female primates actively participate in sexual selection based on their own interests and 
are not simply passive spectators to male competition. Having removed the Victorian 
emphasis on domesticity and chastity from the evolutionary paradigm, she then stripped 
away the scientific justification for another pillar of conservative values: the nuclear 
family. Yes, a child benefits from having more than one adult in her life, but what is in 
fact ―natural‖ (if you are searching for guidance from our evolutionary past) is a multi-
generational support system of friends and family, not mom and dad at home with the 
kids. All of these insights were major developments in evolutionary biology and they 




Martin Daly was another young anthropologist inspired by the possibilities of 
behavioral analysis from a gene-centered perspective. Like many of his peers involved in 
the return of evolutionary thinking to the social sciences, Daly was an atypical academic. 
In his case, however, it is not rugged Amazonian adventures or scientific feminism that 
set him apart. It is love. For, to speak of Dr. Daly, one must inevitably speak of his 
collaboration with Margo Wilson, who stood by his side as both colleague and wife for 
the length of his academic career. Although both Canadian, they came from different 
worlds. She was from a small town in the Northwest Territories, where she was educated 
in a one-room schoolhouse as the only non-first-nations child. Conversely, Daly grew up 
in Toronto, a diverse metropolis. The two met in 1974 at the University of Toronto and 
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then again in a conference in North Carolina. After that day, according to Daly, ―I 
followed her home back to Toronto, and I wouldn‘t leave.‖437 That was the start of an 
incredibly rewarding relationship personally and professionally. After all was said and 
done (she passed away in 2009), the two of them worked together on three 
groundbreaking books as well as over a hundred articles. 
Like Hrdy, Daly and Wilson studied animal behavior before shifting their focus to 
human beings. In personal correspondence, Daly recalled, ―I was a psychology student at 
the University of Toronto (my home town) when, under the influence of Jerry Hogan, I 
decided that animal behaviour was what I wanted to study.‖438 At the time, of course, 
Wynne-Edwards‘ theories held great influence, and as a result, ―many biological 
scientists subscribed to an unexamined ‗greater goodism‘ (in philosopher Helena 
Cronin‘s felicitous phrase), interpreting the behavior of animals as a means to the end of 
‗reproducing the species.‘‖439 Group selectionism was not without its merits. It did 
manage to explain a lot of the cooperation among animals, however, it failed to explain 
the antithesis of cooperation: violence. As a result, there was tremendous debate around 
male competition for females. Did individual animals purposefully restrain the violence 
of their competition in order to keep the species as a whole healthy or were the 
participants actually trying to hurt each other? According to Daly, ―as late as 1966 
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Lorenz (The Pulitzer Prize winning ethologist) was arguing that competition was 
ritualistic and never lethal.‖440  
Previously, Hrdy had challenged the notion that peaceful competition was natural 
and violence was pathological. Her research on monkeys had used Trivers‘ theory of 
parent-offspring conflict to explain the very real violence of infanticide as a result of 
male competition. Soon, Daly and Wilson would make similarly startling claims about 
violence among human beings. ―In 1976,‖ Daly writes, ―we were among the cheerfully 
disputatious participants in a weekly evening seminar in California, working our way 
through Harvard entomologist Edward O. Wilson‘s Sociobiology.‖441 The class 
discussions, which were filled with ―excitement and occasional acrimony,‖ focused on 
Hamilton‘s ―idea that organisms are designed by natural selection to contribute to the 
replication of their genes (rather than) merely to reproduce.‖442 To Daly, ―It was pretty 
obvious once you grasped the theory that this was a sound refinement of the ways in 
which we had previously thought of fitness.‖443 Further, he and Wilson quickly surmised, 
―the evolutionary functionalism of sociobiology offered an exciting and potentially 
integrative perspective for the behavioral sciences.‖444  
 Motivated to participate meaningfully in the sociobiological project, the two of 
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them decided to write a synthesis of the new research in a format accessible to educated 
laymen. The result, Sex, Behavior, and Evolution, succeeded in introducing sociobiology 
to a generation of undergraduate students across the country. Daly and Wilson, aware that 
many of their readers would be unfamiliar with basic biology or evolution, address these 
fundamentals in the first four chapters—paying special attention to the distinctions 
between ―k‖ and ―r‖ selection strategies as well as proximate and ultimate causation 
because these concepts are critically important to sociobiology.
445
 Having summarized 
the existing literature on animal behavior, the authors made their bold switch to human 
beings. Considering the treatment Hrdy, Chagnon, and Wilson received, this could not 
have been an easy decision; however, they were ―certain…that evolutionary biology 
ha(d) profound implications for the social sciences,‖ so they pressed forward.446 In 
example after example they made their case that ―women and men behave differently,‖ 
and that the difference can be explained more effectively through evolutionary analysis 
than discussions about patriarchy and cultural conformity.
447
  
 Sex, Evolution and Behavior received more praise than criticism, but most of the 
attention came from within biological rather than anthropological circles. The Quarterly 
Review of Biology recognized the interdisciplinary value of the book and championed it 
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as ―highly recommended to all biologists and social scientists,‖ yet endorsements like 
these had little influence in academia at-large (How many social scientists read biology 
journals?).
448
 The next step for Daly and Wilson was to focus explicitly on humans. 
There had been calls within sociobiology to analyze human behavior through an 
evolutionary lens, and now was the time to put something on the table that demonstrated 
the benefit of such an approach. The duo decided to write about the genetic logic behind 
crime because ―Influential analyses of criminal behavior were flawed due to reliance on 
model of humans as passive absorbers of culture.‖449 
 What did they find? Well, in one sense, they simply provided evolutionary 
explanations for common sense observations. For example, everywhere in the world, 
most of the killing is between men. And while this is not a startling revelation to anyone 
who watches the news, Daly and Wilson‘s explanation was indeed novel. They argued 
that men were disproportionately violent because their great variation in reproductive 
success makes them intensely competitive. In other words, while most women will have 
more or less the same number of children, dominant men have the potential to reproduce 
with multiple women and subordinate men often go childless. From this perspective, one 
can make sense of the seemingly senseless violence on television. As ugly as it may be, 
Daly and Wilson claimed, over the millennia evolution has selected for men who took 
decisive action when their reproductive potential was threatened—either directly through 
infidelity or indirectly through a challenge to their social status. Of course, this finding 
                                                     
448
 Richard D. Howard, ―Review of Sex, Evolution, and Behavior,‖ by Martin 
Daly and Margo Wilson, The Quarterly Review of Biology 54. no. 1 (March, 1979): 84.  
 
449
 Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Homicide (Piscataway: Transaction 




was not meant as an excuse for murder, but as information provided in the faith that a just 
a society is most effectively built through knowledge.  
 Having written an influential textbook and a seminal paper of sociobiology, it 
would have been understandable if Daly and Wilson rested on their now tenured laurels 
and coasted into the academic sunset. But they were not finished, for they still had an 
intellectual itch to scratch. Back in graduate school when they were first thinking of 
sociobiology projects that would give them the opportunity to test their newfound ideas, 
―a graduate student named Suzanne Weghorst raised the question: hey, what about 
stepparents? Everyone knows the stereotype‖ they‘re hostile and wicked, right? Well, is 
there any truth behind the stereotype?‖450  
 Intrigued by their classmate‘s questions, Daly and Wilson decided to write 
Cinderella: A Darwinian View of Parental Love. The first thing they discovered in their 
research was that evil stepparent stories are nearly universal: ―It really is true that 
virtually everyone, everywhere, is familiar with stories about unjustly treated 
stepchildren.‖451 Beyond fairy tales, however, they also found a darker truth, that having 
a stepparent is an incredibly dangerous risk factor for child abuse. Using data from the 
American Humane Association, Daly and Wilson learned that ―a child under three years 
of age who lived with one genetic parent and one stepparent in the United States in 1976 
was about seven times more likely to become a validated child-abuse case.‖452 And, when 
dealing with fatal child abuse cases, the risk grew a hundredfold! Another indicator that 
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genetic relatedness plays an important role in the relationship between parent and child 
was the differentiation in the type of violence seen in child abuse cases. Typically, 
parents who murdered their genetic children did so as part of a murder-suicide and the act 
itself was passive, such as sleeping pills or carbon monoxide. Eighty percent of 
stepfathers who killed their children, on the other hand, were ―found to have battered, 
kicked or bludgeoned their victims to death.‖453 Viewing the grisly evidence through a 
sociobiological lens, Daly and Wilson concluded that natural selection could explain the 
phenomenon of stepparent violence, as ―a hypothetical psyche that treated stepchildren 
and genetic children alike would be a psyche vulnerable to exploitation, and would be 
evolutionarily unstable in competition with more discriminating alternatives.‖454 Much 
like in their study of homicide, the authors rejected ―the curiously prevalent notion that a 
scientific, materialistic, Darwinian world-view is uglier than its anti-scientific 
alternatives‖ because they had faith that ―more realistic worldviews invite more humane 
attitudes and practices than fantastic ones.‖455  
 Some critics bemoaned their evolutionary analysis because they found ―the 
proposition that stepchildren are not loved like genetic children…distasteful.‖456 To them, 
Daly had a firm response: ―Biology is the study of life and the functioning of living 
things.  (You won't get far studying living creatures with sole reference to gravity and 
other forces that impinge on organisms as they do on rocks.)  The human sciences are 
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branches of biology, regardless of whether their practitioners understand that that is the 
case, and those who insist that ‗biology‘ is some sort of evil counter-discipline are simply 
depriving themselves of the benefits of knowing about potentially relevant theory and 
research in other branches of biology than their own.‖457 Also, be warned before 
attempting to counsel Daly on Durkheim‘s injunction to rely on social science authorities 
for insights into human behavior. According to Daly,  
Durkheim had his virtues, but his commitment to defending (and thereby 
isolating) sociology from psychology and biology was and still is 
damaging. I classify Freud with gurus and god-slingers: their stories (and 
perhaps their calm, authoritative personae) find receptive audiences 
among those who have no time or taste for the messy business of science, 
i.e., for confronting their beliefs with real-world data bearing on those 
beliefs' validity. These and other such figures, and the impulses that they 
represent and exploit, remain an impediment to critical thinking and 




The gloves were off. And sociobiology was just getting started.  
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The pioneering efforts to reintroduce evolutionary thinking in anthropology 
opened the door for intellectuals in other disciplines to follow suit. Logically, sociology 
would be the next ―domino‖ to fall because it, too, explicitly analyzed human behavior; 
however, that would not be an easy task. As previously mentioned, the principal 
theoreticians of sociology were all committed to a strictly cultural analysis of human 
affairs for both intellectual and political reasons. August Comte, Emile Durkheim, and 
Claude Levi-Strauss towered over sociology even from their graves and they would not 
go quietly into the night. To effectively challenge the prevailing dogma required a truly 
iconoclastic thinker, one who was not timid to the prospect of adversity.   
Nobody ever called Pierre van den Berghe timid. Born in 1933 into generations of 
learning and wealth, he identified with his grandfather who ―could so dominate his world 
by sheer strength of intellect‖ and was ―impatient of anything but excellence.‖459 In 
addition to his admitted ―intellectual elitism,‖ the dashing van den Berghe (he always 
dressed impeccably and flaunted a large, well-groomed mustache) had lived in the 
Belgian Congo and experienced the Nazi occupation of Belgium before he committed 
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 This was not a man who would shrink from a fight. He believed 
that there were two approaches to science: one is ―safe, but precludes theoretical 
development. The other takes the plunge into generalization.‖ Needless to say, his "own 
inclination went to the second approach."
461
  
Sociology in the 1960s lacked a solid theoretical foundation because of its post-
modern preference for subjectivity. Consequently, after several years of research in 
Africa and Mexico, van den Berghe became disillusioned with his discipline‘s limitations 
and he dismissed sociology as ―a pretentious and inchoate mixture of fact and 
ideology.‖462 Seeking an alternative approach, ―Edward Wilson‘s 1975 book 
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis suddenly seemed to point the way‖ and before long he 
found himself ―in the clutch of concepts recently developed by the new science.‖463 
―Culture,‖ he realized, could ―only be fully understood as part of the process of biological 
evolution.‖464 This is not to say, as the critics of sociobiology alleged, that he sought to 
reduce human behavior to biology. No, ―sociobiology will never be able to explain the 
French Revolution.‖465 But it might explain why we have revolutions at all—and this was 
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something he wanted to explore. As he began his research, van den Berghe ―soon 
discovered that the pieces to the puzzle, which Wilson had conveniently assembled, had 
all been around for over a decade. Wilson was not so much the innovator as the 
synthesizer.‖466 In 1976 he took the first sabbatical of his career, ―largely to retool as a 
sociobiologist studying humans‖ and he used this time to meet with the ―leading lights in 
the field‖ such as Richard Alexander, Will Hamilton, E.O. Wilson, and Robert Trivers.467  
Upon his return, van den Berghe chose to study incest. To laymen, this might 
seem a marginal and grotesque aspect of human behavior to research, but to sociologists 
incest could be considered the holy grail of research projects because the discipline 
assumed human behavior was a response to unique cultural contexts and thus one would 
not expect to find universal behaviors—yet the taboo against incest exists in every 
society. What was the explanation? Inspired by Marcel Mauss‘s The Gift, Levi-Strauss 
had argued that the incest taboo was the foundation of human culture because it 
facilitated the essential exchange of women among neighboring groups of people. These 
exchanges were necessary because they have a ―significance that is at once social and 
religious, magic and economic, utilitarian and sentimental, jural and moral.‖468 In other 
words, they bring people together in important ways. As evidence for his claim, he 
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referred to Margaret Mead‘s interviews with young Samoans, who responded to her 
queries about incest with indignation: ―What, you would like to marry your sister? What 
is the matter with you anyway? Don‘t you want a brother-in-law? Don‘t you realize that 
if you marry another man‘s sister and another man marries your sister, you will have at 
least two brothers-in-law, while if you marry your own sister you will have none? With 
whom will you hunt, with whom will you garden, who will you visit?‖469  
Van den Berghe had a different explanation. He argued that the incest taboo was 
universal because too many shared genes were unhealthy so evolution had selected 
against those who slept with their siblings. As a result, modern human beings ―naturally‖ 
felt an aversion to incest. Still, questions remained, for nobody knew exactly how a 
biological predisposition to avoid incest would work. Are humans somehow able to 
subconsciously recognize their kin through sight or smell? In Human Family Systems, 
van den Berghe elucidated an unexpected mechanism for maintaining genetic diversity: a 
lack of sexual attraction toward people with whom one was raised. He arrived at this 
remarkable conclusion by studying data on Chinese adoption and Israeli kibbutzim.  
In prerevolutionary China, ―it had long been customary for poor families to give 
away infant daughters to be adopted in better off families. The infant girl would then be 
married to a son of the adoptive family, the marriage being consummated when the 
children reached puberty.‖470 Surprisingly, however, in a vast majority of the cases 
studied, the prospective husband and wife refused to have sex ―despite parental pressure 
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that they should.‖ It seems that there is in fact a biological predisposition toward avoiding 
sexual intercourse with people who grew up with you because throughout the vast 
majority of history they would have been your brother or sister. A similar phenomenon 
occurred in Israeli kibbutzim, where from the 1920s to the 1970s young children were 
raised communally. Although there was no cultural pressure to marry outside one‘s 
childhood home, van den Berghe ―discovered that out of a total of 2,769 marriages 
involving kibbutzniks, only fourteen came from the same kibbutz small group. A closer 
examination of these fourteen exceptions revealed that in only five of those cases had the 
spouses been raised together before the age of six, and then never for longer than two of 
these six years of early childhood.‖471 Sociobiology‘s evolutionary perspective had 
enabled van den Berghe to make sense of these previously unexplainable aversions to 
sexual intercourse in specific cultural contexts. 
A ―big-picture‖ thinker who resisted intellectual specialization, van den Bergh 
proceeded to study a broad range of human behavior that had never been analyzed from 
an evolutionary perspective. Race and ethnicity, in particular, drew his attention due to 
their importance in the modern world. The fact that they were extremely sensitive 
subjects did not deter him in the slightest, as he was confident in the power of 
sociobiological analysis and resentful of the pernicious effect political correctness had 
begun to have on intellectual inquiry. In The Ethnic Phenomenon, van den Berghe 
investigated the evolutionary origins of ethnicity and why it has continued to play such an 
important role in diverse societies. Previously, ―social scientists of both right and left 
believed that ethnic sentiments would become increasingly vestigial, and that 
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―modernity‖ would engulf petty particularism, giving rise to ever wider and more rational 
bases of solidarity.‖472 This, however, had not come to pass, as ethnicity continued to 
play a vital role in a person‘s identity despite increasing globalization.  
The persistence of ethnicity baffled social scientists who assumed that ethnic 
identity resulted from a preindustrial cultural context and that it would simply lose 
meaning when individuals lived in new, more cosmopolitan settings. Van den Berghe, 
however, did not make that assumption. Viewing the subject from a sociobiology lens, he 
concluded that ethnicity was the result of an inherited predisposition to identify with 
those who resembled you in some way. The same could be said for the seemingly 
intractable issue of racism. According to van den Berghe, human beings had evolved 
almost entirely in small groups of extended kin networks that competed with other, rival 
groups of humans. In this setting, the genes that experienced the greatest reproductive 
success were found in humans who gave preferential treatment to others who looked like 
them or shared similar customs because those people were typically relatives. In essence, 
―ethnocentrism and racism are thus extended forms of nepotism—the propensity to favor 
kin over nonkin.‖473 
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 Van den Berghe‘s argument for an innate human desire to join groups is pretty 
convincing when you consider the millions of football fans across the country who fill 
stadiums every Sunday, wearing team jerseys and passionately rooting for their ―home‖ 
team. Of course, cheering for one group of strangers to defeat another group of strangers 
is an odd way to spend a weekend, but it makes perfect sense when one realizes that this 
type of abstract affiliation serves as an emotional proxy for the ancestral longing to 
support our kin network. Put this way, being a sports fan is not so much irrational as it is 
an out of place emotional expression. As van den Berghe explains, humans ―evolved the 
kind of brain to deal with small-scale, Gemeinshschaft-type groups…who think of each 
other as an extended family.‖ Thus, the Gesellschaft that we find ourselves in today is an 
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Not surprisingly, van den Berghe‘s speculations on the biological basis of 
prejudice upset some of his colleagues. Sharlotte Neely Williams cited ―the recent 
decision by the American Anthropological Association to condemn theories of racial, 
sexual, and class inferiority‖ to support her condemnation of his work.474 At the 
University of Washington, ―a chorus of minority organizations, led by the vice-president 
for minority affairs, demanded that (he) be sacked for being a racist.‖475 Then, after he 
had begun to incorporate gender into his sociobiological analysis, the Women‘s Caucus 
demanded that he be prevented from teaching his material. After suffering through these 
repeated attacks on his reputation the sociology department ―tried to block (his) 
promotion to full professor‖ and van den Berghe was only able to earn tenure thanks to 
the intervention of the College Council.
476
 As if that wasn‘t enough, in 1978 van den 
Berghe ―achieved instant world notoriety‖ when a conservative senator sarcastically 
awarded him the Golden Fleece Award for extravagant government spending (apparently 
the senator thought his research grant was a waste of money because it involved 
                                                     
 
unnatural environment, one where support for sports teams has replaced support for a 
family‘s collective, competitive endeavors. And sports are not the only artificial 
expression of kin network loyalty. Nationalism often draws on many of the same themes. 
Japan, for example, has a national myth of a common ancestor, which makes them all 
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interviewing strippers in Cusco, Peru).
477
  
Van den Berghe refused to take the criticism lying down.  Sociology‘s taboo 
against evolutionary thinking was misguided, he claimed, because ―the degree to which 
our behavior is biologically determined is a perfectly good empirical question, and it is 
silly to banish the question from our scientific discourse because it displeases certain 
interest groups.‖478 Even if academia accepted the premise that all research should share 
the same political values, there is no reason to assume sociobiology is intrinsically 
opposed to Progressive politics. In fact, according to van den Berghe, ―sociobiology 
could be seen as revolutionary by stressing how fundamentally alike humans are beneath 
their cultural differences.‖479 Anthropology had already begun to incorporate 
evolutionary thinking, and as a result the ―social scientists who have anything intelligent 
to say about human ecology are overwhelmingly anthropologists.‖480 If sociology wanted 
to remain relevant, it, too, would have to ―abandon the dogma that man is purely a 
product of his upbringing and culture.‖481 
Van den Berghe‘s attempts to align sociology with the natural sciences achieved 
mixed results. Some of his colleagues welcomed the evolutionary perspective as a new 
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lens for analysis while others continued to reject what they saw as antiquated, 
reductionist thinking. He was undeniably successful, however, in sharing his views with a 
young psychology professor named David Barash. Born in 1946 to Eastern European 
immigrants and raised on Long Island when it was still rural, Barash earned his PhD at 
the University of Wisconsin. His dissertation was on the behavior of marmots. Therefore, 
Barash admits, when the University of Washington hired him, they expected him to 
research ―animal (and) not human behavior.‖482 What nobody could have predicted at the 
time was that Barash would become one of sociobiology‘s early leaders.  
As a graduate student, Barash became fascinated with the idea ―that behavior—
even complex social behavior—has evolved and is therefore adaptive.‖483 His efforts to 
better understand adaptive behavior led him to marmots, a social rodent that lives in 
diverse habitats around the world. He chose to study marmots because ―they are diurnal, 
large enough to be easily seen, and relatively insensitive to the presence of a human 
observer.‖484 Over the course of three thousand hours in the field, Barash was eventually 
able to discern ―an exciting series of consistent and predictable correlations between 
marmot environments and social systems that indicate the ways in which social behavior 
may be adjusted to local ecology.‖485 Different species of marmots, it seemed, had 
evolved behaviors best suited for their own habitats.  
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One particular behavior that caught Barash‘s attention was the alarm call given to 
alert others of a nearby predator, so, a few years later, he attempted to make sense of the 
seemingly suicidal phenomenon in ―Marmot Alarm-Calling and the Question of 
Altruistic Behavior.‖486 To many biologists, alarm calling seemed inconsistent with 
natural selection because such daring could not possibly lead to increased reproduction; 
however, Barash had attended the 1972 annual meeting of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science and experienced an ―epiphany‖ listening to Robert 
Trivers.
487
 As a result, he was prepared to make sense of paradoxical behaviors by 
viewing them as expressions of kin selection or reciprocal altruism. Thus armed with the 
tools of sociobiology, Barash discovered that alarm calling is in fact evolutionarily 
adaptive because the caller is usually an older male and ―in a polygamous social system 
the adult male has a closer genetic affinity to, and hence a greater evolutionary interest in, 
the survival of the other colony members.‖488  
Flush with excitement over the possibilities of sociobiology, Barash wanted to test 
out more hypotheses. If behavior truly is adaptive, he speculated, then ―behavioral 
predispositions to minimize the chances of being cuckolded would be strongly selected 
among males,‖ as the devastating cost of raising another‘s offspring would simply be too 
much to bear in a competitive reproductive environment.
489
 Further, ―This tendency 
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would be especially strong among monogamous species‖ since males commit far greater 
resources in these circumstances.
490
 To test this theory, Barash studied mountain 
bluebirds (Sialia currocoides) on Mt. Rainier in 1974. He chose birds because ―In 
contrast to mammals, almost all birds are monogamous… due to the nestlings‘ high 
metabolic demands.‖491  
The experiment was quite simple. Barash built wooden replicas of male bluebirds 
and placed them in the vicinity of females when the males left the nest to forage. Then he 
just waited for the males to return and observed their response. ―Predictably,‖ Barash 
wrote, ―when the model was presented early in the breeding season, at the time 
copulation normally occurs, the resident male directed considerable aggression toward 
it.‖492 Unexpectedly, the aggression was not only directed toward the model. In ―Male 
Response to Apparent Female Adultery in the Mountain Bluebird,‖ Barash addresses a 
dark side of male insecurity toward paternal uncertainty: ―On the second day of model 
exposure, the resident male at nest 1 pulled an undetermined number of primary feathers 
out of his mate‘s wing. Two days later, this female was replaced by another female.‖493 
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For lack of a better word, he had discovered domestic abuse in the natural world.  
 The possibilities for sociobiological speculation were endless, as time and again 
Barash found evolutionary explanations for previously inexplicable animal behavior. He 
discovered that birds, for instance, are decidedly not blank slates when it comes to 
communication. If they were blank slates, they could learn any bird song with enough 
exposure, but in experiments ―without any previous experience in this regard, the young 
bird chooses the song that is appropriate for its species and selectively learns that one 
rather than another.‖494 Also, infant rhesus monkeys raised in captivity ―who have never 
seen a dominant male will nonetheless instinctively present subordinate behavior‖ when 
shown video of an aggressive alpha monkey.
495
 If they had to be taught how to respond 
through cultural education alone, this reaction would not be possible. And how could one 
make sense of the fact that ―adult zebras defend calves against predators, whereas 
wildebeests do not‖ unless one took into consideration that ―zebras live in coherent 
family groups whereas wildebeest herds experience substantial mixing of genetic 
lineages, making it unlikely that an adult is related to an randomly chosen calf.‖496  
Barash‘s exposure to sociobiology clearly had a profound effect on his views of 
animals. It was as if, he explains, ―you have been seriously nearsighted all your life but 
haven‘t been aware of it until your are fitted for eyeglasses. Things seen only dimly, if at 




 David Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior (New York: Elsevier, 1977), 40. 
 
495
 Ibid., 129.  
 
496




all, are suddenly clear.‖497 As previously mentioned, the conversion to sociobiology 
began when he first heard Dr. Trivers speak, an experience he can vividly recall almost 
forty years later: ―I‘ve known Bob Trivers since the early 1970s, and perceived 
immediately that his ideas (not just on reciprocity, but on parental investment theory and 
parent-offspring conflict) were original and very important. In all three cases, I found 
myself echoing Thomas Huxley‘s supposed response upon reading The Origin of Species: 
how stupid of me not to have thought of that!‖498 In addition to Trivers, Barash learned 
from the work of Richard Alexander, Napoleon Chagnon, Sarah Hrdy, and Martin Daly. 
Of all the people who influenced him, however, van den Berghe had the biggest impact. 
Barash recalls, ―It wasn‘t until I was hired by the psychology department at the 
University of Washington that I began to think seriously about the prospects of pushing 
an evolutionary perspective on human behavior.‖499  
  Barash met Pierre van den Berghe shortly after joining the faculty at the 
University of Washington and before long the senior sociologist had facilitated the young 
professor‘s transition to human sociobiology. According to Barash ―Pierre was probably 
the most important‖ influence on him because their proximity allowed for friendly 
conversations and professional collaboration.
500
 As a result, Barash made his first foray 
into human sociobiology in 1977 with van den Berghe as the co-author of an article titled 
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―Inclusive Fitness and Human Family Structure.‖ In the article, the two of them argued 
that ―kin selection theory provides a parsimonious way of accounting for nepotism.‖501 
From then on, Barash dealt almost exclusively with humans. In Sociobiology and 
Behavior, for example, he addressed the sexual double standard that exists between men 
and women. While radicals and feminists believed the hypocrisy to be rooted in Victorian 
mores, Barash claimed, ―the high parental investment required of women compared with 
that of men‖ naturally leads to a binary of acceptable reproductive strategies: frequent 
copulations for men and discerning choice for women.
502
 Similarly, Barash argued, ―Men 
are rarely prostitutes‖… because sperm is cheap and eggs are expensive,‖ and not 
because women have been objectified by a patriarchal society.
503
  
 The general theme in Barash‘s writing is that ―our potential as human beings is 
undeniably very great, but it isn‘t infinite.‖504 Just as ―an ocelot has ocelot nature, we 
have human nature. We are, perhaps, the most flexible animals in the world, but to be 
human is still something distinctive, and evolution offers us a look at what that something 
may be.‖505  Therefore, we should be mindful of the potential difficulty in establishing 
government policies or social norms that contradict our biological predispositions. This is 
not to say that we are slaves to a fixed human nature, far from it, but it is important to 
                                                     
501
 David Barash and Pierre van den Berghe, ―Inclusive Fitness and Human 
Family Structure,‖ American Anthropologist 79, no. 4 (Dec, 1977), 815.  
 
502
 Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior, 293. 
 
503
 Ibid., 283. 
 
504
 David Barash, The Whisperings Within (New York: Harper & Row Publishing, 
1979), 1.  
 
505




know what challenges lie ahead in order to set and achieve social objectives. Take racism 
as an example. Most thoughtful people agree that it is hurtful to both the individuals 
affected and society as a whole, yet ―blank slate‖ thinkers mistakenly claim that ―nobody 
is born a bigot,‖ which implies that there is no education necessary to create a postracial 
society. ―If sociobiology is correct,‖ Barash claimed, ―we‘ve got to be carefully taught 
not to hate others who are different from ourselves, because it may be our biological 
predisposition to do so.‖506 The same lesson holds for efforts to remove gender norms. 
While a worthwhile endeavor to consider, those committed to establishing a society that 
ignores gender should know what they are up against. Barash argued, ―In all human 
societies there is a clear asymmetry (between) gender roles‖ because of very real 
physiological and behavioral adaptations; therefore, a better path forward might be to 
value these differences rather than fight against them.
507
   
 In the end, Barash claimed, ―much of the discordance in human existence may be 
due to the discordance between our biology and our culture.‖508 The struggles of the 
modern nuclear family, for example, exist largely because humans evolved in large 
extended kin networks. Thus, today‘s parents are in the impossible position to fulfill all 
of the roles that numerous friends and family had played in the past. The current obesity 
epidemic is another example. Humans evolved a ―sweet tooth‖ in a context of calorie 
deficiency; however, we no longer live in that environment, turning what was originally 
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an adaptive longing into an obstacle to health for millions of people. The juxtaposition of 
these two examples demonstrates the flexibility of Barash‘s sociobiology. With regard to 
families, he believes people should listen to their biological predispositions and raise 
their children in more inclusive environments, but he certainly does not advocate eating a 
diet high in sugar simply because our bodies have evolved that preference. Each situation 
must be analyzed separately, taking into consideration humans‘ evolutionary past without 
abandoning contemporary values. In his own words, ―evolution is a wonderful thing to 
learn about, but a terrible thing to learn from.‖509 
 Unfortunately for Barash, not everybody saw things the same way.
510
 As a 
pioneer in sociobiological psychology he was on the front lines of the battle for 
evolutionary thinking‘s return to the social sciences. When activists threw water at E.O. 
Wilson, he ―was seated right next to Ed at the speaker‘s table, and even was mildly 
dampened by some the water in question!‖511  When he and Pierre van den Berghe 
published ―Inclusive Fitness and Human Family Structure‖ they met considerable 
resistance from both academics and activists. In their reply to several critical reviews, van 
den Berghe and Barash noted that ―our article is already under ideological fire by a group 
calling itself the Committee Against Racism.‖512 The vitriol, however, did not deter them: 
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―We are more amused than alarmed by such attacks, which, of course, do nothing to 
detract from the empirical validity of our statements.‖513 By this time in his career, 
Barash was comfortable in his sociobiological skin and looked forward to the challenges 
ahead. When asked about the difficulty of introducing evolution to his discipline, he 
responded ―I was very much aware of being a pioneer, both in introducing more direct 
and dynamic use of evolutionary principles into ethology and in introducing them into the 
social sciences. If anything, I was attracted by being involved in ushering in a new 
paradigm.‖514 
 Barash was well aware that many people resisted sociobiology. In ―Behavior as 
Evolutionary Strategy‖ he acknowledged, ―psychologists and sociologists particularly 
may find this new approach confusing and distasteful.‖515 But he was convinced that the 
―critics who accuse sociobiology of genetic determinism unfairly oversimplified the 
issue, since the claim for evolution‘s relevancy to behavior rests on genetic influence, not 
determinism,‖ and he was determined to help the social sciences leave behind its rickety 
theoretical edifice for one grounded in the biology.
516
 By legitimizing so many schools of 
thought, the social sciences had created an incoherent mix of ―Durkheimians, Weberians, 
Marxists, Freudians, Adlerians, Jungians, Piagetians, and Skinnerians,‖ none of whom 
believed evolution had influenced culture.
517
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Barash thought, correctly, that sociologists and anthropologists had created the 
taboo against evolutionary thinking as a corrective measure for their disciplines‘ earlier 
acceptance of Social Darwinism, and that ―they did penance for their sins by proclaiming 
that human beings enjoy absolutely unlimited behavioral potential as tabula rasa upon 
which experience can write as it will.‖518 As a result, most social scientists who trained 
after World War II feared the potential for genetic determinism in evolutionary thinking. 
Sociobiologists, however, had no desire to advocate for the inevitability—or even 
superiority—of nature over nurture. ―Behavior is not,‖ he assured, ―somehow 
encapsulated within genes, waiting to spring fully armed like Athena from the head of 
Zeus.‖519 Further, not everything ―natural‖ needs to be accepted. For goodness sakes, he 
exclaimed, ―male rabbits court females by urinating on them.‖520 That does not make the 
practice something to emulate! According to Barash, the criticisms of sociobiology were 
not legitimate, as they came from misunderstanding and misplaced fears. When asked 
about the critics‘ opinions, many of whom were communists and feminists, Barash 
candidly admitted, ―despite the fact that my own political leanings were then, and still are 
very far to the left, my perspective was that they ate shit!‖521  
Like other sociobiologists, Barash shared many of his critics‘ political 
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convictions; therefore, he strove to conduct research that could serve as a counter-
example to those who remained convinced that evolutionary thinking was inherently 
reactionary. Nuclear war, or, more precisely, the movement to stop it, provided Barash 
with this opportunity, and he wrote prolifically on the subject for many years. In The 
Caveman and the Bomb, he argued that human beings have a ―Neanderthal mentality‖ 
that was adaptive in the Stone Age but is no longer appropriate for the challenges of the 
modern world.
522
 ―It is quite difficult,‖ he explained, ―for a naked, untrained human 
being to kill another,‖ so our ancestors had less need to restrain their attacks.523 As a 
result, we did not evolve the same inhibitions to violence as more dangerous animals did, 
which left us vulnerable to unfathomably violent acts such as dropping nuclear bombs. In 
addition, Barash claimed, nuclear war is too abstract to engender empathy. Human beings 
evolved an aversion to causing suffering in a face-to-face context and the triggers to this 
emotion (e.g., crying, blood, screams) are largely absent in nuclear warfare. ―The same 
man,‖ Barash explained, ―who can coolly plan for twenty million ‗acceptable casualties‘ 
in a ‗limited‘ nuclear war would doubtless be appalled by a single gunshot.‖524 For this 
reason, Barash supported the idea, presumably more in theory than in practice, of placing 
the codes to launch a nuclear missile within the living body of another person. That way 
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the president would have to truly experience her natural biological repulsion to violence 
before ordering the deaths of millions. 
Barash also proposed electing women into positions of power to mitigate the 
discrepancy between our Neanderthal mentality and our dangerous technological 
capabilities.
525
 Hamilton had shown that all humans evolved a sense of in-group amity 
and out-group enmity due to kin selectionism. For this reason, ―the biological roots of 
militant nationalism are consistent with the many evolutionary survival advantageous to 
an individual belonging to a group.‖526 Put more crassly, ―if religion is the opiate of the 
masses, nationalist propaganda is the cocaine.‖527 There was hope, however, in the 
biological distinctions between genders. According to Barash, ―mentality might be 
different than ‗womentality‘ because men are naturally more aggressive due to their 
much higher variation in reproductive success.
528
 Thus, ―sperm bearers tend to be spear-




The possibility of nuclear war worried a lot of people in the late 1970s and early 
80s, as the Cold War heightened anxieties for an entire generation of people who felt, 
rightfully so, that a war of unprecedented destruction was only one misstep away from 
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becoming a frightening reality. Political scientists of the era responded to the tenuous 
peace in one of two ways. Either they wanted to ―win‖ the conflict or they wanted to 
defuse it. In general, those who sought a unilateral victory, men such as Henry Kissinger, 
held pessimistic views of human nature and the prospects for genuine peace. They 
believed a pragmatic, if not ruthless, advancement of one‘s own interests was the best 
strategy to achieve a global order through economic and military dominance. Others 
hoped to find the means to cooperation among equal nations. Attempts to dominate 
others, they reasoned, could easily lead to tragedy when all of the parties involved have 
nuclear bombs.  
Unfortunately for the pacifists, classical political theory did not support their 
views. Heavily influenced by the Enlightenment, the discipline had largely accepted the 
premise that authority was the price of peace. Here is the cynical eighteenth-century 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his classic, Leviathan, ―There must be some coercive 
power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some 
punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.‖530 
Hobbes thought a king was best suited to keep order but the appeal to authority need not 
result in deference to royalty. Another titan of the Enlightenment, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
also advocated the suppression of individual interests for the common good, but he 
advocated subordination to the ―general will‖ of the people. ―In order that the social 
contract may not be an empty formula,‖ he writes in The Social Contract, ―it tacitly 
includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to 
                                                     
530
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Or the Matter Form and Power of a 





obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing 
less than that he will be forced to be free.‖531  
Robert Axelrod is a professor of political science at the University of Michigan 
and he was one of those who sought genuine peace. He rejected classical political 
theory‘s reliance on authority because he believed it did not solve the complex problems 
nations faced in the twentieth century. For both Hobbes and Rousseau, authority 
functioned due to its ability to punish the offender; however, in an interdependent global 
economy that relies on free trade, punitive measures often negatively affect both parties. 
Militarily speaking, an invasion could now be met with nuclear weapons (clearly bad for 
everyone involved), and economic punishment was problematic. The mercantilism of the 
Enlightenment Era was a zero-sum contest, so hoarding gold or blocking trade from a 
weaker rival made sense, but capitalism needs growth to survive, making cooperation 
essential to even the most powerful nations.   
Axelrod argued that the central problem for modern political scientists, then, was 
to figure out how to foster cooperation in a competitive environment. ―A good example‖ 
of this fundamental problem ―is the case where two industrial nations have erected trade 
barriers to each other‘s exports. Because of the mutual advantages of free trade, both 
countries would be better off if these barriers were eliminated. But if either country were 
to unilaterally eliminate its barriers, it would find itself facing terms of trade that hurt its 
own economy.‖532 According to Axelrod, Hobbes had ―built his justification of the state 
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upon the purported impossibility of sustained cooperation in such a situation,‖ yet he 
believed he might have found a solution.
533
 Influenced by a visiting scholar, the 
seemingly ubiquitous William Hamilton, Axelrod had turned to evolutionary theory and 
subsequently discovered ―a demonstration that mutual cooperation could emerge among 
rational egoists.‖534 He hoped that this discovery ―would provide a powerful argument 
that the role of the state should not be as universal as some have argued.‖535 In other 
words, he hoped to transform his discipline.  
Axelrod ―was fascinated by Darwinian evolution‖ for almost as long as he could 
remember.
536
 In high school, his project ―Hypothetical Life Forms and Environments by 
Computer Simulation‖ won him a college scholarship and a trip to Washington D.C. to 
meet President Kennedy.
537
 As an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, he 
―studied evolution in more depth‖ with the Committee on Mathematical Biology.538 And 
when he began his doctorate, he ―always kept evolutionary thinking in mind.‖539 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Axelrod formed a personal and professional 
relationship with William Hamilton when the British evolutionary biologist accepted a 
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position as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan. The two men were both 
fascinated with altruism, especially in circumstances where their colleagues agreed it 
should not exist. For Hamilton, this meant in nature, and for Axelrod this meant among 
competing political entities. Both settings were purportedly governed by selfish interests 
that left everyone involved ―red in tooth and claw,‖ yet Hamilton and Trivers had 
recently discovered the mechanisms for altruistic behavior in nature. Was it possible to 
engender cooperation in the callous world of international politics?  
Axelrod‘s seminal work, The Evolution of Cooperation, is an attempt to answer that 
question. It begins by elaborating the logic for ―an evolutionary approach‖ rather than 
classical political science methodology and then grounds the reader in the relevant 
evolutionary biology research.
540
 ―The theory of biological evolution,‖ Axelrod explains, 
―is based on the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. Yet cooperation is 
common between members of the same species and even between members of different 
species.‖541 To account for this altruism, ―evolutionary theory has recently acquired two 
kinds of extensions. These extensions are, broadly, genetical kinship theory and 
reciprocity theory.‖542 By taking these factors into consideration, one can make sense of a 
wide array of sacrifice and symbiosis among animals and human beings. ―The problem 
is,‖ Axelrod continues, ―that while an individual can benefit from mutual cooperation, 
each one can also do even better by exploiting the cooperative efforts of others.‖543 In 
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225 
political scenarios rife with self-serving advocates of realpolitik, it goes almost without 
saying that at least one party would choose to exploit the other, thus eliminating the 
mutual benefits of cooperation.  
 Apparently, the limits of cooperation had been reached. One could reasonably 
expect the other to ―play nice‖ when they happen to be your friend or part of your family, 
but, according to evolutionary biology, the incentive to take advantage of the other‘s 
kindness will lead to selfish behavior when the parties involved have competing agendas. 
Here, where others saw an impasse, Axelrod saw an opportunity. He knew what the 
theory said, but he also knew of examples in history when antagonists had cooperated for 
their mutual benefit. Combatants in trench warfare during World War I, for example, 
developed ―live-and-let-live‖ systems to help ease their otherwise terrible 
circumstances.
544
 As unbelievable as it sounds, these men (who were sent to the front line 
explicitly to kill the other) frequently arranged safe times and locations, as well as a 
prohibition against destroying incoming rations. Axelrod took this phenomenon as proof 
that ―friendship is hardly necessary for cooperation.‖545 Similarly, Axelrod pointed out, 
members of the United States Congress frequently engage in mutually rewarding 
behavior, colloquially known as ―horse trading,‖ with their political rivals. The practice 
has become so common that insiders claim "it is not an exaggeration to say that 
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reciprocity is a way of life in the Senate."
546
  
 To understand how cooperation emerged in these hostile environments, Axelrod 
needed a new approach, so he developed ―agent-based modeling.‖547 This method utilizes 
computer programs to simulate the actions of autonomous agents in ―games‖ that mimic 
real life. The game that he chose to analyze was the Prisoner‘s Dilemma. ―In the 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma game,‖ Axelrod explains, ―two accomplices to a crime are arrested 
and questioned separately. Either can defect against the other by confessing and hoping 
for a lighter sentence. But if both confess, their confessions are not as valuable. On the 
other hand, if both cooperate with each other by refusing to confess, the district attorney 
can only convict them on a minor charge.‖548 Although the Prisoner‘s Dilemma deals 
with criminals and prison sentences, the basic premise is the same as the political 
scenarios Axelrod studied. If he could discover a way to engender cooperation among 
agents in this game he could use that knowledge to support peace in the real world.  
 The first step in his analysis was to invite ―experts in game theory to submit 
programs for a Computer Prisoner‘s Dilemma Tournament—much like a computer chess 
tournament.‖549 After over two hundred rounds of competition, ―the winner was the 
simplest of all the programs submitted, Tit-for-Tat. Tit-for-Tat is merely the strategy of 
starting with cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous 
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move.‖550 Afterwards, Axelrod invited even more people to participate in another 
tournament, but, again, Tit-for-Tat won. The implications were profound; cooperation, 
appeared, was not only possible, it was the best strategy. What made this possible, 
Axelrod theorized, were the repeated iterations of the game during the course of the 
tournament. Each participant could still deceive the other and enjoy a disproportionate 
benefit, but this only worked once. Over the long haul, Tit-for-Tat succeeded because it 
developed trust with the other and thus fostered cooperation, which benefitted both 
parties.  
The Evolution of Cooperation had a tremendous impact on both evolutionary 
biology and the social sciences. Biologists took note because The Prisoner‘s Dilemma 
―simulates the survival of the fittest.‖551 Therefore, Axelrod immediately ―collaborated 
with a biologist (William Hamilton, of course) to develop the biological implications of 
these strategic ideas.‖552 For one, "the simplicity and robustness of the Tit-for-Tat 
strategy strongly support(ed) individual level selection.‖553 In a larger sense, it could be 
argued that Axelrod had contributed the third and final chapter to the evolutionary logic 
of cooperation. Before him, Hamilton had demonstrated altruism among kin, then Trivers 
had shown how reciprocal altruism operated among friends, and now he had proven it 
could thrive even among antagonists. Using, ―an evolutionary approach,‖ as Axelrod did, 
                                                     
550
 Ibid., vii. 
 
551
 Ibid., 50.  
 
552
 Ibid., ix. 
 
553
 Donald Campbell, ―The Agenda Beyond Axelrod‘s The Evolution of 




it was now possible to speculate on the biological origins of human beings‘ almost 
pathological ―concern for reputation.‖554 Being known as a good person—and knowing 
who not to trust—played a critical role in our ancestors‘ reproductive success and our 
inherited, nearly insatiable interest in these matters can be seen in the scandalous personal 
content found in newspapers and television shows around the world.  
Of course, some people took umbrage with Axelrod‘s work. When asked about 
the critics, he responded, ―I thought they had gone too far.‖555 Yes, he had ―always been 
supportive of the themes of sociobiology.‖556 And ―yes,‖ he was ―aware of being a 
pioneer in the reintroduction of evolutionary thinking‖ in political science.557 However, 
the resistance he encountered frustrated Axelrod, for he had gone out of his way to make 
clear that his work did not advocate genetic determinism. He recalls, ―I ran into a 
problem in 1982. Working with Sandra Scarr we submitted an outline to Scientific 
American. The editor encouraged us to submit the article, which we did: ‗Human 
Intelligence and Public Policy.‘ When I enquired after about four months whether it 
would be accepted, the editor wrote back that the publisher didn‘t want to have anything 
to do with something related to genetic aspects of human intelligence—even though we 
cited Scarr‘s work with twins reared apart that showed there was no difference in mean 
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IQ between U.S whites and blacks.‖558 Apparently, despite the authors‘ unequivocal 
stance on racial equality, the journal felt the content, if not the argument, was too 
reminiscent of the racist biological analyses of the early twentieth-century.  
Ultimately, Axelrod remained undeterred by his detractors, as the very real threat 
of nuclear war loomed much larger for him than threats to his professional reputation. 
Years later, he described the pragmatic concerns that inspired his work: ―The Evolution of 
Cooperation, with its focus on Prisoner‘s Dilemma, was written during the Cold War. 
Indeed, one of its primary motivations was to help promote cooperation between the two 
sides of a bipolar world. My hope was that a deeper understanding of the conditions that 
promote cooperation would make the world a little safer.‖559 To this end he was 
successful. He had discovered that, in order to circumvent the incentive to deceive the 
other, it was necessary to ―enlarge the shadow of the future.‖560 Otherwise, one or both 
parties will logically refuse to cooperate in circumstances that mirror the Prisoner‘s 
Dilemma. One ―way to enlarge the shadow of the future is to make the interactions more 
frequent.‖561 Knowing you will engage with the other party again introduces personal 
reputation into the equation and incentivizes cooperation due to the prospect of continued 
benefits. ―This is why,‖ Axelrod argues, ―cooperation emerges more readily in small 
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towns than in large cities.‖562 For governments engaged in protracted negotiations, 
―another way to make interactions more frequent is to break down the issue into small 
pieces. An arms control or disarmament treaty, for example, can be broken down into 
many stages.‖563  
Axelrod had done it. Inspired by Hamilton and Trivers, he had taken an 
evolutionary approach to the problem of cooperation among competitors and he had 
discovered the mechanisms to make it work. Politicians and policy makers could now 
turn to his research for guidance in achieving peaceful outcomes when conflicts between 
nations developed into Prisoner‘s Dilemma‘s. But what about normal people? Could they 
use Tit-for-Tat to guide them in their lives? Should they? The strategy was undeniably 
successful, but that did not mean it was ethical. Yes, there were some admirable 
characteristics to the method. Those who follow Tit-for-Tat, for example, are not greedy; 
indeed, they cannot by definition do better than their adversary. Also, they always begin 
with cooperation, and this is some conciliation to those who strive to conduct themselves 
according to their highest standards. In addition to those positive traits, Tit-for-Tat helped 
people find mutually beneficial solutions to difficult problems. Surely this counts for 
something. Ethics, however, are complex. For some, the ends do not justify the means, so 
Tit-for-Tat‘s potential to achieve peaceful outcomes might not qualify the strategy as an 
ethical way of life for them. If one takes Axelrod‘s work as the third and final extension 
of kindness under natural selection, reasonable people could conclude that evolution is in 
fact a theory of selfishness because the kindness that it engenders ultimately serves to 
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facilitate one‘s own reproductive success. At the time Axelrod was writing, professional 
philosophers did not have much to say on the matter. As far as they were concerned, any 
application of evolution to ethics had been discredited by Henry Sidgwick and G.E. 
Moore in the early twentieth-century.  
E.O. Wilson begged to differ. In Sociobiology, he claimed that ―scientists and 
humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be 
removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers.‖564 For those who remained 
skeptical that biology could succeed where thousands of years of philosophical 
speculation had failed, Wilson metaphorically dissected a human body to reveal the roots 
of ethics in flesh and blood: ―The hypothalamus and limbic system ... flood our 
consciousness with all the emotions - hate, love, guilt, fear, and others – that are 
consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and evil. 
What, we are then compelled to ask, made the hypothalamus and the limbic system? 
They evolved by natural selection. That simple biological statement must be pursued 
to explain ethics.‖565 Of course, most philosophers did not relinquish their authority 
immediately upon hearing Wilson‘s claims. Michael Ruse explains, ―As might be 
expected, like everyone else we philosophers have genes for self-preservation (Socrates 
notwithstanding), and no doubt matters did not seem quite so clear-cut to us.‖566 Some 
philosophers, such as Ruse himself, however, did come to believe that the recent 
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developments in evolutionary biology warranted serious attention.  
Born in Birmingham, England in 1940, Michael Ruse was raised in a very pious 
family. His father, William, worked as both a civil servant and school bursar while his 
mother taught at the local school. During World War I, William was a conscientious 
objector. After the war, the family became involved with the Society of Friends, 
otherwise known as the ―Quakers,‖ and subsequently Michael left home to study at a 
Quaker boarding school in York. These early experiences played an important role in 
Ruse‘s intellectual development, as he learned to think deeply about ethics. In 1962 he 
emigrated to Canada to earn a master‘s degree in philosophy at McMaster University 
before returning to Bristol to receive his PhD in 1970. At this time, Ruse, like most 
students of philosophy, felt evolution had no place in serious philosophical matters. In 
fact, he agreed that ―evolutionary ethics is one of those subjects with a bad philosophical 
smell. Everybody knows that it has been the excuse for some of the worst kinds of 
fallacious arguments in the philosophical workbook, and in addition it has been used as 
support for socioeconomic policies of the most grotesque and hateful nature, all the way 
from cruel nineteenth-century capitalism to twentieth-century concentration camps.‖567 
Ruse‘s harsh perspective was commonplace among his colleagues, for he earned his 
doctorate during the heyday of ―analytic philosophy,‖ which had little patience for ethics 
in general, and no tolerance for evolutionary theories. Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose work 
inspired many of the leading analytic philosophers, once claimed that ―Darwin‘s theory 
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has no more relevance for philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science.‖568 
And so it stood. At least until sociobiology began to threaten philosophy‘s domain. 
 ―Evolutionary ethics continued on ice,‖ Ruse explains, ―and things did not start 
to thaw until the middle of the 1970s, with the development of sociobiology, and 
especially with the insistence of Edward O. Wilson that evolution is indeed relevant to 
ethics.‖569 Most philosophers dismissed Wilson out of hand. Ruse, however, who had 
gained tenure at an obscure teaching college in Canada almost immediately after earning 
his doctorate, relished the opportunity to explore the science behind Wilson‘s 
controversial claims. As a Quaker, he was accustomed to being an ethical outsider, and, 
besides, he had just secured professional immunity–might as well enjoy it. What he 
discovered invigorated him: ―My newfound enthusiasm is connected with exciting 
developments in modern evolutionary biology, especially that part which deals with 
social behavior."
570
 Excitedly, he outlined the two primary scientific explanations of 
altruism to his colleagues. ―First, there is so-called kin selection, the brainchild of the 
British biologist (then but a graduate student) William Hamilton. He pointed out that 
organisms that are related share copies of the same genes, and hence, inasmuch as one 
individual reproduces, it is also passing on copies of the genes of the relatives. Hence if 
one can get a relative to reproduce by giving it help, one is doing oneself a bit of genetic 
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good on the side.‖571 Second, ―there is reciprocal altruism…due to the American biologist 
Robert Trivers.‖572 This is essentially ―you scratch my back and I will scratch yours. It 
can hold between non-relatives and even between members of different species.‖573 For 
the remainder of his career, Ruse would investigate and elaborate upon these basic 
principles. In 2014, he recalled, ―it took me a few years to see how sociobiology could 
help our understanding of ethics – once that happened, everything fell into place and I 
have not changed my thinking much since then.‖574  
Writing in the late 1970s and 1980s, Ruse benefitted from the trailblazing efforts 
of the social scientists before him who had already embraced sociobiology. Because of 
these men and women, he could learn from the applications of evolution to human 
behavior and not simply the evolutionary biology of Hamilton and Trivers. The 
quotations and citations in Ruse‘s writing reveal the profound influence these social 
scientists had on him. In Darwinism Defended, he praises Napoleon Chagnon‘s discovery 
―that power in a Yanomamo village translates into having more offspring than 
average.‖575 He thanks Richard Alexander, whom he describes as ―the one sociobiologist 
who has really tried to pin down the culture‘s of specific societies to genetic foundations‖ 
for ―patiently listening to my half-formed ideas‖ in one of his earliest works, 
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Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?
576
 Sarah Hrdy convinced him that human beings are 
not the only species with a moral capacity in Taking Darwin Seriously and, later in the 
same book, he describes David Barash as a ―perceptive writer.‖577 As a final example, to 
explain the evolutionary roots of moral codes, he cites van den Berghe‘s research on the 
incest taboo. ―Consider,‖ Ruse wrote in the journal Philosophy, ―the avoidance of 
brother-sister incest…. the inhibition persists even when the pairs are biologically 
unrelated and encouraged to marry. Such a circumstance occurred, for example when 
children from different families were raised together in Israeli kibbutzim and in Chinese 
households practicing minor marriages.‖578 If there were any lingering questions whether 
the sociobiologists had influenced Ruse, one need only look at the co-author of the 
Philosophy article: E.O. Wilson! Clearly, by the mid-1980s Ruse was ―in the 
sociobiological camp fully‖ and ready to make his own contributions.579  
 The first step in Ruse‘s effort to reintroduce evolutionary thinking to philosophy 
was to address the elephant in the room, evolutionary ethics, for ―almost without 
exception, professional philosophers have dismissed evolutionary ethics with brief 
contempt.‖580 Ruse had to decide whether to challenge the condemnation of evolutionary 
ethics, to argue that his predecessors had been wrong, or to somehow differentiate his 
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approach from those in the past. The answer was easy for Ruse, as he agreed that ―it is 
fairly clear that the evolutionary ethics commits the naturalistic fallacy,‖ and thus should 
remain abandoned.
581
 ―You cannot go from the course or fact of evolution to moral 
prescriptions‖ he argued, a fact made clear with even a cursory glance at the cruelty of 
nature.
582
 ―Take, for example, the smallpox virus,‖ he writes. ―This is a product of 
evolution: one which the World Health Organization is trying to eliminate. But, inasmuch 
as WHO is trying to eliminate smallpox, it is trying to frustrate the course of evolution. It 
is trying artificially to make one species extinct. Yet surely, no one would want to say 
that the actions of the members of the WHO are morally wrong, and that people 
(including ourselves!), should just be allowed to die from smallpox.‖583 No, Ruse had no 
use for evolutionary ethics as commonly understood. Instead, he wanted to establish a 
new approach to combining biology with philosophy. He called it ―Darwinian ethics.‖  
In ―Evolution and Ethics,‖ Ruse introduces Darwinian ethics, claiming that ―a 
major attraction to my position is that one simply cannot be guilty of committing the 
naturalistic fallacy or violating the is-ought barrier, because one is simply not in the 
justification business at all.‖584 Ruse‘s confidence comes from the fact that Darwinian 
ethics does not even attempt to argue what is or is not moral. ―A philosopher is not a 
preacher,‖ he explains, ―not even a moralist in the usual sense of the term. Whatever the 
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value of moral exhortations may be, it is not in any straightforward way the job of the 
philosopher to spout forth as a font moral wisdom: ‗Love your neighbor!‘ ‗Abstain from 
sex!‘ ‗Return your library books!‘‖585 In Darwinian ethics, ―the philosopher‘s intrinsic 
interests lie elsewhere. He/she is trying to understand the nature of morality, and the 
grounds which support it.‖586 Therefore, ―the genuine Darwinian need not fear the 
criticisms of traditional evolutionary ethics.‖587  
 Ruse‘s primary focus is to remove morality from the abstract, rational heavens 
and to plant it firmly in the dirt of evolutionary theory. To most philosophers, evolution is 
the cutthroat survival of the fittest; therefore, ―it would seem prima facie that morality 
does not pay from an evolutionary perspective, and hence ought not to have evolved.‖588 
Thus, a change in the understanding of evolution was necessary for natural selection to 
become relevant to morality, which is cooperative if nothing else. The ―‘breakthrough,‘‖ 
Ruse argued, ―occurred when the then graduate student William Hamilton saw that social 
cooperation is possible—can indeed be a direct result of natural selection—so long as the 
individual giving aid benefits biologically.‖589 As a result of the developments in 
evolutionary biology, ethics ceased to be a transcendent exception to biology requiring 
philosophical explanation and became just another mundane result of natural selection. 
Ruse explained, ―Morality, or more particularly the moral sense, comes about because the 
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moral human has more chance of surviving and reproducing than the immoral person.‖590 
Nothing more, nothing less.  
 To illustrate this concept, Ruse asked the reader to imagine living near a river or 
ocean where everyone is at risk of drowning. If the reader were to fall in the water, Ruse 
would ―help you from drowning because of my biological urges to do so. Although this 
puts me at a one in twenty risk of drowning myself, I in turn avoid the one in two risk of 
drowning were you never to respond to my cry for help.‖591 In this scenario it is easy to 
see how moral sentiments could evolve because, due to the law of averages, the 
biological ―gamble‖ to develop moral intuition will pay off over time.592 Thus, morality, 
Ruse claims, is just another adaption, making them ―part of our genetic heritage as much 
as our physical features and our sexual desires.‖593  
―But, wait!,‖ some may protest. How can evolution explain human beings‘ 
incredible ethical diversity? Surely the very existence of ―honor killings‖ demonstrates 
conclusively that ethics are cultural constructs, as an individual‘s views on the subject are 
largely determined by her upbringing. To this reasonable critique, Ruse defers to Noam 
Chomsky‘s groundbreaking linguistic research. For generations, the rich diversity and 
mutual incomprehensibility of the world‘s languages resulted in an almost unquestioned 
assumption that each language was a unique cultural expression. In the 1970s, however, 
                                                     
590
 Ruse, Sense or Nonsense?, 197.  
 
591
 Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, 219. 
 
592
 Of course, one‘s genes do not consciously ―gamble.‖ I use this verb as 
shorthand for the natural selection of advantageous genetic mutations. 
 
593




Chomsky had argued persuasively that, despite the superficial differences, each language 
shared a fundamental ―deep grammar.‖594 Ruse, following Chomsky‘s lead, argued ―that 
the same may be true of morality.‖595  
Human beings share the same fundamental ethical ―grammar‖ because the vast 
majority of human evolution occurred on the African plains, long before different groups 
of people migrated to the continents. Ruse is adamant, however, that the universality of 
our ethical grammar does not make it objective. This is a tricky concept, especially 
considering the pains Ruse took to undermine claims of ethical subjectivity. Reality, 
however, is not binary, which allows Ruse to advocate a third perspective: that ―morality 
is a collective illusion foisted upon us by our genes.‖596 If ethics were truly objective, he 
argues, they would exist independently of humans, and this is not the case. To the 
contrary, our shared moral predisposition only exists due to the particular historical 
contingencies of human evolution.  ―This is not to deny,‖ he elaborates, ―that we humans 
think it has a justification—that we think it objective—but this is part of its adaptive 
nature. If we thought ethics were simply emotion, it would break down as people realized 
that it was not binding and started to cheat. So natural selection leads us to think that we 
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ought to do things, not just from emotion or desire, but because they are ‗really and truly 
right.‘‖597  
Ruse had thrown down the gauntlet in philosophy. Not only had he claimed to 
know the origin of morality (as a by-product of evolution), he had also stripped ethics of 
the objectivity many philosophers believed was necessary for it to be credible. Having 
seen the response to pioneering sociobiologists in other fields, Ruse knew what to expect 
from his colleagues, so he expected that ―the bile will be surging up the throats of most of 
my fellow philosophers‖ after reading his controversial claims.598 He was ―very much 
aware‖ that he was swimming in dangerous academic water, but it ―never really bothered 
me—I was a full prof with tenure at an undistinguished university in Canada – so I felt 
quite safe—I did think that biology was part of understanding humankind and so simply 
said so.‖599 Yes, there were those who remained ―very hostile‖ to his arguments, but 
change always encounters resistance.
600
  
When asked if he encountered any professional challenges due to his intellectual 
positions, Ruse recalled, ―very much so, especially getting grants.‖601 What bothered him 
the most, though, were what he saw as the misplaced critiques from those who considered 
his Darwinian ethics to be tools of oppression. According to him, he ―had great resistance 
from Marxists and feminists because I endorsed human sociobiology‖ despite the fact 
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that he was a deeply committed to progressive values.
602
 Forty years later, he still has a 
hard time concealing his disdain for these critics: ―A ―Marxist prof at Harvard is a 
hypocrite in my book—go and teach in the inner city of NYC or Chicago.‖603  
The critics of sociobiology have been a consistent theme in the story of 
evolutionary thinking‘s return to the social sciences. But who are these men and women, 
exactly? The vanguard of sociobiologists in anthropology, sociology, psychology, 
political science, and philosophy have been given ample attention. I fear, however, that 
the relative lack of space devoted to the critics might have led the reader to view them as 
simply antiscience activists motivated by political rather than intellectual positions. The 
leadership of the opposition to sociobiology were highly respected academics who 
believed that applying evolutionary thinking to human behavior suffered from both moral 
and intellectual flaws. What is unknown at this point is how successful they were in 
convincing others that evolutionary thinking is dangerous. The next chapter introduces 
the critics who have thus far remained in the shadows and examines the aftermath of their 
efforts. 
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―Critics‖ are not protagonists. At a safe distance from the heat of the action, they 
appraise the performance of others who brave the spotlight.
604
 The label ―critic,‖ 
therefore, is not neutral, as it relegates people to peripheral—and typically negative—
roles. Sophisticated readers, however, recognize that reality is not so black-and-white, 
that every person is the star of his own show, and that an author‘s decision to label certain 
people ―critics‖ is subjective. In the context of the current historical narrative, the focus 
has been on the return of evolutionary thinking to the social sciences. I have attempted to 
explain what caused this important intellectual shift to occur when it did; thus, the men 
and women who were responsible for this development took center stage and those who 
opposed them were…well, critics. Yet, this label is not entirely fair or accurate, for the 
critics, in addition to being protagonists in their own narrative of heroic defense against 
biological determinism, also played a vital role in the successful return of evolutionary 
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thinking by compelling sociobiologists to shift their focus from behavior to psychology.  
Much of the early sociobiology, despite the authors‘ protests to the contrary, was 
riddled with offensive language towards women and people of color. Flush with 
excitement over sociobiology‘s potential, sociobiologists often reached too far and made 
claims about direct genetic influence on human behavior that could not be supported by 
scientific evidence. The critics of sociobiology, who had ―their antennae up‖ for 
regressive science due to Arthur Jensen‘s recent controversial research on race and 
intelligence, immediately attacked some of the more speculative assertions.
605
 As a result 
of these attacks, sociobiologists (as a whole) seriously reevaluated their positions and 
made the necessary adjustments. In time, those who wished to continue the return of 
evolutionary thinking to the social sciences adopted a new moniker for their efforts, 
evolutionary psychology, which emphasizes the evolution of mindsets rather than 
specific behaviors. This new approach serves as the foundation for the current 
widespread adoption of evolutionary thinking across disciplines and should be seen as the 
synthesis of sociobiology and the critical response to it, not as the triumph of 
sociobiology under a different name.   
The impetus to transform sociobiology into evolutionary psychology came from 
the offensive and incorrect statements made by sociobiologists themselves. Perhaps this 
was inevitable. Perhaps those who disregard academic taboos are also those who 
disregard social conventions; their academic iconoclasm and social impropriety are, so to 
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speak, two sides of a coin and you cannot have one without the other.
606
 Though 
plausible, I do not think this is the case when it comes to sociobiology. Instead, I think 
sociobiologists were orthodox liberal men whose genteel paternalism simply stopped 
holding moral authority with a generation radicalized by Vietnam and the civil rights 
movement. In the new moral climate, the opinions of ―responsible patriarchs‖ came to be 
seen as condescending assertions of white male authority.  
To the modern eye, many of the leading sociobiologists were hopelessly sexist. 
Here is Michael Ruse, writing in 1979: ―It is certainly implied by today‘s sociobiology 
that because of their biology men will tend to be more dominant, more polygamous, and 
if any avoidance of child-rearing occurs it will be by them.‖607 A male, he explains, just 
―wants to fertilize and get away and go on to the next; the female wants to be fertilized, 
but she wants to hang on to the male for help.‖608 Not very nuanced thinking from a 
professor of philosophy. Richard Alexander believed that monogamy was the result of 
―pressure exerted by females to monopolize a male‘s parental behavior‖ and that women 
were among the ―resources‖ for which men competed.609 Even in their dealings with 
respected female colleagues, sexism reared its ugly head. When asked about Sarah 
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Hrdy‘s remarkable research in the Indian jungles, Robert Trivers admitted, ―My own 
view is that Sarah ought to devote more study and thought to raising a healthy 
daughter.‖610  
A major problem with sexism in sociobiology was that it lent credibility to the 
notion that gender inequality is natural and thus inevitable. E.O. Wilson, for example, 
started with the claim that ―in hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women stay at 
home. This strong bias persists in most agricultural and industrial societies and, on that 
basis alone, appears to have a genetic origin.‖611 He then concluded, ―the genetic bias is 
intense enough to cause a substantial division of labor even in the most free and most 
egalitarian of future societies.‖612 Wow. In these short sentences he dismissed the hopes 
of generations of feminists. Could education not remove the glass ceiling preventing 
women‘s professional success? Not according to Wilson, who argued, ―even with 
identical education…men are likely to continue to play a disproportionate role in political 
life, business and science.‖613  
Women were not the only ones with reason to fear a sociobiological future. 
Immigrants and people of color would also struggle to find their place, as many 
prominent sociobiologists believed racism and xenophobia to be genetic adaptations 
alongside patriarchy. Van den Berghe, for example, claimed that ―any quality rooted in 
biology will be with us for the foreseeable future‖; and while this might seem innocuous 
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at first glance, van den Berghe‘s previous statement that ―ethnocentrism and racism are 
deeply rooted in our biology‖ illuminate the deeply regressive social implications of the 
claim.
614
 To progressives, America‘s potential greatness depended on overcoming a long 
history of racial strife to create a colorblind democracy but Hamilton appeared to aim in 
the opposite direction. In the short article ―Innate Social Aptitudes of Man,‖ he professed 
his ―hope to produce evidence that some things which are often treated as purely cultural 
in humans—say racial discrimination—have deep roots in our animal past and thus are 
quite likely to rest on direct genetic foundations.‖615 Likewise, Barash turned a popular 
bumper sticker slogan upside down when he argued, ―it is not true that nobody is born a 
bigot.‖616  
According to sociobiologists, the evolution of xenophobia and racism were not 
unfortunate aberrations but necessary corollaries to morality. Seemingly paradoxical, the 
intimate relationship between good and evil is entirely logical from a sociobiological 
point of view. Altruism exists in the context of kin selection and reciprocal altruism 
because it is adaptive—an individual‘s genetic reproduction increases when they behave 
altruistically towards their relatives and friends. Over time, trust builds in the community 
and they all benefit from their collective sacrifice for the common good. There is a threat 
to their prosperity, however, and that is the introduction of an individual or group who do 
not share the same genes and who will not reciprocate the goodwill shown them. These 
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―outsiders‖ can exploit the host group‘s kindness and give nothing in return. As Hamilton 
explained, ―For collective sacrifice to work members (of the community) need and are 
expected to evolve a degree of xenophobia.‖617 Or, as Barash put the matter, ―prejudice 
and racism might have roots in the biological tendency to distinguish between in-group 
and out-group.‖618  
Critics of sociobiology rightfully feared that the new discipline naturalized 
sexism, racism, and xenophobia. Anticipating this response, the sociobiologists went out 
of their way to assure people that you cannot derive a cultural ―ought‖ from a biological 
―is.‖ In Darwinism and Human Affairs, Richard Alexander emphasized, ―Evolutionary 
analysis…has essentially nothing to say about what goals are desirable‖ and ―nothing 
whatsoever‖ to do with ethics.619 It is like our predilection for sweet food. Craving sugar, 
which is a biological adaptation, does not mean we should abandon efforts to eat healthy. 
Still, with a little digging, it was possible to find evidence that at least some 
sociobiologists believe that a greater understanding of the genetic causes of behavior 
should lead to some acceptance of biological limitations. ―Judge me a moral monster if 
you will,‖ Ruse admits, but consider the example of ―a woman with an IQ of 71—just 
about the level that even today‘s Supreme Court thinks makes a person incompetent—
who had eight children out of wedlock. Is it absolutely wrong if the state says, ‗Get 
sterilized or we will keep you out of society until you are past reproductive age?‘ I keep 
thinking of all of those kids. Even if they are not genetically inferior, I doubt very much 
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that they are going to have the warm, nurturing upbringing I have tried to give my 
children.‖620 
Hamilton, who established the scientific foundation for sociobiology, supported 
eugenics although ―the thoughts were painful.‖621 In one of his darker moods, he 
lamented, ―The only sure recipe for improving society is eugenics. Either it is that or else, 
not many generations hence, tranquilizers and other mood drugs and unlimited medical 
patches for every one of us all of the time.‖622 In 1969, while at the ―Man and Beast: 
Comparative Social Behavior‖ conference held in Washington, D.C., a senator‘s wife 
asked Hamilton how his research could reduce violence and crime in America. Hamilton 
demurred from the difficult question but he wanted to say "she should make sure the laws 
(her husband) helps to enact are always such as to encourage not merely the direct 
influence but also the breeding of citizens democratically considered above average in 
ability, kindliness, and health, while discouraging influence and breeding from 
opposites.‖623 Hamilton did acknowledge, ―it is hard, perhaps impossible, to define what 
is best.‖624 But he also believed that it was ―not so hard to say what is simply moderately 
good and that is all we need; on the other side it is less difficult than most seem to think 
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to define what are bad and worst.‖625  
 Radical scholars had heard enough. Sociobiologists‘ descriptions of sexism, 
racism, and xenophobia as ―natural‖ convinced them that they were dealing with another 
iteration of biological determinism, not a revolutionary insight into human behavior. The 
introduction of population genetics and kin selection might be new, but in the end ―there 
was really nothing that separated the program or specific claims of the social Darwinism 
of the 1870s from the Darwinian sociobiology of the 1970s.‖626 According to the radicals, 
―The reason for the survival of these recurrent determinist theories is that they 
consistently provide a genetic justification of the status quo and of privileges for certain 
groups according to race, class, or sex.‖627 In the context of increasing public demands 
for racial and gender equality, therefore, sociobiology could be seen as ―an attempt to 
deflect the force of (the protests) by denying their legitimacy.‖628 For the critics of 
sociobiology, many of whom were political activists themselves, it was imperative to 
discredit Wilson and his ideological brethren as soon as possible because ―the theories 
put forth by the sociobiologists…. convince people that revolutionary changes in social 
relationships (e.g. class structure and sex roles) are impossible.‖629  
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Dr. John Beckwith was among the first to take on the challenge. Skinny, 
bespectacled, with a goatee and dressed ―hip‖ (for an interview with BioEssays in 2007 
he wore a leather vest), Beckwith embodied the intellectual and cultural background of 
many of the critics. For the most part, they came from bigger cities and went to better 
schools, with Beckwith himself attending Harvard after growing up in New York. 
Further, they embraced their identity as radical intellectuals who rejected ―square‖ 
American values and institutions. Beckwith had become a ―Francophile‖ after spending 
―the summer of 1957 bicycling through Europe, much of it in France,‖ and he credits ―the 
books I began to read during (his) college years,‖ particularly the works of Camus and 
Sartre, with heavily influencing his political views.
630
 In short, Beckwith and his 
colleagues considered themselves to be more sophisticated thinkers—and people—than 
the sociobiologists. To some extent, the critics‘ arrogance (Gould admitted that he was 
―not a modest person‖) had merit, as they were by all measures inordinately successful 
professors.
631
 For example, by 1969 Beckwith had become a rising star in microbiology 
and genetics at Harvard for being ―the first to totally separate a gene from all the other 
genes that normally surrounded it in the organism‘s chromosomes.‖632 To honor this 
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groundbreaking work he received the prestigious Eli Lily award. At the ceremony, 
however, Dr. Beckwith chose not to bask in the adulation. Instead, he ―condemned the 
practices of the drug industry, of which the Eli Lilly company was a 
representative…(and) then announced that I was donating the award money to a Black 
Panther free health clinic.‖633 Clearly this was a man who would not shrink from his 
convictions. And, on May 28, 1975, when E.O. Wilson‘s Sociobiology appeared on the 
front page of the New York Times, he rose for another fight.   
Although he admittedly felt an initial ―Bill Murray-like puzzlement‖ over the 
praise given Wilson‘s book, Beckwith soon grew serious—and very concerned.634 
―Overall,‖ he recalls, ―the media gave the impression that there had been major new 
scientific insights into the genetic influences on human behavior,‖ but ―given the impact 
of past theories of this sort, it seemed to me that those of us who were alert to this history 
should take a close look at the scientific basis of sociobiology.‖635 To this end, he 
contacted Richard Lewontin, a friend and colleague at Harvard who also held deep 
political convictions. Born in 1929 in New York, Lewontin looked like your typical 
professor; he wore glasses and worn-out sweaters, and had an infectious smile when 
among friends. Lewontin had always been drawn toward social activism. As he recalls, 
while in high school he and the young woman who would become his wife ―were part of 
a political group that the students organized called ―The World we Want.‖636 Later, 
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during his stint teaching in Rochester, the two of them, along with like-minded friends, 
―sat in a police station because of the first incidents of police brutality against black 
people. That was just they way our lives went.‖637 To Lewontin, professors ―make a 
claim on the public purse,‖ and simply satisfying one‘s intellectual curiosity was just 
―mental masturbation.‖638 He had to do more.  
Together, Beckwith and Lewontin ―agreed to call together a few people who 
might share our concerns. We would meet to consider whether and how to respond to this 
public surfacing of sociobiology. Toward the end of July a small group of us gathered at 
my house in Cambridge. We sat out on the breezy front porch, escaping the heat of a hot 
summer night. By this time, our own heat had mounted a sociobiology garnered 
increasing publicity for its claimed social applications. We decided to read Wilson's book 
and evaluate scientific basis of its arguments.‖639 The small cadre of academics  ―took on 
the name ―The Sociobiology Study Group‖ and ―over the next few months we met 
regularly every two weeks, continuing to read and discuss chapters of the book.‖640 
Within a few months the group decided ―to publish a critique of sociobiology in a journal 
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that would reach a wide audience.‖641 The resulting letter to the New York Review of 




The letter to the New York Review of Books did not pull any punches. In it, the 
Sociobiology Study Group likened sociobiology to the biological determinism that had 
―provided an important basis for the enactment of sterilization laws and restrictive 
immigration laws by the United States between 1910 and 1930 and also for the eugenics 
policies which led to the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany.‖643 Members 
of the group were willing to make such a damning comparison because they sincerely 
worried that ―the explanations which Wilson's Sociobiology provides for racism, fascism, 
and war are unscientific…and dangerous.‖644 As academics, they valued the free 
exchange of ideas, but sociobiology was not idle chatter in a lecture hall; it had the 
potential to cause great harm to society-at-large and needed to be repudiated. Beckwith 
explained, ―If such statements were limited to academic journals and academic 
discussions, they would not be of much concern to us.‖645 Sociobiology, however, was on 
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the front page of newspapers across the country, and the critics saw this publicity as a 
―politically motivated‖ campaign to defend ―existing social arrangements as part of our 
biology.‖646 
The Sociobiology Study Group comprised intellectuals from various disciplines 
with shared political values. In their words, we ―share a commitment to the prospect of 
the creation of a more socially just – a socialist – society.‖647 Contrary to biological 
determinists, they ―believe that it is possible to create a better society than the one we live 
in at present; that inequalities of wealth, power, and status are not ‗natural‘ but socially 
imposed obstructions to the building of a society in which the creative potential of all its 
citizens is employed for the benefit of all.‖648 The most prominent member of the group 
was Stephen Jay Gould, a paleontologist at Harvard who had gained fame as a popular 
science writer. Like Beckwith and Lewontin, Gould was born in New York. As a young 
boy his court reporter father took him to the American Museum of Natural History, 
where he encountered his first dinosaur. ―I had no idea there were such things—I was 
awestruck,‖ he recalls.649 From that point forward there was no doubt he would study the 
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fossils of these amazing creatures. There was also no doubt to those that knew him that 
Gould would be at the forefront of any battle concerning scientific justification of 
inequality. Throughout his life Gould had embraced the activism of the 60s, participating 
in lunch counter sit-ins and boycotts as a member of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee.
650
 In The Mismeasure of Man, which he wrote to combat 
biological determinism, Gould explains the intimate connection between his politics and 
his scientific criticism. ―My father,‖ he writes, ―became a leftist, along with so many 
other idealists, during upheavals of the depression, the Spanish Civil War, and the growth 
of Nazism and fascism….(and) I shall always be gratified to the point of tears that, 
although he never saw The Mismeasure of Man in final form, he lived just long enough to 
read the galley proofs and know that his scholar son had not forgotten his roots.‖651  
Feminists played a large role in The Sociobiology Study Group. Throughout 
history women‘s biology had been used to rationalize their oppression, and now, in the 
context of the social activism of the 1970s, those who were committed to gender equality 
believed it was imperative to discredit the return of scientific narratives that perpetuated 
the notion of women‘s ―natural‖ inferiority. In one sense, the feminists‘ criticism of 
sociobiology‘s biological determinism simply echoed the broad ideological position 
taken by all of the critics; however, there were subtle differences due to women‘s 
particular historical experiences of injustice that made their criticisms unique. For 
example, when Enlightenment scientists sought proof of natural inequalities between the 
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races and sexes (an endeavor motivated, perhaps, by a need to justify white men‘s 
monopoly of power in an era of universal ―natural rights‖), there were ―glaring 
asymmetries in studies of race and sex in this period.‖652 As the historian of science 
Linda Schiebinger cleverly points out, ―it was fraternitè, not humanitè, that was 
celebrated alongside egalitè and libertè in the great bourgeois revolution‖ of the time, 
which made black men‘s place in the republic problematic, but not necessarily 
women‘s.653 Power belonged exclusively to men, the revolution did not change that—
and, in fact, the women who ―forgot the virtues of (their) sex‖ and assumed too much 
public authority often found themselves on the wrong end of a guillotine blade.
654
  
More recently, and of more importance to the feminist critics of sociobiology, 
women had experienced the taboo against biological thinking in the social sciences 
differently. That is to say, they hadn‘t really experienced it all. While UNESCO and 
various academic organizations were loudly and proudly proclaiming the invalidity of 
biological analyses of human beings with regard to race, there was nary an official word 
about the prevailing, and quite damaging, biological narratives of women‘s ―natural‖ 
domesticity. Therefore, feminists, while allied with their fellow critics who emphasized 
race or class, did in fact have their own agenda.
655
 They were on the front lines to get 
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biology finally off their backs, not trying to prevent its return.  
As part of their sustained struggle against biological determinism (sociobiology 
was seen as only the latest iteration) feminists set out to challenge the objectivity, and 
thus authority, of science as currently practiced. Ruth Bleier led the charge, revealing 
androcentric, if not sexist, epistemological motivations throughout evolutionary theory. 
Her research inspired Helen Longino, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Evelyn Fox-Keller, Donna 
Haraway, and other feminist luminaries to explore the ―the role that values in general, 
and gender values in particular, play in the production of scientific or biological 
knowledge.‖656 According to these women, science is subjective. Like everything else we 
do, science is conducted through the filter of our own perspective, and because scientists 
in the mid-twentieth-century, who were almost all men, lived in a society that 
marginalized women, this meant they would almost inevitably conduct hopelessly sexist 
research. This is not to say that they were bad people. Fausto-Sterling explains that her 
intention was to simply demonstrate ―how ideological constructs become part of science 
done in good faith by successful, well-meaning scientists.‖657  
During the sociobiology controversy feminists highlighted the inherently 
subjective nature of science because they thought sociobiologists were pushing a political 
agenda under the cover of false objectivity. In ―Sociobiology, Morality, and Feminism,‖ 
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A.T. Nuyen despaired, ―Modern anti-feminists fervently believe that they are dealing in 
truth (and) their main weapon is science.‖658 To women who had committed their lives to 
gender equality, it seemed that sociobiologists were using their authority to sanction 
patriarchal social norms just as the women‘s rights movement was beginning to reap the 
fruits of their labor—and they claimed to be neutral while doing so!  Ruth Hubbard, the 
editor of Women Looking at Biology Looking at Women, recognized the popular appeal of 
apparently objective science, so she made the political implications of sociobiology 
explicit: ―The new science of sociobiology would have us believe that women stay home 
with the children because their eggs are large (hence metabolically more expensive) than 
their husband‘s sperm and that women‘s ―nurturing instinct‖ has evolved to guard these 
biological investments.‖659 For their part, feminist scientists had embraced what Donna 
Haraway coined ―situated knowledge,‖ or the acknowledgement that one‘s perspective 
influences every aspect of research and publication. Clearly frustrated that her political 
adversaries were not holding themselves to the same standards, Fausto-Sterling proposes 
the ground rules for the fight ahead in The Myths of Gender, ―The critics of sociobiology 
make no bones about their beliefs. It is high time that those who make pronouncements 
about human sociobiology own up to theirs.‖660 
 Of course, Wilson and the sociobiologists would argue that they were also 
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liberals—that they, too, wanted to help build a more just society. Within a short time of 
Sociobiology’s publication, however, a discerning reader could find evidence that 
sociobiological thinking was indeed being used to justify the existing social order. A 
front-page New York Times article written on November 30
th
, 1977, for example, 
claimed, ―Even some staunch feminists are reluctantly reaching the conclusion that 
women's aspirations may ultimately be limited by inherent biological differences that will 
forever leave men the dominant sex.‖661 Dr. Judith Bardwick, a psychologist, feminist, 
and a dean at the University of Michigan, was interviewed for the article. In light of 
recent scientific discoveries, she found herself ―saying things that she herself does not 
want to believe and that are anathema to the very movement she supports.‖662 
Specifically, Bardwick admits, ―if you define dominance as who occupies formal roles of 
responsibility, then there is no society where males are not dominant. When something is 
so universal, the probability is—as reluctant as I am to say it—that there is some quality 
of the organism that leads to this condition.‖663 The founder of the National Organization 
for Women, Dr. Rossi, also found her commitment to gender equality waning. ―It may 
mean,‖ Rossi lamented, ―that there never will be full parity in jobs, that women will 
always predominate in the caring tasks like teaching and social work and in the life 
sciences, while men will prevail in those requiring more aggression—business, and 
politics, for example.‖664 The writing was on the wall. If those opposed to sociobiology 
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wanted to prevent the general public from biological determinism, they would have to act 
quickly and decisively.  
In order to more effectively combat what they perceived as sociobiology‘s threat 
to gender and racial equality, the Sociobiology Study Group joined forces with another 
organization of radical intellectuals, Science for the People. The founders of Science for 
the People had formed in 1969 to ―establish a forum where all concerned scientists—and 
especially students and younger members of the profession—may explore the questions, 
Why are we scientists? For whose benefit do we work? What is the full measure of our 
moral and social responsibility?‖665 Its members were concerned that the supposedly 
objective nature of science had led scientists to unwittingly support unethical programs 
such as nuclear warfare, and in response they hoped to re-establish scientists as 
benefactors of the common good.
666
 As fellow radicals, Science for the People shared the 
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 In a particularly inspiring passage, Science for the People declared: ―We see 
our cities falling apart, people thrown out of work, education and other vital social 
programs being cut back and the danger of war continually increasing. At the same time, 
people are struggling against these attacks on their standard of living. Workers are 
fighting back everywhere and there are many rent strikes, teacher strikes, student 
demonstrations, and other actions. And where is science in all of this?  
The health of this country is declining as huge amounts of money are being put 
into high-level medical technology while day-to-day problems of preventive medicine, 
diet and exercise are being ignored. Little attention is given to the problems of industrial 
health and safety as workers are being sped up and companies cut costs, leading to more 
accidents. Only a small amount of investigation is going into the effects of industrial 
pollutants even though it has been shown that they may be a major cause of cancer and 
other diseases. More and more research gets poured into developing new weapons and 
new methods of warfare, while other research and education in science gets cut back. 
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Sociobiology Study Group‘s concern about biological determinism; therefore, starting in 
1975, they began publishing a steady stream of articles condemning sociobiology.
667
  
The articles on sociobiology in the Science for the People magazine focused on 
the dangerous political implications of biological determinism. Written by professional 
academics, the tone of these articles was surprisingly conspiratorial: ―In periods of social 
unrest and questioning, there is typically a resurgence of the nature-nurture question. 
Tremendous publicity is given to supposedly scientific theories that purport to show that 
poverty, hunger, unemployment, disease are due to our genes and not products of our 
social institutions."
668
 From this perspective, sociobiology is ―not science, it is 
propaganda, touted by the media not for its scientific merits but for its political 
functions.‖669 And who stood to gain from claims of biological determinism? According 
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to the article ―Sociobiology: The Controversy Continues,‖ ―the group that benefits most 
from such theories is a small, but powerful, wealthy and privileged class, the corporate 
elite.‖670  
 Science for the People desperately fought against what it perceived as 
sociobiology‘s counter-revolutionary ideology. In ―Sociobiology: A Sexist Synthesis,‖ 
sociologist Barbara Chasin reassured readers that ―the faults in our society, the injustices, 
the inequalities do not lie in our genes; they are rooted in social institutions, and class 
structure.‖671 Change was indeed possible. ―People have challenged,‖ Chasin continued, 
―with a growing success—sexism, racism, poverty, degradation, and brutality. Cuba, 
Vietnam, China, Mozambique, Angola are not utopias, but they are supporting a real 
effort to remove inequality.‖672 The respectful reference to nations that had recently 
become communist demonstrated the extent authors who contributed to Science for the 
People sincerely believed they were engaged in a proletarian struggle against the 
establishment. To them, the social activism of the 1960s and 70s was just the start of a 
major political revolution, one that would face tremendous resistance but was worth 
fighting for. ―Whenever people join together to create a new order,‖ the sociologist 
Barbara Chasin declared, ―those benefitting from the old try to crush the people and their 
vision. They use weapons to kill, maim and terrorize: and they use theories to demoralize 
people, to convince them of their essential inferiority, and to reconcile them to the world 
as it is. But despite the damage that they can cause, despite their capacity to hold back 
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genuine progress, neither the bombs, the napalm, the armies, the C.I.A., nor theories of 
biological determinism can stop the movement to build a new society.‖673 
The political pressure greatly affected Wilson, who felt ―blindsided by the 
attack.‖674 The soft-spoken professor had ―expected some frontal fire from social 
scientists on primarily evidential grounds‖ but was not prepared for ―a political enfilade 
from the flank.‖675 Twenty years later, he recalled, ―In 1975 I was a political naïf: I knew 
almost nothing about Marxism as either a political belief or a mode of analysis; I had paid 
little attention to the dynamism of the activist Left, and I had never heard of Science for 
the People. I was not an intellectual in the European or New York/Cambridge sense.‖676 
Due to the persistent attacks, which included bullhorns in Harvard Square calling for his 
dismissal and antisociobiology chants during his lectures, Wilson became known as a 
reactionary professor, which, in Harvard during the 1970s, was ―like (being) an atheist in 
a Benedictine monastery.‖677 As time passed and Wilson saw his personal and 
professional reputation increasingly sullied, he ―received little support from my 
colleagues on the Harvard faculty. Some friends spoke up in interviews and public radio 
forums to oppose Science for the People….But mostly what I got was silence.‖678 By 
1978, Science for the People was celebrating their success with an article called 
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―Sociobiology on the Run.‖679  
In February of 1878, the political tension surrounding sociobiology came to a 
head during a two-day symposium of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science in Washington, D.C. It was at this conference, the reader may recall, that 
activists rushed the stage and poured water over E.O. Wilson, chanting ―Racist Wilson, 
you can‘t hide, we charge you with genocide.‖680 Now that the context for the unusual 
protest has been more firmly established and Wilson has been properly introduced, I want 
to take a closer look at that fateful encounter from the perspective of sociobiology‘s 
critics, for it is clear that the tenor of the debate changed significantly from that point 
forward.  
A number of people the Sociobiology Study Group and Science for the People 
attended the infamous conference. In their eyes, ―The high drama of the meetings came 
on Wednesday afternoon, when the center of the controversy, E.O. Wilson, was to speak. 
The session began with a beautiful critique by Steve Gould, who spent some time 
demolishing a study by David Barash, an ardent sociobiologist who was the next 
speaker.‖681 It was at this time that Val Dusek, a philosopher and member of Science for 
the People, ―inadvertently opened the door on the stage to a group of demonstrators. They 
were members of CAR (Committee Against Racism) a radical Maoist group.‖682 CAR 
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was not affiliated with any of the other critics of sociobiology—Beckwith referred to 
them as ―a mindless, group of ‗storm troopers‘‖—so no one was prepared for what came 
next.
683
 When the small group of young, African-American activists rushed the stage and 
doused Wilson, the once staid event disintegrated into ―confusion and screaming.‖684 In 
the moment it was unclear what it all meant. Was this the final nail in sociobiology‘s 
coffin? Had it become so thoroughly associated with reactionary politics that its 
practitioners would be denied a seat at the liberal table of academia? Had the taboo 
against biological analyses of human behavior held?  
No one at the conference knew for sure what the reaction to the water incident 
would be. It was unprecedented, really. Then, after the moderator of the symposium, 
Alexander Alland, managed to regain control of the event…..―a large segment of the 
audience gave Wilson a standing ovation.‖685 The protest had backfired, as members of 
the audience sympathized with the beleaguered professor. Years later, the sociobiologist 
Martin Daly acknowledged, ―I think the famous water dump actually did some good, in 
that it made a lot of people feel that they had to stand up for a little civility.‖686 Beckwith 
also recognized the importance of the moment. According to him, when Wilson took the 
stage ―the tide seemed more than ever against him and his followers,‖ but the incident 
―restored some respect to his position.‖687 In order to distance his organization from the 
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ugly, failed protest, Beckwith ―stood up from the audience after the incident and strongly 
denounced this action on behalf of Science for the People, making it clear that we 
opposed such behavior.‖688  
The applause for Wilson and subsequent disavowal of the protest did not, of 
course, signal a sociobiology victory or even an end to the debate, but the sociobiologists 
had achieved something significant. Their ideas would now be fought on intellectual 
grounds, not political ones. Before the conference, the critics of sociobiology sought to 
discredit the discipline as a tool of oppression, but the crass tactics of the Committee 
Against Racism had upset the sensibilities of everyone present, as no one wanted to see 
Wilson, a thin, elderly man, treated in such a manner. The members of the Sociobiology 
Study Group and Science for the People, many of whom identified as Marxists, were not 
necessarily opposed to utilizing political methods in academic disputes; however, they 
were ―dismayed‖ by the CAR‘s protest because they felt that it ―made the critics look 
ridiculous.‖689 Afterward, the unusual academic drama received a lot of coverage from 
the press, most of it portraying the event as a simple narrative of antiscience political 
activism. If the critics wanted to discredit sociobiology now, they would need to take an 
intellectual approach, as further political attacks, whether physical or written, could be 
too easily disregarded for lacking scientific basis.   
The taboo, in essence, had been broken, not in the sense that sociobiological 
theories had ―won,‖ but they now had to be included in the dialogue and challenged on 
intellectual grounds rather than scornfully cast aside. Previously, critics of sociobiology 









saw the new discipline as a simple extension of harmful early twentieth-century 
biological determinism such as Social Darwinism and eugenics, and subsequently their 
criticism focused on potential political abuses. After the 1978 AAAS conference, 
however, neutral observers, who were the very hearts and minds the critics hoped to win, 
began to see the political attack on sociobiology as a witch-hunt rather than a heroic 
defense of Western values. To be successful moving forward, the critics would need to 
firmly establish their critiques on scientific ground.
690
 In October of 1978, eight months 
after the conference, Stephen Jay Gould addressed claims that previous critiques of 
sociobiology were simply partisan politics: ―the foundation of our unhappiness has 
always been the methodological issue: human sociobiology is unsupported, not merely 
bedeviled by unfortunate implications. We may have been more sensitive to the flaws 
because we disliked the implications, but we didn’t make them up (emphasis added).‖691 
Then, not a month later, he reiterated, ―I do not act to suppress truth for fear of its 
political consequences. Truth, as we understand it, must always be our primary 
criterion.‖692  
Due to their transparent communist leanings, the members of Science for the 
People had the biggest hill to climb when it came to convincing others that their politics 
were not interfering with their scientific judgment. In March of 1979, one year after the 
AAAS conference--and their optimistic article, ―Sociobiology on the Run‖—the 
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magazine took an exhausted, defensive stand in ―Sociobiology: The Controversy 
Continues.‖ Here is the author, the physicist Freda Friedman Salzman: ―Critics of 
sociobiology, with Science for the People usually singled out, are simply dismissed as 
being Marxists or left-leaning liberals who are letting their politics interfere with hard 
science—‗Burning Darwin to Save Marx,‘ as the title of a recent article in Harper's 
states. It is claimed that these left-leaning professors, because of their politics, wish to 
believe that humans are born with a clean slate, and are infinitely malleable. Thus, the 
argument goes, these politically motivated scientists are trying to discourage studies 
which would show the genetic basis of human social traits because they are afraid to 
know the truth. This characterization of our position is a pure fabrication, attributing 
totally false motives to us.‖693 Yes, they were Marxists. The members of Science for the 
People were not going to hide that fact. But, they believed, all scientists had political 
beliefs of some sort or other. Why should a Marxist scientist be categorically rejected 
while a liberal or conservative was given the benefit of the doubt? What was important 
was the science, and the claim of Science for the People was, without question, ―that 
human sociobiology, as presently formulated and promoted, is without any real scientific 
merit.‖694 
In addition to the accusations of political polemicism, critics of sociobiology had 
to mitigate claims that they were antiscience. Beckwith, for good reason, called these 
claims ―absurd‖; many of the men and women involved were, after all, professional 
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scientists and some of them were quite accomplished in their respective fields.
695
 Still, in 
response to the political attacks, sociobiologists had characterized their critics as 
advocates of strict cultural determinism and the label stuck. To maintain credibility, it 
would be necessary to articulate the scientific concerns about sociobiology. Stephen Jay 
Gould, who was the best writer of among them, provided the most eloquent defense of 
their position: ―We who have criticized (sociobiology) have been accused of denying 
altogether the relevance of biology to human behavior, of reviving an ancient superstition 
by placing man outside the rest of ‗the creation.‘ Are we pure ‗nurturists?‘ Do we permit 
a political vision of human perfectibility to blind us to evident constraints imposed by our 
biological nature? The answer to both is no. The issue is not universal biology vs. human 
uniqueness, but biological potential vs. biological determinism.‖696 While the political 
implications of sociobiology were indeed terrifying, the Sociobiology Study Group and 
Science for People now emphasized, the impetus for their outspoken criticism came from 
their concern over bad science.  
Much like their sociobiology rivals, the critics themselves rejected notions of a 
―blank slate‖ human nature (to do otherwise, according to Gould, would deny ―the 
fundamental insight my profession.‖).697 In Lewontin‘s treatise against biological 
determinism, Not in Our Genes, he explained how illogical, and ultimately counter-
productive, the liberal attachment to cultural determinism was: ―The post-1968 New Left 
in Britain and the United States has shown a tendency to see human nature as almost 
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infinitely plastic, to deny biology and acknowledge only social construction...But this 
denial of biology is so contrary to actual lived experience that it is has rendered people 
the more ideologically vulnerable to the ‗common sense‘ appeal of reemerging biological 
determinism.‖698 Of course, the critics agreed, ―humans are animals and everything we do 
lies within our biological potential.‖699 But there was a catch. And, Gould stressed, it was 
the ―biggest but I can muster—the statement that humans are animals does not imply that 
our specific patterns of behavior and social arrangements are in any way directly 
determined by our genes.‖700  
The critics of sociobiology had a sophisticated understanding of both genetics and 
evolution, and they questioned efforts to determine which genes caused which behavioral 
characteristic: ―Why imagine that specific genes for aggression, dominance, or spite have 
any importance when we know that the brain's enormous flexibility permits us to be 
aggressive or peaceful, dominant or submissive, spiteful or generous?‖701 Despite the 
tremendous developments in modern evolutionary theory, they argued, ―we can dispense 
with the direct evidence for a genetic basis of various human social forms in a single 
word, ―none.‖702 Earlier in the twentieth-century, geneticists had made major advances 
deciphering the relationship between genes and phenotype, but those occurred with fruit 
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flies raised in captivity; it would be almost unfathomably more complicated—and 
unethical—―to perform the kind of breeding experiments, in standardized environments, 
that would yield the required information‖ to deduce the genetic influence on human 
behavior, especially when cultural factors are considered.
703
 Because sociobiologists are 
unable to generate evidence for the role of specific genes on behavior through traditional 
scientific methods, the critics argued, they resort to speculation. ―The method,‖ Lewontin 
complained, ―consists essentially of contemplating the trait and then making an 
imaginative reconstruction of human history that would have made the trait adaptive, or 
would have led the possessors of the hypothetical genes for the trait to leave more 
offspring.‖704 
The critics of sociobiology frequently derided sociobiological explanations of 
behavior as ―just-so‖ stories, an insult referring to Rudyard Kipling‘s turn-of-the century 
children‘s book of the same name that gave humorous explanations for natural 
phenomena such as the spots on a leopard or a camel‘s hump.705 Kipling‘s stories were 
obviously of no scientific merit (he originally wrote them to help put his daughter ―Effie‖ 
to sleep) but sociobiologists, the critics claimed, ―also tell just-so stories.‖706 Here is a 
clearly frustrated Lewontin, writing in Not in Our Genes, ―If one is allowed to invent 
genes with arbitrarily complicated effects on phenotype and then to invent adaptive 
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stories about the unrecoverable past of human history, all phenomena, real and 
imaginary, can be explained.‖707 For sociobiology to have any scientific merit it had to be 
able to be proven wrong, but its practitioners, purportedly, avoided this necessary 
requirement by settling for mere consistency with natural selection. 
Gould critically analyzed two sociobiological explanations of behavior, one 
human and one animal, to demonstrate that ―most work in sociobiology has been done in 
the mode of adaptive storytelling based upon the optimizing character and pervasive 
power of natural selection.‖708 To prove this point, he provides examples in sociobiology 
that did just that. The first such example came from a colleague who ―insisted that the 
classic story of Eskimo on ice floes provides adequate proof for the existence of specific 
altruistic genes maintained by kin selection.‖709 According to this colleague, who 
remained nameless in Gould‘s critique, ―among some Eskimo peoples, social units are 
arranged as family groups. If food resources dwindle and the family must move to 
survive, aged grandparents willingly remain behind (to die) rather than endanger the 
survival of the entire family by slowing an arduous and dangerous migration. Family 
groups with no altruistic genes have succumbed to natural selection and migrations 
hindered by the old and sick led to the death of entire families. Grandparents with 
altruistic genes increase their own fitness by their sacrifice, for they ensure the survival of 
close relatives sharing their genes.‖710 Seemingly pretty standard sociobiology here. And 
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Gould acknowledged that ―the explanation by my colleague is plausible, to be sure.‖711 
However, Gould convincingly argued, it was certainly not conclusive because ―an 
eminently simple, nongenetic explanation also exists: there are no altruist genes at all, in 
fact, no important genetic differences among Eskimo families whatsoever. The sacrifice 
of grandparents is an adaptive, but non-genetic, cultural trait. Families with no tradition 
for sacrifice do not survive for many generations. In other families, sacrifice is celebrated 
in song and story; aged grandparents who stay behind become the greatest heroes of the 
clan. Children are socialized from their earliest memories to glory and honor such 
sacrifice.‖712 Surely sociobiological science, if it were to remain a science, had to do 
more than provide one of many competing interpretations.  
The next sociobiological explanation in Gould‘s crosshairs was David Barash‘s 
experiment on aggression and cuckoldry among mountain bluebirds. You may remember 
this experiment. Barash had concluded that male birds were more aggressive before they 
had fertilized their partner‘s eggs (and thus secured their reproductive potential) after 
observing a male bird‘s decreasing violence in response to a stuffed male decoy placed 
near his nest. Again, Gould admitted Barash‘s explanation was ―a perfectly plausible 
story that may be true,‖ but he was concerned that Barash felt no need to do more than 
establish ―consistency with natural selection.‖713 ―What about the obvious alternative, 
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dismissed without a test,‖ Gould complained, that the ―male returns at times two and 
three, approaches the model a few times, encounters no reaction, mutters to himself the 
avian equivalent of ‗it's that damned stuffed bird again,‘ and ceases to bother?"714 Again, 
it appeared that a sociobiologist had prematurely claimed confirmation of his theory, 
which gave teeth to the troubling questions that began to circle the discipline. Was 
sociobiology hot air? Could every explanation of adaptive behavior be countered with a 
nongenetic alternative? Despite the playful etymology of ―just-so‖ stories, the accusation 
was clearly no laughing matter.  
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The characterization of sociobiology as a collection of ―just-so‖ stories threatened 
to discredit, once again, biological analyses of human affairs, as people on both sides of 
the argument came to see that sociobiologists had mistakenly assumed every behavior 
was adaptive. An anthropologist who strongly supported the integration of social sciences 
with biology, Jerome Barkow, admitted, ―There is danger in the assumption of adaptive 
value. Given a good imagination, we can each be experts on evolution, advancing endless 
naturalistic explanations.‖715 The acceptance of sociobiology‘s failings, however, did not 
necessarily imply support for a return to strictly cultural perspectives in the social 
sciences. To Barkow, it was ―entirely appropriate to utilize the paradigm of Charles 
Darwin.‖ The challenge was to do so correctly.716 Having seen the flaws in sociobiology, 
Barkow and others, many of whom eventually identified as ―evolutionary psychologists‖ 
for political and theoretical reasons, began to advocate a humbler, more careful approach 
that limited claims of adaptation and focused on mindsets rather than behaviors. 
Donald Symons, an anthropologist at Santa Clara, shared Barkow‘s concern that 
―the Darwinian wagon may be in danger of being hitched to a meteor shower,‖ meaning, 
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presumably, that sociobiology was bound to crash and they did not want evolutionary 
analysis as a whole to go down with it.
717
 The first thing Symons and Barkow did to 
preserve the possibility of a future Darwinian social science was acknowledge the 
limitations of sociobiology. ―There are no genes for complex behavior,‖ they claimed, 
echoing the concerns of Beckwith, Gould, Lewontin, and the other critics.
718
 
Sociobiologists‘ previous ―attempts to leapfrog the psychological and to apply 
evolutionary biology directly to human social life have not been successful‖ because 
they incorrectly assumed all behavior was adaptive.
719
 That assumption was simply 
wrong. In fact, ―there is no justification for assuming that any particular cultural trait is 
fitness enhancing.‖720 Symons chose Sarah Hrdy‘s argument about female promiscuity 
to confuse paternity as an example of faulty sociobiology to be avoided. Hrdy, he 
argued, ―believe(d) that her discovery of an adaptive explanation‖ qualified her research 
as sound science.
721
 It seemed to Symons, however, ―that Hrdy had things backwards. 
Except in parapsychology, an explanation of a phenomenon is not normally considered 
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to be evidence.‖722 Clearly, he was willing to throw sociobiologists under the bus if that 
was what it took to establish the credibility of Darwinian social science. Thirty years 
later, Symons remains skeptical that sociobiology ―delivered much of lasting value.‖723  
 Despite the occasional academic barb in a journal, the evolutionary psychologists 
never fully shared the radical activists‘ contempt for sociobiology, for they viewed the 
early sociobiologists as important, if misguided, pioneers in the return of a Darwinian 
social science. Savvy professors who had experienced departmental politics firsthand, the 
evolutionary psychologists cynically recognized that ―the sciences can reasonably be 
thought of as being organized around systems of scientist‘s reputations.‖724 To make 
genuine advances it was necessary to move to the periphery of these systems, but ―move 
to the periphery and you take risks.‖725 Predictably, the sociobiologists who ―violated the 
taboo against evolutionary thinking found their motives questioned,‖ and this, to Barkow 
and Symons, was not legitimate intellectual debate but just crude bullying of people who 
deserved respect.
726
 When asked about the ―water incident‖ at the AAAS conference, 
Symons admitted that he fantasized about ―decking the perpetrator.‖727   
Part of the reason evolutionary psychologists sympathized with the 
sociobiologists was that they, too, had been persecuted for their association with 
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 According to Symons, the ―scales fell from my eyes‖ the first 
time he learned about kin selection, and Barkow believed that ―people like 
Hamilton…and a number of others made genuine mathematical breakthroughs in 
evolutionary biology that permitted those of us who were already biologically-oriented 
to sally forth.‖729 Because of this intellectual debt, Barkow faced ―deep hostility‖ from 
the critics of applied biological thinking.
730
 For example, a criminologist in his 
department told him ―that what I was doing was just a continuation of phrenology‖ and 
―students informed (him) that certain colleagues were warning them not to take his 
course on human nature.‖731  
The professional persecution strengthened both men‘s resolve to integrate biology 
with the social sciences. To do so successfully, as we have seen, required 
acknowledging that sociobiology had reached too far and claimed genetic origins for 
specific behaviors without conclusive evidence. Barkow humbly admitted these 
mistakes, but insisted that sociobiology was ―not meant as the last word, but the first 
word.‖732 The pioneers in sociobiology knew they were entering unknown territory and 
none of them were under the illusion they could engage in such a speculative endeavor 
without error. According to Barkow, ―sociobiology was more a paradigm than a simple 
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theory to be proven,‖ yet the critics wanted to throw it out for its theoretical 
shortcomings.
733
 Instead of such a rash rejection, the appropriate response was to 
acknowledge that sociobiology should have focused on ―the evolution of cultural 
capacity (rather than) contemporary cultural behavior.‖734 Symons concurred. In the 
provocatively titled, ―If We‘re all Darwinians What‘s the Fuss About?‖ he suggested a 
more ―modest role for Darwinism‖ in the social sciences.735  
Symons believed the fundamental error of sociobiology was to assume all existing 
physical and behavioral characteristics were adaptive when, in fact, ―adaptation (was) a 
special and onerous concept that should be used only when it really is necessary.‖736 To 
redress sociobiology‘s sins, he advocated a ―doctrine of parsimony‖ in the study of 
adaptation.
737
 Applying Occam‘s razor to evolutionary analyses of human beings, 
Symons argued, would help evolutionary psychologists avoid the faulty claims of 
adaptation that had discredited early sociobiology as ―just-so stories.‖  
To prove his point, Symons revealed the faulty logic of prevailing sociobiological 
theories. For example, English evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, who considered 
William Hamilton the ―greatest scientist of the twentieth-century‖ and became famous 
for popularizing kin selection and reciprocal altruism in The Selfish Gene, claimed, 
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―genes for becoming reproductively infertile in middle age became more numerous 
(because) a woman could not invest in her grandchildren if she went on having children 
of her own.‖738 Nonsense! Or at least Symons thought so. Dawkins had disguised a 
merely plausible adaptive narrative as a conclusion reached through the scientific 
method. More research would have revealed that few Pleistocene humans lived past the 
age of forty, so ―the number of women who lived long enough for infertility resulting 
from old age to influence reproductive success must have been negligible.‖739 Therefore, 
―menopause is more parsimoniously interpreted as an artifact than as an adaptation.‖740  
Barkow also sought to promote evolutionary analysis by circumscribing the 
claims of sociobiology. His focus, however, was not on policing overzealous claims of 
adaptation; it was on toning down Wilson‘s call to ―biologize‖ the social sciences. 
Barkow simply wanted to make the social sciences compatible with biology. He called 
this ―vertical integration,‖ and he argued that it was necessary because, "[a] behavioral 
science concept incompatible with evolutionary biology is just as bizarre as a chemical 
reaction incompatible with basic physics.‖741 A biologist would never propose a theory 
that violated the law of gravity, so why did some social scientists insist on basing their 
models on outdated, unscientific archetypes of blank-slate human beings?  
Barkow thought the disconnect originated in the disciplines‘ disparate training: all 
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natural scientists learn the fundamentals of physics, chemistry, and biology, while social 
scientists study an assortment of ―great individualistic, relatively unintegrated thinkers 
(e.g., Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, 
etc.).‖742 Nearly a century had passed since Darwin wrote On The Origin of Species, and 
it was no longer acceptable to consider yourself a scientist, even a ―social scientist,‖ if 
your theories were not compatible with evolution through natural selection. This meant, 
according to Barkow, ―social scientist(s) striving to explain everything in terms of 
environment and culture must now cope with abundant evidence for very complex, 
evolved psychology.‖743 
Barkow advocated vertical integration and Symons wanted to limit claims of 
adaptation; what united them was their shared focus on thinking rather than behavior. In 
personal correspondence, Symons explained, ―we called ourselves ―evolutionary 
psychologists (or Darwinian psychologists) because we saw our goal as the study of the 
evolved machinery of the mind/brain, not really of ‗behavior.‘‖744 In part, the name 
change was strategic. ―Sociobiology‖ had become politically and intellectually 
ignominious by this time, and it would be easier to develop evolutionary analyses of 
human affairs without that baggage. The shift from sociobiology to evolutionary 
psychology was not simply subterfuge, however. It held profound implications for future 
research, as it changed the types of questions researchers would seek to answer. For 
example, Symons believed that ―we will never find that women are innately superior or 
                                                     
742
 Jerome Barkow, Missing the Revolution, 31. 
 
743
 Barkow, ―Broad Training for Social Scientists,‖ 992. 
 
744




inferior to men but it may be that they predisposed to like and excel at different tasks. 
Similarly, racism is not innate, but we may well find it easier to learn to like those who 
are physically similar to ourselves.‖745  
The new research program to understand various aspects of a universal human 
nature avoided the political resistance to researching gender and race differences as well 
as the scientific criticism of ―just-so‖ stories, making it a plausible foundation for future 
research. Of course, not everyone believed evolutionary psychology was categorically 
different from sociobiology. Richard Lewontin lamented, ―‗sociobiology‘ has recently 
been replaced by the less ideologically tainted 'evolutionary psychology', but plus ça 
change, plus c'est la même chose.‖746 And in a pugnacious exchange of letters with 
Steven Pinker in the New York Review of Books, Stephen Jay Gould called it just another 
―logically flawed and basically foolish caricature‖ of Darwinism.747 Lewontin and 
Gould, however, were outliers. Other critics less committed to Marxist science 
grudgingly accepted evolutionary psychology‘s legitimacy. Beckwith did not approve of 
―citing theoretical advances in sociobiology in support of their theories,‖ but he allowed 
that, ―the evolutionary psychologists have been more restrained than their ‗pop 
sociobiology‘ predecessors in offering prescriptive advice to society.‖748 Because it 
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appeared ―sort of toned down,‖ (which was precisely what Barkow and Symons 
intended), he decided to forego criticism and to focus on his own research.
749
 Beckwith 
was not alone. Over time, the critics lost the critical mass necessary to retard further 
integration of biology with the social sciences, as most intellectuals felt confident that 
evolutionary psychology successfully resolved the concerns about sociobiology and 
Social Darwinism. Research into the implications of evolution for human beings 
continued unabated for the next thirty years, and, as a result, our understanding of 
economics, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, and political science—of what it 
means to be human in the modern world—has transformed. 
There is overwhelming evidence demonstrating the prevalence of evolutionary 
thinking in 2016. From academic journals to newspaper articles, literate Americans are 
inundated with arguments for genetic influence on their bodies, their minds, and the 
world they live in. Evolution has become ―mainstream.‖ Demonstrating that fact with an 
exhaustive catalog of sources would be tedious to write and boring to read, however, so 
allow me to instead highlight the influential thinkers who exemplify evolution‘s current 
intellectual credibility (for those who remain unconvinced, perhaps because this 
approach seems too anecdotal, there will be a additional supporting evidence in the 
footnotes ahead).  
 Linguistics is the study of language. Before the return of evolutionary thinking in 
the social sciences, ―American linguists regarded the aim of their discipline as being the 








classification of the elements of human languages. Linguistics was to be a sort of verbal 
botany.‖750 In practice, this meant a linguist spent most of her time parsing languages into 
phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, and sentences.
751
 Questions about language‘s 
origin had no place in the discipline because everyone assumed, in accordance with the 
traditional Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), that each language was a unique 
cultural expression passed down from generation to generation.  
 Then Noam Chomsky changed everything. According to the philosopher of 
language, John R. Searle, the revolution took place much as Thomas Kuhn described in 
The Structure of Scientific Revolution: structural linguistics faced ―increasing numbers of 
counterexamples and recalcitrant data which the paradigm could not deal with (and) 
eventually the counterexamples led Chomsky to break the old model altogether and to 
create a completely new one.‖752 Chomsky argued that all healthy human beings have a 
Language Acquisition Device (LAD) in their brains that enables them to learn languages 
intuitively. Language was not an independent cultural construct; it shared a universal 
―deep grammar‖ with all languages and children could learn any variation simply through 
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exposure. This explains how ―a preschooler‘s tacit knowledge of grammar is more 
sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer 
language system.‖753 Children in the United States, for example, are never formally 
taught the rules of English. (What percentage of parents or teachers even knows the 
function of an auxiliary verb?) Instead, they simply ―absorb‖ it by listening to others. 
Steven Pinker‘s Language Instinct, which was ―deeply influenced by Noam Chomsky,‖ 
declares that ―language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct.‖754  
 Darwin himself had concluded that ―man has an instinctive tendency to speak, as 
we see in the babble of young children,‖ so the idea did have some scientific precedent, 
albeit some time removed.
755
 However, if indeed language was rooted in the biology of 
the brain, it remained to be seen where, exactly, these roots were located. Pinker 
suspected that language originated in the left hemisphere of the brain, for the French 
physician Paul Broca had previously demonstrated language impairment in two patients 
who had suffered damage to the eponymously named ―Broca‘s area,‖ which lies above 
one‘s left temple. To be sure, Pinker turned to modern technology: ―In a new technique 
called Positron Emission Tomography (PET), a volunteer is injected with mildly 
radioactive glucose or water, or inhales a radioactive gas, comparable in dosage to a chest 
X-ray, and puts his head inside a ring of gamma-ray detectors. (Then), computer 
algorithms can reconstruct which parts of the brain are working harder from the pattern of 
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radiation that emanates from the head.‖756 Triumphant, Pinker declared, ―The hot spots, 
as expected, are on the left side.‖757  
The ―biologization‖ of the mind has been integral to one of psychology‘s most 
influential thinkers, Daniel Kahneman. He has been called ―the most distinguished living 
psychologist in the world‖ and ―certainly the most important psychologist alive today‖ by 
his peers.
758
 In both 2007 and 2008, a group of powerful men including Elon Musk of 
Tesla, Jeff Bezos of Amazon, and Larry Page of Google traveled to Napa, California to 
listen to Kahneman speak. He is a Nobel Prize winner. And his intellectual biography, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, was a critically acclaimed best-seller. To put it modestly, 
Kahneman is an important thinker—and his research deals directly with the biology of 
psychology.  
Born in Tel Aviv in 1934, Kahneman earned his doctorate from the University of 
California, Berkeley before beginning his career at Princeton University. There, he, along 
with his friend and colleague Amos Tversky, spent decades conducting experiments that 
demonstrate people are biologically ―hardwired‖ with two distinct systems of thinking, 
one lightning quick and intuitive but prone to mistakes, and another that takes its time 
and is indeed logical. At first glance, the first, ―fast‖ system might seem obviously 
inferior, calling into question why it exists at all, but Kahneman stressed the synergy of 
our dual systems: ―The sophisticated allocation of attention has been honed by a long 
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evolutionary history. Orienting and responding quickly to the gravest threats or most 
promising opportunities improved the chance of survival.‖759 Am I in danger? Is this 
person friendly or angry? Answers to critical questions such as these often require 
immediate response, so human beings evolved an ability to go with their ―gut,‖ which, 
although arguably presidential, is clearly not logical.  
During his research into ―fast‖ thinking, Kahneman discovered several cognitive 
biases, which are unconscious errors of reasoning that distort our judgment of the world. 
For example, he learned that humans have an irrational fear of loss (relative to an equal 
gain). You can see this at work in commercials that warn the consumer she must ―Act 
Now!‖ or risk losing out on the opportunity forever. Kahneman called this ―loss 
aversion‖ and believed that it, too, had a biological explanation: ―asymmetry between the 
power of positive and negative expectations or experiences has an evolutionary history. 
Organisms that treat threats as more urgent than opportunities have a better chance to 
survive.‖760 In laymen‘s terms, ―if there is a deer in your sights and a lion, you are going 
to be busy about the lion and not the deer.‖761 Our minds are quirky in other ways, too. 
One would reasonably assume that less pain is preferable to more pain. (As Daffy Duck 
once said, ―I don‘t like pain, it hurts me.‖) However, Kahneman found that what matters, 
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at least to our remembering selves, is the peak amount of pain, not the total amount.
762
 In 
various experiments using cold water and needles, people overwhelmingly preferred the 
experience of more total pain when that pain tapered down toward the end, meaning 
otherwise reasonable people would rather get cut more times if the last few cuts are not as 
deep. Of course, nobody would come to this conclusion if they thought about it in 
advance, but that‘s the point: a lot of the time we are not thinking rationally.  
The man who shared the Nobel Prize with Kahneman was Vernon Smith, an 
economist who also relies heavily on evolutionary thinking. Previously, other economists 
had integrated evolution into their analyses, but their work suffered from the same 
simplistic adaptationist thinking as the sociobiologists. Evolutionary psychology 
facilitated a more sophisticated approach, opening the door for Smith to revolutionize his 
discipline by effectively killing ―Homo Economicus,‖ the rational actor at the heart of 
classical economics as developed by Adam Smith in the eighteenth-century.  
Vernon L. Smith is at heart a laid back, slightly socially awkward guy from 
Wichita, Kansas.
763
 He wears bolo ties and keeps his hair shaggy, if not long. But this 
unassuming economist set his discipline on fire. When Smith began teaching, he realized 
that classic economics did not tell the whole story, so he began to reevaluate Adam 
Smith‘s arguments. He found that Smith had based his theories on an outdated Cartesian 
divide between the mind and body, and that this false premise had caused a fissure in the 
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foundation of classical economic theory. According to Smith, ―Cartesian constructivism 
applies reason to the design of rules for individual action, to the design of institutions that 
yield socially optimal outcomes, and constitutes the standard socioeconomic science 
model. But most of our operating knowledge, and ability to decide and perform is non-
deliberative (my emphasis).‖764 Humans are not rational. Therefore, attempts to 
understand the market as a collection of competing self-interests will inevitably be 
incomplete.  
The first step to better understanding economics, Smith believed, was to 
recognize our evolutionary heritage. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech he argued, 
―acknowledging and investigating the workings of unseen processes are essential to the 
growth of our understanding of social phenomena, and enable us to probe beyond the 
anthropocentric limitations of constructivism.‖765 Economic exchange is not compliance 
to a set of rules; a group of men did not set out à la the French Revolution and draft the 
working of the economy on a page of paper; instead, the market largely operates by the 
―traditions that have formed, inscrutably, out of the ancient history of human social 
interactions.‖766 Smith argued that ―recent research in evolutionary psychology suggests 
that humans may be evolutionarily predisposed to engage in social exchange‖ so it makes 
no sense to construct economic models based on selfish competition.
767
 In fact, ―markets 
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in no way need destroy the foundation upon which they probably emerged—social 
exchange between family, friends and associates‖; therefore, ―it might be dangerous to 
inappropriately apply the rules of impersonal market exchange to our cohesive social 
networks.‖768 Thanks to Smith, a new generation of economists are conducting 
experiments to study alternative market incentives. 
Smith‘s trailblazing work in economics exposed as fraudulent some of Western 
society‘s long-standing shibboleths, namely the assumption of rationality and self-interest 
in market behavior. For some, that is frightening. Others, such as philosopher Daniel 
Dennett, welcome evolutionary thinking as a necessary ―universal acid‖ capable of 
exposing flaws in our most cherished beliefs. According to Dennett, the evolutionary 
perspective ―eats through just about every traditional concept, and leaves in its wake a 
revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but 
transformed in fundamental ways.‖769  
 An elderly, slightly rotund professor at Tufts University, Dennett‘s long white 
beard and round glasses give him the appearance of Santa Claus. But this Harvard 
educated philosopher (he studied under W. V. Quine) is bringing a wrecking ball, not 
gifts. After learning of evolutionary psychology in the 1980s, Dennett dedicated himself 
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 Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of 




to redressing an unforgivable wrong in philosophy: the avoidance of the ―single best idea 
anyone has ever had‖: evolution.770 ―Today,‖ he complains, ―more than a century after 
Darwin‘s death, we still have not come to terms with its mind-boggling implications.‖771 
Philosophers, who, by title, should love to learn, ―cannot conceal their discomfort with 
Darwin‘s great idea.‖772 Their responses range from ―nagging skepticism, to outright 
hostility.‖773 Not Dennett.774 Throughout the corpus of his work, including the best-seller, 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Dennett demands that his colleagues address evolution‘s 
potential to inform inquiry into some of philosophy‘s perennial questions such as free 
will, ethics, and the nature of meaning.  
Influenced by W. V. Quine and other ―analytic‖ philosophers whose work 
dominated the discipline in the mid-twentieth century, many of Dennett‘s peers looked 
toward language when contemplating meaning. He argues that this was a mistake. ―By 
concentrating first on linguistic meaning, philosophers have distorted their vision of the 
minds these words depend on, treating them as somehow sui generis, rather than as 
themselves evolved products of the natural world.‖775 In reality, ―human beings are 
products of evolution, and their capacity to speak, and hence mean anything, is due to a 
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suite of specific adaptations.‖776 When one acknowledges our evolutionary heritage, it 
becomes clear that it is no longer tenable to ignore Darwin in philosophical investigations 
of any sort. ―Any theory of the birth of ethics,‖ for example, ―is going to have to integrate 
culture with biology.‖777 This is not something to lament, however, for as much as critics 
of biological determinism protest to the contrary, ―the self-understanding we can gain 
from science can help us put our moral lives on a new and better foundation, and once we 
understand what our freedom consists in, we will be much better prepared to protect it 
against the genuine threats that are so regularly misidentified.‖778 
When it comes to morality, there is perhaps no greater academic authority than 
Peter Singer, whom The New Yorker has called the world‘s ―most influential living 
philosopher,‖ and, like Dennett, evolution informs Singer‘s analyses.779 Originally from 
Australia, Singer now teaches at Princeton University, where he has written prolifically 
on applied ethics. Most of his colleagues regarded ―Wilson‘s invasion of their territory as 
too absurd to merit a considered response,‖ and, indeed, Singer acknowledged, ―the 
sociobiological approach to ethics often involves undeniable and crude errors.‖780 He 
remained committed, however, to evolutionary psychology because he was convinced it 
could help philosophers ―gain a better understanding of ethics than has hitherto been 
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By viewing human beings as just another species in the animal kingdom, Singer 
arrived at some incredibly thought-provoking—and controversial—conclusions. In 
Practical Ethics, for example, he argued that people with severe brain damage or in a 
coma have less cognitive ability than primates and should not receive public funds. 
Critics around the world criticized him for his supposed lack of respect for human life 
(especially in Germany, where the citizenry is quite sensitive to judgments of people‘s 
worth), but Singer himself regarded his position as animal advocacy, not the devaluation 
of people. In fact, Singer went on to lead the modern animal rights movement, eventually 
convincing millions of people that factory farming and testing on animals was immoral 
with evolution-inspired arguments: ―With the eventual acceptance of Darwin‘s theory 
…only those who prefer religious faith to beliefs based on reasoning and evidence can 
still maintain that the human species is the special darling of the entire universe, or that 
other animals were created to provide us with food.‖782 
 Singer‘s application of evolutionary ethics does not stop with the treatment of 
animals; he is also interested in politics, for, as a utilitarian, he recognizes politics as the 
most effective means of improving the largest number of lives. Unapologetically liberal, 
Singer argues that the Left ―is urgently in need of new ideas and new approaches‖ due to 
the almost universal failure of communism to improve lives around the world.
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most of the twentieth-century, he argues, liberals rejected evolutionary thinking because 
it seemed to imply biological constraints on human nature and a ―belief in the 
malleability of human nature had been important for the Left because it provided grounds 
for hoping that a very different kind of human society is possible.‖784 Unfortunately, 
however, ―the dream of the perfectibility of humankind turned into the nightmares of 
Stalinist Russia, China under the Cultural Revolution, and Cambodia under Pol Pot,‖ not 
a worker‘s paradise.785 The time to embrace a Darwinian Left, according to Singer, is 
now.  
In A Darwinian Left, Singer suggests ―an understanding of human nature in the 
light of evolutionary theory can help us to identify the means by which we may achieve 
some of our social and political goals, including various ideas of equality.‖786 According 
to him, the Left has mistakenly accepted the Right‘s assumptions about evolution, 
―starting with the idea that the Darwinian struggle for existence corresponds to the vision 
of nature suggested Tennyson‘s memorable (and pre-Darwinian) phrase, ‗nature red in 
tooth and claw.‘‖787 The reality of evolution, as demonstrated by Hamilton, Trivers, and 
others, is much more amenable to a Progressive vision of society. Axelrod, for example, 
has shown the conditions in which cooperation between competing individuals emerges 
as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Singer believes the left should ―learn from Axelrod‘s 
work‖ and ―encourage a broader sense of our interests, in which we seek to build on the 
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social and cooperative side of our nature, in addition to the individualistic and 
competitive side.‖788  
It might be argued that Singer‘s positions on evolution and government should be 
dismissed as amateur speculation (he is, after all, a philosopher and not a political 
scientist). However, one of the world‘s foremost political thinkers, Francis Fukuyama, 
concurs with Singer that the evolution of human beings has profound implications for 
political science. Fukuyama is a fascinating public intellectual. After studying 
comparative literature in Paris under the tutelage of Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, 
he became disillusioned with postmodernism and transferred to Harvard, where he earned 
a PhD in political science in 1979. From there he embarked on a tremendously successful 
career as both an author and policy analyst. He has consulted the World Bank on state 
building in developing nations, served as the Deputy Director of Policy Planning in the 
State Department, become a member of the Rand Corporation, and, most famously, 
written The End of History and The Last Man, which drew international acclaim for his 
controversial argument that ideological conflict has largely come to an end with the 
triumph of liberal secularism. In his latest book, The Origins of Political Order, 
Fukuyama again ruffles a few feathers, this time by validating the notion that 
evolutionary biology ―is extremely important as a foundation for any theory of political 
development, because it provides us with the basic building blocks by which we can 
understand the evolution of human institutions.‖789 
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 According to Fukuyama, political scientists have incorporated beliefs about ―the 
state of nature‖ into their theories from the very beginning. The reason was simple: in 
order for a city to be just, Plato and Aristotle argued, it ―had to exist in conformity with 
man‘s permanent nature.‖ But what, exactly, was that nature? Before the discovery of 
evolutionary biology, political scientists basically had to guess—and they were often 
wrong. To Thomas Hobbes, man in his natural state was alone and miserable (his 
immortal description ―nasty, brutish and short‖ was in fact preceded by ―solitary‖ and 
―poore‖ (sp.)). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand, romanticized the solitary 
savage, seeing in him a pure soul uncorrupted by the trappings of civilization. Both 
Hobbes and Rousseau agreed with John Locke ―that human beings are not naturally 
social, and that society is a kind of artifice that allows people to achieve what they cannot 
get on their own.‖790   
The Enlightenment theorists‘ depictions of primitive humans might have been 
heuristic metaphors rather than attempts to accurately depict the ancient past; however, 
they clearly influenced their respective authors. Fukuyama celebrates that now, thanks to 
―primatology, population genetics, archaeology, social anthropology, and, of course, the 
overarching framework of evolutionary biology,‖ we can substitute those metaphors for 
empirical knowledge.
791
 To start, with the benefit of twenty-first-century science it is 
clear that Hobbes was wrong: human beings are not solitary by nature. In fact, Fukuyama 
argues, ―Everything that modern biology and anthropology tell us about the state of 
nature suggests the opposite: there was never a period in human evolution when human 
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beings existed as isolated individuals; the primate precursors of the human species had 
already developed extensive social, and indeed political, skills; and the human brain is 
hardwired with faculties that facilitate many forms of social cooperation.‖792  
The realization that humans are a social species radically transforms the 
fundamental building blocks of political science. Fukuyama claims that, as members of 
groups, humans evolved biological predispositions that one must take into account when 
considering plausible political systems. In his words, ―Human beings are not completely 
free to socially construct their own behavior. They have a shared biological 
nature…(and) this shared nature does not determine political behavior but it both frames 
and limits the nature of institutions that are possible.‖793 First and foremost among these 
common traits is a desire to cooperate, which, based on research on chimpanzees and 
other primates, predates human beings by millions of years and has ―two natural sources: 
kin selection and reciprocal altruism (Author‘s note: at this point, readers should no 
longer be surprised at the profound legacy of Hamilton‘s and Trivers‘ research).‖794 In 
addition to cooperation, human beings have evolved ―an innate propensity for creating 
and following norms or rules‖ and a ―desire not just for material resources but also 
recognition.‖795 To Fukuyama, knowing this about ourselves allows him to construct a 
new, more accurate narrative of political history not based on ―great men‖ or class 
conflict.  
                                                     
792
 Ibid., 30. 
 
793
 Ibid. 438.  
 
794
 Ibid., 30. 
 
795




According to Fukuyama, political history began with the advent of agriculture, as 
nomadic humans lived in small groups that required minimal organization. Farming 
brought stable, if not necessarily easy, access to carbohydrates, which resulted in 
exponential population growth. The increase in numbers meant that a political order was 
needed. Fukuyama explains, ―Depending on climatic conditions, hunter-gatherer societies 
have a population density from 0.1 to 1 person per square kilometer, while the invention 
of agriculture permits densities to rise to 40-60 per square kilometer. Human beings were 
now in contact with one another on a much broader scale, and this required a very 
different form of social organization.‖796 Critical to this transition from hunting and 
gathering was the development of property rights; however, unlike other political 
theorists who emphasized private property such as John Locke, Fukuyama argues that 
―the earliest forms of private property were not held by individuals but by lineages of kin 
groups.‖797 The tribal system functioned well because it relied on the natural bonds 
between friends and family members. 
From this perspective, the ―forced collectivization by the Soviet Union and China 
in the twentieth-century sought to turn back the clock to an imagined past that never 
existed, in which common property was held by nonkin.‖798 In fact, all state-level 
societies are somewhat artificial and arose, Fukuyama argues, only in areas of great 
natural resources that faced an outside threat. The great challenge of modern society, 
then, is to maintain a collective identity when humans are predisposed to relate to each 
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other tribally: ―once states come into being, kinship becomes an obstacle to political 
development, since it threatens to return political relationships to the small-scale, 
personal ties of tribal societies. It is therefore not enough merely to develop a state; the 
state must avoid retribalization.‖799 The solution, predictably, for those familiar with 
Fukuyama‘s End of History, is democracy. Unique among state organizations, democratic 
nations benefit from the productivity of large-scale interconnectivity while satiating 
human being‘s biological needs. ―The rise of modern democracy,‖ Fukuyama concludes, 
―gives all people the opportunity of ruling themselves, on the basis of the mutual 
recognition of the dignity and rights of their fellow humans. It thus seeks to restore, in the 
context of large and complex societies, something of what was lost in the original 
transition to the state.‖800 
At the risk of evidence overload, allow me to introduce one final prominent 
thinker who also incorporates evolution into his analysis, geographer Jared Diamond. 
Over the course of his career, Diamond has emerged as one of the world‘s most 
influential authors. His book, Guns, Germs, and Steel, is a perennial best-seller and won 
the Pulitzer Prize in 1998. And his overall corpus has earned him the prestigious National 
Medal of Science, which is bestowed upon those who have made important contributions 
to science by the president of the United States, as well as membership to the National 
Academy of Sciences. Diamond joins Fukuyama and the others in this chapter as the 
leading figures in a new academic establishment that rejects the post-World War II taboo 
against biological factors in the social sciences, seeking instead to explore what 
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implications our shared evolutionary heritage might have for human affairs.  
Diamond comes from a family steeped in intellectual and cultural pursuits (his 
mother and father, both Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, were a musician and 
physician, respectively), so it was expected that he attend prestigious universities, which 
he did, earning his undergraduate degree from Harvard and his doctorate from 
Cambridge. For a creative, adventurous young man, however, the typical academic career 
quickly became stultifying, as he ―discovered that scholars are expected to devote their 
lives to studying and writing about just one tiny slice, occasionally a few tiny slices, of 
life‘s broad palette.‖801 Fortunately, ―in 1985 came a phone call came that changed my 
life. The director of the Fellows‘ Program of the MacArthur Foundation phoned to say 
that I had just been awarded MacArthur Foundation Fellowship for five years, with no 
strings attached.‖802 He immediately set off for Papua New Guinea, which was and 
remains one of the least explored parts of the world (by nonindigenous people, at least).  
Diamond developed close friendships with a number of New Guineans while 
conducting his academic research and conservation efforts over the years. One of these 
men, a local headman named Yali, played a critical role in Diamond‘s intellectual 
development by posing a simple question the professor could not answer, ―Why is it that 
you white people developed so much cargo and brought it to New Guinea, but we black 
people had little cargo of our own?‖803 According to Diamond, ―the commonest 
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explanation involves implicitly or explicitly biological differences among peoples;‖ 
however, after his extensive experience in developing countries, Diamond had come to 
fervently believe that there was no inherent intellectual disparity between the races—if 
anything, he thought that Yali and his countrymen might be smarter because ―natural 
selection promoting genes for intelligence has probably been far more ruthless in New 
Guinea than in more densely populated, politically complex societies.‖804 Determined to 
discover the true cause of the modern world‘s hierarchy of technological development 
and subsequent power he began to examine the past through an evolutionary lens.  
As a geographer, Diamond is well aware of the complex differences among 
faraway cultures. Most of his discipline, in fact, focuses on these differences, with each 
professor specializing in one group of people and contributing her niche knowledge with 
others to form a mosaic of geographic understanding. Blessed with a MacArthur Grant, 
however, Diamond could travel his own path, and he chose to examine the ―big picture.‖ 
His book Guns, Germs, and Steel is a global geographic analysis, ultimately concluding 
that Europeans did, in fact, come to dominate other people due to biological advantages, 
just not the ones typically claimed by white supremacists. According to Diamond, 
Europe‘s military conquests were not facilitated by superior intelligence or strength but 
just resistance to disease.
805
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Like Fukuyama, Diamond places great emphasis on the development of 
agriculture when contemplating the major events in human history. Relying on the 
research of scholars before him, he convincingly claims that humans grudgingly 
abandoned hunting and gathering, which affords considerable leisure, for the hard work 
of farming:  
Although humans had been manipulating wild plants and animals for a 
long time, hunter–gatherer behavior began to change at the end of the 
Pleistocene because of increasingly unpredictable climate, decreases in 
big-game species that were hunters‘ first-choice prey, and increasing 
human occupation of available habitats. To decrease the risk of 
unpredictable variation in food supply, people broadened their diets (the 
so-called broad-spectrum revolution) to second- and third-choice foods, 
which included more small game, plus plant foods requiring much 
preparation, such as grinding, leaching and soaking. Eventually, people 
transported some wild plants (such as wild cereals) from their natural 




Unlike Fukuyama, Diamond pays particular attention to an often-overlooked corollary of 
farming: farm animals. Cows, sheep, chicken, pigs, horses, all of these animals provided 
immediate benefit to the humans who domesticated them. Furs gave you warmth, oxen 
made plowing easier, and leather was like the original duct tape, it helped with 
everything. Paradoxically, however, in Diamond‘s analysis the biggest benefit of farm 
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diet higher in simple carbohydrates, saturated fats and calories and salt, and lower in 
fibre, complex carbohydrates, calcium and unsaturated fats, than the hunter-gatherer 
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animals was their diseases. Europeans got infected with smallpox, the measles, and the 
flu by living among animals.
807
 This, of course, resulted in tremendous short-term 
suffering and death, but in the long run it provided them with an almost invincible 
weapon in their colonization efforts. Diamond explains, ―the humans who domesticated 
animals were the first to fall victim to the newly evolved germs, but those humans then 
evolved substantial resistance to the new diseases. When such partly immune people 
came into contact with others who had had no previous exposure to the germs, epidemics 
resulted in which up to ninety-nine percent of the previously unexposed population was 
killed.‖808 Ninety-nine percent! That level of devastation is almost inconceivable, and 
while the exact percentage is disputed, even the lower estimates appear apocalyptic. 
Knowing this, it is hard to take seriously the previous claims of intellectual or cultural 
superiority as the explanation for the rise of European global dominance in the 
seventeenth century. By incorporating evolution into his geographical research, Diamond 
found a more plausible explanation, one that could also serve as an answer to Yali‘s 
question: ―luck.‖  
Many of those who carry the mantle of intellectual leadership in contemporary 
America view the world through an evolutionary lens. As professors at the top 
universities and winners of prestigious awards, they exert considerable influence on the 
intellectual discourse throughout the country, both in academia and in popular culture. 
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This is not to say that evolution has become orthodoxy in all disciplines. There still exists 
strenuous debate surrounding the appropriate role of biology in the social sciences. 
However, a casual examination of popular podcasts, magazine articles, and books reveals 
just how widespread evolutionary thinking has become. Of course, simply pointing out 
this obvious development, while potentially entertaining, is no significant contribution to 
intellectual history. What is required, and what I hope to have achieved, is to explain 
why—and to a lesser extent how—evolution went from heterodoxy to respectability, 
from taboo to the mainstream.  
The Hungarian physiologist and Nobel Prize winner Albert Szent-Györgyi once 
said, ―Discovery consists of looking at the same thing as everyone else and thinking 
something different.‖809 Today, evolutionary arguments are commonplace, almost banal. 
Considering the general acceptance of Darwin and natural selection, one could 
reasonably assume that the popularity of evolutionary arguments was predictable, even 
inevitable. This assumption, as we have seen, is far from the truth. My research has 
discovered the tumultuous, contested history behind evolution‘s current place of 
privilege.  
In the late 1800s intellectuals of all stripes sought to claim Darwin as one of their 
own, for establishing ties with the new dominant scientific paradigm brought tremendous 
credibility. Socialists and anarchists argued that humans were competing against nature 
and thus cooperation was the logical solution while their opponents believed human 
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beings were competing against each other in a ruthless ―survival of the fittest.‖ By the 
turn of the twentieth-century political conservatives had won the contest due in large part 
to the left‘s support for ―soft inheritance,‖ or the inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
which August Weisman discredited in his experiments on mice. The result was a rise in 
―Social Darwinism,‖ or the belief that government should not interfere in the emergence 
of a natural economic and political hierarchy among its citizens. Not surprisingly, this 
belief benefited those currently in power, namely white men. Eugenics, scientific racism, 
and, eventually, the holocaust all emerged as the logical outcome of a worldview based 
on the positive effects of evolution among populations of superior and inferior people.
810
 
After the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, intellectuals throughout the West 
repudiated the notion of any meaningful biological difference between races or genders. 
While not a repudiation of science or evolution per se (most everyone still recognized 
that human beings had evolved), the consensus throughout academia was that culture—
and culture alone—explained why people behaved as they did. The taboo against 
biological thinking in the social sciences achieved official sanction in some instances, 
most notably in UNESCO‘s 1950 publication of ―The Race Question,‖ which stated 
categorically that ―most, if not all, measurable characters, the differences among 
individuals belonging to the same race are greater than the differences that occur between 
the observed averages for two or more races within the same major group.‖811 For the 
most part, however, there was just an implicit agreement among intellectuals that cultural 
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analysis was preferable because it avoided the seemingly inevitable slippery slope toward 
racism and sexism that had plagued biological narratives.  
During the post-WWII taboo against biological thinking, academics proposed a 
number of interesting, innovative theories and experiments purporting to prove the almost 
infinite malleability of human behavior. For example, ―behaviorism,‖ the brainchild of 
psychologist B.F. Skinner, claimed that people learned algorithmically: positive feedback 
encouraged more of the same behavior and negative feedback discouraged it. According 
to Skinner, there are no intrinsic predispositions toward certain behavior, just conditioned 
responses. You can hear echoes (or shouts, depending with whom you are speaking) of 
Skinner‘s theory in discussions about crime today. These thinkers argue against personal 
responsibility, instead claiming that the decision to commit a crime is a result of 
unfortunate circumstances. In a similar vein, if perhaps even more radical, during this era 
one‘s gender identity came to be seen as largely a by-product of cultural conditioning. 
Informally, many families, including my own, experimented with gender-neutral toys in 
an attempt to discourage boys and girls from developing stereotypical aggression or 
passivity. The apotheosis of gender neutrality theory took place in the 1960s. David 
Reimer was born a boy but doctors permanently disfigured his penis during circumcision 
and psychologists convinced them to raise David as a girl named ―Brenda.‖ Grow his hair 
long and give him positive feedback for being feminine, the theory went, and he should 
grow up to be a well-adjusted woman. Unfortunately for David, the gender reassignment 
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Around this same time, developments in evolutionary biology opened the door for 
a new chapter in the social sciences, one that took into consideration, and often relied 
upon, evolutionary thinking when constructing theories of human affairs. Building on the 
populational genetics of R.A. Fisher and others, William Hamilton derived a 
mathematical formula for the evolutionary logic of altruism among kin, C < r x B, where 
C is the cost in fitness to the actor, r is the genetic relatedness, and B is the benefit to the 
recipient. Then, only a few years later, a young graduate student named Robert Trivers 
expanded Hamilton‘s theory to explain cooperation among non-kin in a process known as 
―reciprocal altruism.‖ Evolution, it appeared, was not simply ruthless competition; it was 
also kindness and sacrifice.  
Almost immediately a small number of social scientists began to investigate the 
implications of Hamilton and Trivers‘ research. Many of these men and women were 
graduate students or young professors who had personal relationships with Hamilton or 
Trivers, and, importantly, for the most part they had at least some training in biology 
(interdisciplinary education being on the rise at this time due to C.P. Snow‘s damning 
condemnation of the knowledge gap between the ―two cultures‖ of academia). Their 
background in the natural sciences was critical because it gave them exposure to an 
intellectual discourse unencumbered by the taboo against biological analyses of human 
affairs.  
                                                     
 
extrapolate general principles from his experience. His depression and eventual suicide 
might have been completely unrelated to his gender reassignment; however, it is clear 
that he struggled with being a girl. Perhaps the only clear lesson we can learn from David 
is how hard it is to be treated as a gender you don‘t identify with. 
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The seeds had been sown for a biological social science, but the new discipline, 
sociobiology, grew slowly at first. Due to their age and relatively minor academic 
standing, the first sociobiologists had little impact. Then, in 1975, world famous 
entomologist E.O. Wilson synthesized the existing research into a massive tome, 
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, and this released a deluge of sociobiological 
publications followed by condemnation from those committed to strictly cultural analysis 
in the social sciences. The two sides quickly became enmeshed in a polemical exchange, 
with the sociobiologists claiming that their critics were antiscience, politically motivated 
Marxists and the critics charging the sociobiologists with racism and sexism. Much of 
this discourse can be dismissed as partisan mud slinging; however, the argument did have 
one important effect. By thoroughly scrutinizing the early sociobiological publications 
for errors—and fiercely criticizing the authors when they found them—the critics forced 
the sociobiologists to curtail their speculations on the genetic basis for specific behaviors, 
as there was not sufficient evidence to support these claims. As a result, many of the early 
sociobiologists and those inspired by them began to focus on the evolution of human 
psychology.  
The switch in emphasis from behavior to general psychological predispositions 
did not deter all criticism but it has proved tremendously influential. Besides those on the 
intellectual fringes who view human behavior as entirely the by-product of either cultural 
conditioning or genetic determinism, the majority of thoughtful people recognize it to be 
the result of exposure to environment constrained by biological hardwiring. The leaders 
of disciplines throughout the social sciences and humanities have rejected the earlier 
taboo against evolutionary thinking in their fields and now actively seek to integrate, or at 
  
309 
least be compatible with, current accepted theories in the natural sciences. Due to their 
influence, today‘s intellectual dialogue in the United States has become so saturated with 
evolution that it can go unnoticed—like water to a fish. But what an incredible, contested 
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